Tracing the PRC's Forced Return Operations around the Globe

CHASING FOX HUNT

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About Safeguard Defenders

Safeguard Defenders is a human rights NGO founded in late 2016. It undertakes and supports local field activities that contribute to the protection of basic rights, promote the rule of law and enhance the ability of local civil society and human rights defenders in some of the most hostile environments in Asia.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

"Xi has pointed out that corrupt fugitives are bound to be pursued and brought to justice even if they have fled to the remotest corners of the globe." PRC State Council Information Office, January 11, 2024¹

"Nothing in this Convention shall entitle a State Party to undertake in the territory of another State the exercise of jurisdiction and performance of functions that are reserved exclusively for the authorities of that other State by its domestic law." Article 4 UN Convention against Corruption²

"The fifth category is irregular measures. There are two common ways: kidnapping, which means using methods of kidnapping to arrest fugitives and return them to the country [...]"

Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, July 4, 2018³

Ten years ago, the People's Republic of China launched Operation Fox Hunt (2014), soon followed by overarching Operation Sky Net in 2015. Operations that led to mass efforts by various Party and State entities to pursue alleged fugitives to the remotest corners of the globe and bring them back to face *justice* in a country notorious for its absence of an independent judiciary and grave, widespread and systematic violations of human rights.

This report takes stock of the operations' first decade and examines the **extensive use of extrajudicial mechanisms to coerce targets into returning to China** on the basis of an official written legal interpretation by lead Party-agency Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI).

That definition explicitly defines the range of illicit means in violation of the sovereignty of third nations and the fundamental human rights of the targeted individuals. Notably, the official playbook includes *kidnapping*. It provides a staggering snapshot of just one of the means in the PRