Chinese Transnational Policing Gone Wild
110 OVERSEAS
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Keywords: China, human rights, criminal justice, transnational repression, long-arm policing

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A revised version of this report was released October 29.

Two changes, marked in color, appear on page 6, while a case example on page 15 (Yang Moudong) has been removed. Page 6 revisions concern a factual error regarding a Yunnan taskforce set up to manage illegal border crossings to northern Myanmar, here changed to indicate it operates in Yunnan province, not across the border. Likewise, a 10-province pilot project announced does not explicitly mention the use of overseas police service centers. Both errors were spotted courtesy of Jeremy Daum. In addition, several new sources were added to the end notes, with some minor changes. Previous version of investigation available on request.
Introduction

As part of a massive nationwide campaign to combat the growing issue of fraud and telecommunication fraud by Chinese nationals living abroad, Chinese authorities claim that from April 2021 to July 2022, 230,000 nationals had been “persuaded to return” to face criminal proceedings in China.

This campaign, which started on a humble scale in 2018, has developed alongside the establishment of overseas Chinese police “service stations,” sometimes called “110 Overseas” after the national police emergency phone number, now found in dozens of countries across five continents. This investigation looks into these two related and recent developments, especially in view of the expansion of other forms of long-arm policing and transnational repression by the PRC.

This investigation follows the release of new Chinese governmental data and is part of Safeguard Defenders’ ongoing monitoring of China’s growing global transnational repression.

Summary of key points

- Faced with a growing issue of fraud and telecommunication fraud by Chinese nationals living abroad, China claims 230,000 suspects of fraud and telecom fraud were successfully “persuaded to return” to China from April 2021 to July 2022.

- Official statements detail use of depriving suspects’ children the right to education back in China, as well as other actions against relatives and family members, in a full-on “guilt by association” campaign.

- China has designated nine countries as having serious fraud, telecom fraud and web crimes, and Chinese nationals are no longer allowed to stay in those countries without “good reason”.

- Rapidly emerging evidence points to extensive online campaigns and the use of “Overseas Police Service Stations” being used in these operations on five continents, often using local “Chinese Overseas Home Associations” linked to the CCP’s United Front Work.

- These operations eschew official bilateral police and judicial cooperation and violate the international rule of law, and may violate the territorial integrity of third countries involved in setting up a parallel policing mechanism using illegal methods.
Persuasion to return and China’s Involuntary Returns campaign

“Persuasion to return” is a key method within China’s larger Involuntary Return operations (IR). Classified as primarily Type 1 (and occasionally Type 2) actions in Safeguard Defenders’ Involuntary Returns report on the subject, overseas targets and/or their families back in China are approached directly to “encourage” the return of the target to China to face justice, “or else.”

In many cases identified in the Involuntary Returns report, methods used under IR Type 1 and Type 2 actions include:

1. The tracking down of the target’s family in China in order to pressure them through means of intimidation, harassment, detention or imprisonment into persuading their family members to return “voluntarily”;

2. Direct approach of the target through online means or the deployment of – often undercover - agents and/or proxies abroad to threatened and harass the target into returning “voluntarily”.

The final Involuntary Returns category -Type 3 - involves direct kidnappings on foreign soil. As far as known at the time of reporting, this method has not been used in the operation described in this investigation.

“Persuasion to return” methods plays an integral part of China’s Fox Hunt operation – run by the Chinese Ministry of Public Security (MPS) – which is one of several components of the wider Sky Net operation overseen by the National Supervision Commission (NSC). The Fox Hunt/Sky Net operations pursue higher value targets. Despite its global scale and an official claim of ensuring the return of at least 10,000 targets since the start of operations, it is much more modest in scale than the campaign described here. However, as an example cited in this investigation shows, the networks set up to conduct the latter can and are being used within the Fox Hunt ambit as well.

These methods allow the CCP and their security organs to circumvent normal bilateral mechanisms of police and judicial cooperation, thereby severely undermining the international rule of law and territorial integrity of the third countries involved. In eschewing regular cooperation mechanisms, the CCP manages to avoid the growing scrutiny of its human rights record and the ensuing difficulties faced in obtaining the return of “fugitives” through legal proceedings such as formal extradition requests. It leaves legal Chinese residents abroad fully exposed to extra-legal targeting by the Chinese police, with little to none of the protection theoretically ensured under both national and international law.

Online fraud is, or has been, considered an endemic problem. News reporting in both China and Taiwan indicates that during the pandemic telecommunication fraud became even more widespread, with an increasing number of reports surfacing on the luring and trafficking of individuals from the Mainland, Hong Kong and Taiwan to operate in such illegal “industries.” However, the Chinese police recently claimed their campaign launched in 2018 had been so successful that online fraud had been contained.

While establishing these operations to hunt down those accused of fraud and telecommunications fraud, China identified nine countries particularly prone to hosting Chinese nationals engaging in such criminal activities, the “nine forbidden countries.” However, the setting up of overseas police “service stations” is a worldwide
phenomenon, with the majority of such being in western democratic nations, with a particular focus on Europe, and not in the “nine forbidden countries.” As documents identified by Safeguard Defenders show, such overseas police “service stations” have been used by police back in China to carry out such “persuasion to return” operations on foreign soil, including in Europe.

Abandoning any pretext of due process or the consideration of suspects’ innocence until proven guilty, targeting suspects’ children and relatives in China as “guilty by association” or “collateral damage,” and using threats and intimidation to target suspects abroad, is now itself becoming an endemic problem.

Local Beginnings

After being listed by the inter-ministerial joint meeting of China’s State Council as a “Key Rectification Area of the Origins of Criminals Going Overseas for Fraud”, on 18 September 2018, the government of Anxi County, Fujian, held a “thousand person” conference and launched operation “Fighting Gangsters and Scammers Going Overseas from the Area Where They Come From” to combat transnational telecom fraud.

Under the campaign, Anxi country departments at all levels were instructed to carry out five measures against fraud suspects, actions to be taken before any suspect was taken before a court of law:

1. Demolish property built using illicit money and recover any illicit money;
2. Ban the children of suspects from studying in public schools;
3. Suspend all medical insurance subsidies and confiscate passports;
4. Ban “dishonest persons” from taking high-speed rail and planes or being accommodated in hotels;
5. Stop all applications for policy subsidies at the county level or above.

Additionally, the Anxi county government also required that local leaders in villages where there were more than two fraudsters should be “dismissed or mandated to resign” and that if one person were to be arrested for the crime of telecommunications fraud, the officials of the village should be “notified and criticized.”
The Anxi County government’s campaign launch was not without controversy. Since the targets are merely suspects, and the five punishments are all carried out before any guilt has been established, Xinhua Net in an article that same month opposed the measure of banning suspects’ children’s access to school, equating such action as guilt by association. While it stated that such actions were unfit for a modern society, it endorsed all other aspects of the campaign.4

Multiple domestic media reports of the meeting lauded the conference’s launch of the “hundred-day battle” from 1 September to 31 December (2021). Later, a pilot project to tackle organized crime was launched, part of which focused on telecom fraud, with some local governments launching actions aimed at overseas fraud operations. The basis for this was the “National Supervision Work Plan for the Special Fight against Organized Crime” issued by the General Office of the Communist Party of China and the General Office of the State Council.5 These pilot projects were supervised by the Provincial-level Commissions for Discipline Inspection (CDI’s) and was applauded for its success by the Supreme People’s Court on 31 January 2019.6

On 14 April 2022, Vice-Minister of Public Security Du Hangwei revealed last year’s nationwide achievements of crackdown on telecom fraud in a press conference, stating:

“We persuaded 210,000 people to return in the last year [2021]…” Additionally, on 17 August 2022, the Ministry of Public Security announced the total tally of those persuaded to return under this campaign alone from April 2021 to July 2022 stood at 230,000 individuals: “The number of cross-border telecom fraud cases targeting Chinese residents has been significantly decreased in China, with 230,000 telecom fraud suspects being educated and persuaded to return to China from overseas to confess crimes from April 2021 to July 2022 […]”7

As language from the Anxi county “thousand-person conference” demonstrates however, the battle did not stop at home but needed to be taken overseas. According to cited reports of the meeting, it was all hands on deck: a “commando team” composed by the Public Security Bureau and assisted by propaganda, procuratorial and local cadres, public security bodies were tasked with taking the lead in setting up “anti-fraud” assaults abroad. An overseas “strike headquarters” was set up in Yunnan to carry out “crackdown, persuasion, dispersion, control and publicity work”, and reportedly a taskforce of 70 people was established to target people overseas involved in fraud and illegal cross border travel.7

There was no mincing of words on the methods to be employed either: “A group of immediate family members of the Party members and cadres should be persuaded to return in an all-around way.” Those refusing or unable to cooperate in persuading suspects to return home would themselves be handed over to the County Commission for Discipline Inspection and the Supervisory Commission for investigation and punishment.8

Going Global: “Catch them within and outside the borders”

This followed earlier actions to expand the campaign. One year before, on 26 January 2021, the Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate and the Ministry of Public Security issued a document, “Bulletin of the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and the Ministry of Public Security Regarding Urging Criminal Suspects Involved in Cross-Border Gambling to Voluntarily Surrender Themselves” (最高人民法院最高人民检察院公安部关于敦促跨境赌博相关犯罪嫌疑人投案自首的通告), calling on the suspects of cross-border gambling to return to surrender in exchange for lighter punishments. The deadline given was 30 April 2021. The same notice also asked judicial organs to encourage individuals or organizations to persuade suspects to return.11
The Anti-Telecom and Online Fraud Law (ATOFL)\textsuperscript{12}, passed 2 September 2022 and coming into effect 1 December includes extraterritoriality provisions for Chinese citizens. It states in article 3 that:

> The Law shall apply to fighting the telecom and online fraud in China’s territory, or telecom and online fraud overseas committed by Chinese citizens. It also stipulates that overseas organizations or individuals engaging in or assisting in telecom and online fraud against people in China’s territory shall be held accountable.

The law also strengthens government regulation in fighting fraud, with article 6 empowering the State Council to establish an anti-telecom and online fraud work mechanism to coordinate the work. Local governments at all levels shall organize and lead the anti-telecom and online fraud work within their respective region. Article 25, which outlines the work to be undertaken against fraud, and activities to be considered criminal, includes an un-defined “other acts of providing support or assistance to telecom and online fraud activities”.

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\textsuperscript{12} The Anti-Telecom and Online Fraud Law (ATOFL) is a Chinese law passed on September 2, 2022, aimed at combating telecom and online fraud, both within China and by citizens overseas.
Shortly following the 26 January bulletin, on 4 April 2021, an annual session on combating telecom-related crimes was held (国打击治理电信网络新型违法犯罪工作会议), after which local governments all over the country, mainly on county but also on township and village levels issued various “return persuasion” announcements. According to an estimate by outlet Southern Weekend, over 110 announcements were issued, with many from Hunan, Fujian and Sichuan. The majority of identified targets were located in northern Myanmar.

According to Wang Bo (pseudonym), a Hunan police official working on电信诈骗 cited in Southern Weekend’s coverage, it was the first time a nationwide “persuasion to return” campaign had been initiated against telecom fraud suspects. Some of the policies employed were based on the Anxi government’s “hundred-day” pilot campaign in 2018.

Wang Bo told Southern Weekend that although not all (Chinese) citizens staying in northern Myanmar were engaged in criminal activities, they would still be regarded as targets for persuasion because most of them exited the country to Myanmar illegally. Wang admitted that some suspects persuaded to return would only be imposed a fine for crossing border illegally as the police held no evidence of crimes.

On 17 September 2021, Director of the Criminal Investigation Bureau of the Ministry of Public Security Liu Zhongyi disclosed that a total of 54,000 fraud suspects had been persuaded to return solely from northern Myanmar since the beginning of the year. If the rate held steady for the full year of 2021, as many as 81,000 or more Chinese nationals may have been persuaded to return from northern Myanmar alone.

Solely in Wanding, a river port bordering Myanmar in Ruili city, Yunnan province, over 960 suspects of telecom fraud and over 100 suspects of cross-border gambling returned to China to surrender between January and October 2021.

In July 2022, the government of Wenchang City, Hainan province, issued a notice to disclose the names and pictures of those from Wenchang “illegally staying in northern Myanmar” and warned them to return. If they did not contact their local police stations by 10 August 2022:

1. Their spouses, parents and children would all be suspended from getting subsidies such as severe illness insurance and medical insurance subsidies;
2. Their children would be disqualified to enter urban schools once the parents failed to show up together in the interviews for registrations or to apply for the admission jointly;
3. Their immediate family would be blocked in principle from joining the Party and the military, and from taking the exams for becoming public servants or employees of state-owned companies;
4. Real estate purchased with their illicit money would be vacated and auctioned, any personnel settled in the property would be forcibly driven out, and houses built with stolen money would be demolished.

Even though none of those targeted had been convicted of any crime and, notwithstanding Xinhua’s prior warnings that such actions would paint relatives, children and family members as guilty by association, collateral punishment continued to remain a key part of the “persuasion to return” operation.

Similar notices giving deadlines for suspects to return “voluntarily” or else face a variety of punishments against their children or family members continued to pop up in various cities during 2021 and 2022.
In February 2022, the government of Laiyang city, Yantai, Shandong province, issued a notice to ask those from Laiyang “illegally staying” in northern Myanmar to return by 31 March 2022. If they did not follow the notice, the bank accounts of their immediate family members and friends who engaged in financial transactions with the suspects would be controlled, restricted or even cancelled. The suspect’s children would also be moved back to their hometown for school. Moreover, if family members refused to cooperate with the authorities in persuading the suspects to return, they would see their policy benefits and subsidies suspended or cancelled.19

Local governments are not left to their own devices in setting out these operations, nor do announcements issued by local government authorities target only Myanmar. In addition to “persuasion to return” operations by local governments, the central Ministry of Public Security (MPS) sent multiple working groups to Cambodia, the UAE, northern Myanmar and other key countries and regions to carry out international law enforcement operations during 2021.20

Cambodia has become so popular for Chinese anti-fraud operations that in 2019 Chinese police moved to set up a joint law enforcement office with its Cambodian counterparts in the capital of Phnom Penh. In 2021, at least 610 Chinese nationals suspected of online fraud were repatriated to China: none of them via formal extradition procedures, but simply deported with the direct cooperation from the Cambodian authorities. As of July 2022, one report notes that four mass deportations had occurred over the last year.21 Cambodia is one of many countries around Asia with a ratified bilateral extradition treaty with the PRC, but these are rarely – or in some cases, never – used as authorities instead rely on the faster, smoother and easier method of having people deported – thus depriving them of any chance of due process to fight accusations of criminal behavior.

Similar stories of often young people being lured to other countries only to be held hostage and forced to engage in online scams are not limited to Cambodia. One report identifies Myanmar as another hotspot for such actions, where people are often promised well paid positions to lure them, while others end up being forced into prostitution.22

Another report from Phoenix Weekly cited a police
source stating that over 100,000 Chinese people in Myanmar alone were engaged in telecom fraud. In Yunnan province, some 13,380 people were detained for illegal border crossings in 2020, a major increase from the year before.\(^{23}\)

Reports cited above indicates that among suspected criminals there are also entirely innocent people simply living in the wrong country, as well as victims themselves who have been forced into such illegal acts through threats, smuggling and intimidation.

Since the end of November 2021, several more notices have been issued to warn the Chinese public not to travel to nine countries with serious telecom and web crimes: Cambodia, the UAE, the Philippines, Thailand, Myanmar, Laos, Malaysia, Turkey and Indonesia. People who have no "strict necessity" or "emergency reason" to travel to or stay in those countries are required to return to China as soon as possible.\(^{24}\)

### Attacking non-suspects abroad

On 11 March 2022, Li Qingqing (pseudonym), a woman from Yuanzhuang township, Xianyou County, Fujian province, who currently runs a restaurant in Phnom Penh, was asked by the Yuanzhuang police to return. She argued that she is not a suspect of any crime and is just doing business in Cambodia. The police told her that according to China’s policy, Chinese citizens staying in the nine fraud-related countries are required to return unconditionally. After that, she continually received messages from the local police asking her to return.

On 5 May, police informed her she had been put on the telecom suspect list and warned her that her mother’s house would be cut off from power and water supplies. Her mother’s house was later spray-painted with the words "House of Telecom Fraud" and a policy notice was posted next to the spray-painting. Her mother was then called to the village committee and asked to persuade her daughter to return by 31 May.\(^{25}\) Li’s current fate and whether she has or has not returned is unknown. Li’s is not the only case. As early as 2021, Chinese media reported on how local police went around to fraud suspects’ hometowns and sprayed “shameful fraud” on a relative’s house and cut off power supply.\(^{26}\)

### “110 Overseas”: Widening the net?

“ Strikes against Chinese overseas suspects” are not limited to the nine forbidden countries as the Fujian pilot origins demonstrate. While many of the publicly reported operations appear to have been conducted mainly through online means, on 22 January 2022, Liu Rongyan, Director of the Overseas Chinese Police Office of the Public Security Bureau in Fuzhou City, Fujian Province, announced that the Fuzhou Public Security Bureau had opened its “first batch” of 30 overseas police service stations in 25 cities in 21 countries. The combination of the overseas stations and an online platform used for services such as receiving reporting is together called ‘110 Overseas’.

110 is the emergency phone number in China, much like 911 and 112 in the US and EU respectively. The Fuzhou city police operation out of Fujian province uses the name “110 Overseas” for its campaign, while other police jurisdictions uses different names.
The list of thirty initial Fuzhou “110 Overseas” offices is clearly expanding rapidly, as an announcement on the joint launch with the Fuzhou Public Security Bureau from the Fujian Overseas Chinese Hometown Association in Prato, Italy, from 30 March demonstrates, with the reported tally on 21 June standing at 38 stations across five continents.

There is no complete list of such “110 Overseas” police service stations available, but the initial list, along with further stations identified by Safeguard Defenders via government announcement, provides a clue to how it looks worldwide, even though the number is undoubtedly larger and such stations more widespread. The list herein presented are the service stations run by Fuzhou city and Qingtian city police, while a government announcement earlier stated that such work had begun in ten provinces, and hence one can assume the list of such stations goes far beyond what can be presented here.

While not the object of this investigation, at first glance at least some of the associations abroad are tied to the United Front system, such as the French Fujian Federation of Industry and Commerce and the Shiyi Hometown Association in Fuzhou, France, cited among the first overseas service stations for Fuzhou police overseas Chinese affairs established by the Fuzhou Public Security Bureau.

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The United Front system (United Front Work) is the work of Chinese Communist Party agencies seeking to co-opt and influence ‘representative figures’ and groups inside and outside China, with a particular focus on religious, ethnic minority and diaspora communities.

Overseas hometown associations, while often providing genuine services to the community, have by now become overwhelmingly co-opted by the CCP’s United Front organizations, which seek to increasingly control the Chinese diaspora. Leaders of hometown associations are frequently rewarded with meetings with CCP officials, participation in party-organised events and symbolic appointments to party-controlled bodies in China. In return, they are expected to assist the party in its propaganda and political influence activities, such as promoting China’s invasion (under the propaganda guise of “peaceful reunification”) of Taiwan. This has become an even more emphatic feature following Xi Jinping’s latest assertions on the importance of the United Front Work in the summer of 2022:

“Xi said that as China is striving to build itself into a modern socialist country and realize national rejuvenation, the United Front plays a more important role in gathering broad support to concentrate on the central tasks and serve the overall interests of the country. […] He also underlined the need to foster overseas patriotic elements and enhance United Front work online.”

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The list of the “first batch of Fuzhou county overseas police service stations”

110 OVERSEAS: Chinese Transnational Policing Gone Wild
Openly labeled as overseas police service stations to accommodate the growing administrative needs of Fuzhou residents abroad – for example in renewing Chinese driver’s licenses remotely and other tasks traditionally considered of a consular nature – the “110 Overseas stations”, both in their online and physical overseas form, also serve a more sinister goal as they contribute to “resolutely cracking down on all kinds of illegal and criminal activities involving overseas Chinese.”

In one account provided by the authorities themselves, we find direct evidence of their role in the "persuade to return" method abroad: On April 11, 2022, an “110 Overseas” notice was received from Mozambique by the Yangxia Police Station, with a businessman reporting that one of his employees had stolen a large amount of cash from the company before fleeing back to China in 2020. Upon receiving the notice, the police station immediately took to investigate and arrested the suspect on 18 May. When the suspect confessed to the existence of an accomplice, "Yu", the “police quickly identified Yu and immediately mobilized to persuade him (to return) after confirming that he was still in Mozambique. After being persuaded to return, [Yu] decided to cooperate with the police and fly back to China from Mozambique.”

According to a Party-owned media’s report on this case, the local police “contacted Yu’s relatives back in China and urged them to persuade Yu to surrender as soon as possible” and meanwhile “directly got in touch with Yu and told him relevant laws and policies”, making Yu give in.
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Map of publicly documented Overseas Police Service Centers from Fuzhou County and Qingtian County\textsuperscript{39}
Extending the prosecutor's service tentacles overseas

“The procuratorial work involving overseas Chinese is long-term. The procuratorial and overseas Chinese should cooperate closely and strengthen interaction to normalize the mechanisms such as information exchange, legal publicity, joint visits and joint meetings. They should give full play to the ‘four major procuratorial’ functions of the procuratorial organs in criminal, civil, administrative and public interest litigation [...]”

Li Riqin, Minqing County Procuratorate, Fujian

Whereas the Fujian “overseas police service station” presents direct links with the local Public Security Bureau, additional close ties appear between the prosecutorial work by the Fujian Provincial People’s Procuratorate and “procuratorates and overseas Chinese communication stations” (检侨联络站), or as one article puts it: “extending the prosecutor’s service tentacles to overseas Chinese-related and Taiwan-related procuratorial work”43, in which “cooperation between procuratorates and overseas Chinese (检侨合作)” is gradually being rolled out in various places, with “overseas contact points in Italy, Germany and other countries to carry out overseas Chinese-related prosecution work such as transoceanic mediation, cross-border inquiries, video reports and complaints.”44

According to a July 202245 People’s Daily report, the Fujian Provincial People’s Procuratorate and the Provincial Overseas Chinese Federation in April jointly issued their “Opinions on Strengthening the Procuratorial Work of Overseas Chinese Involved in the New Era to Protect the Legitimate Rights and Interests of Returned Overseas Chinese and Overseas Chinese in Accordance with the Law”. While Safeguard Defenders was unable to retrieve
On 23 May 2019, People’s Public Security News published the article《探索爱侨护侨助侨机制, 设立警侨驿站海外服务中心 青田警方积极打造“枫桥经验”海外版》on the Qingtian County Public Security Bureau’s “innovative set up of Overseas Police Service Centers” providing “convenient services for the vast number of overseas Chinese” in a cited 21 cities in 15 countries, including Rome, Milan, Paris, Vienna, Austria, etc., “hiring 135 Qingtian-born overseas Chinese leaders and leaders of overseas Chinese groups” and “establishing a team of more than 1,000 overseas grid service information personnel,” coordinated by a “domestic liaison center.”

Beyond listing the performance of objectively useful services to the Qingtian overseas community of a cited 330,000 individuals in over 120 countries such as the renewal of passports, the article expressly references the overseas centers’ role in the “collection of overseas Chinese sentiments, public opinions and policy information push,” as well as its global policing efforts under Operation Fox Hunt:

“Through the establishment of overseas service centers, Qingtian County Police has made breakthroughs in its overseas pursuit of fugitives. Since 2018, the Qingtian police have detected and solved six criminal cases related to overseas Chinese, successfully arrested a red notice fugitive, and persuaded two suspects to surrender under the assistance from the Overseas centers.”

The article goes on to provide a case example of the overseas center’s role in the successful “persuade to return” of Fox Hunt target Xia, who was accused of theft and fled to Serbia. “Through lots of efforts on investigation, the police found the location where Xia was hiding in Belgrade. After successfully getting in touch with Xia through the overseas service center, the Qingtian police worked jointly with the staff members of the overseas service center to carry out the persuasion to return through WeChat audio and video communication.”

In another reported example from 2020 of a suspect wanted for environmental pollution in China, the County Procuratorate in Qingtian, Zhejiang Province, joined efforts with the Qingtian Hometown Association of Spain - through the County Overseas Chinese Federation -, following an
investigation by the Qingtian County Public Security Bureau and an “online chase” of the suspect that had failed to yield the desired result. In the end, “with the efforts of all parties, Liu began to have the idea of returning to China to surrender [...]” and according to the report shortly thereafter did surrender in Qingtian. Following the success of the operation, Ji Yongjun, a full-time member of the Procuratorate Committee of Qingtian County Procuratorate and chairman of the Overseas Chinese Federation was quoted to have said that “the procuratorate will launch a quick mechanism for handling cases involving overseas Chinese.”

“From Madrid, Spain, to Qingtian’s ‘Home for Overseas Chinese Inspection’: Fugitive persuaded to return.”
Conclusion

Worrying Growth of China’s Transnational Repression

The scourge of fraud and online fraud has become endemic in China, both within its borders and outside. Police reported in April 2022 that they had resolved 394,000 cases and arrested 634,000 suspects in 2021 – an increase of 28.5% and 76.6% respectively – while also stating that the successful campaign had effectively curbed the growth of online fraud crimes. A big part of this campaign has been to effectively target those suspected of fraud, as well as related cases of human trafficking, abroad. Vice-Minister Du of the Ministry of Public Security indicated that the focus on fraudsters abroad has been an important part of the campaign, and China Daily reported “the number of people who committed crimes against Chinese people from abroad has significantly decreased.”

However, nothing indicates this campaign is about to slow down. Liu Zhongyi, head of the criminal investigation bureau of the Ministry of Public Security, said: “The rapid rise in cases has been effectively curbed, but the telecom fraud crime situation remains grim and complex, and the intensified crackdown and comprehensive governance should remain.”

Moreover, the transnational mechanisms set up under this campaign may well serve other overseas policing purposes as well, as some cited examples already indicate. Much of the information contained in this brief investigation is very recent, making it difficult to fully capture the picture of how these mechanisms interact and/or overlap. China’s growing campaign to police Chinese nationals abroad has gone hand in hand with its expanded “anti-corruption” campaign domestically, but it is rare to get insight into the true scope of its action. While it was known that lower value targets are often pursued via “persuaded to return” tactics, the data presented in this brief are the first to provide some insight into the scope and methodology of this specific campaign... one among many.

Safeguard Defenders research into the methods of Involuntary Returns showed that the Sky Net campaign – which includes operation Fox Hunt targeting higher value suspects – surpassed 10,000 successful returns by Christmas 2021, from 120 different countries. Our deep-dive into individual cases also demonstrated how only about 50% of those reported were successful, and how most involved dissidents or individuals that had fled religious and/or ethnic persecution. As announced in March 2022, Sky Net and Fox Hunt are set to expand. Another report showed how China, tied to Xi Jinping’s signature “anti-corruption” campaign, have significantly expanded its use of INTERPOL.

Whether the targets are dissidents, corrupt officials or low-level criminals, the problem remains the same:The use of irregular methods – often combining carrots with sticks – against the targeted individual or their family members in China undermines any due process and the most basic rights of suspects. The described treatment of targets, their families and even wider community as suspected criminals – in some cases even in the absence of any factual accusation as emerges from the “nine forbidden countries” – further deprives them of the right to be considered innocent until proven otherwise and the right to a fair trial, and also institutes a far-reaching “guilt by association” paradigm.

Furthermore, the disregard for the use of proper channels and processes in international relations is blatant. Despite China’s insistence on the establishment of bilateral extradition treaties
or other mechanisms of judicial cooperation – which serve both a specific propaganda purpose in legitimizing the Chinese Communist Party-controlled judicial system, as well as nurturing a chilling effect for the rapidly growing number of individuals fleeing China – it rarely uses these legal international procedures. Rather than cooperating with local authorities in the full respect of territorial sovereignty, it prefers – as reiterated frequently in the articles cited in this investigation – to cooperate with (United Front-linked) overseas “NGOs” or “civil society associations” across the five continents, setting up an alternative policing and judicial system within third countries, and directly implicating those organizations in the illegal methods employed to pursue “fugitives”.

This methodology further allows them to circumvent firmly-set international principles such as the non-derogatory principle of non-refoulement under the United Nations Convention Against Torture and the UN Convention on the Protection of Refugees, or the guarantees established under international mechanisms such as the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto.67

As these operations continue to develop and new mechanisms are set up, it is evident that countries governed by the standards set by universal human rights and the rule of law urgently need to investigate these practices to identify the (local) actors at work, mitigate the risks and effectively protect the growing number of those targeted.

For a further set of recommended actions in and by democratic countries, find Safeguard Defenders’ factsheet on countering extraditions, report on Involuntary Returns and manual on dealing with extraditions to China, Hide and Seek.
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For more on China's Operation Fox Hunt and use of Involuntary Returns methods, see: https://safeguarddefenders.com/sites/default/files/pdf/INvoluntary%20Returns.pdf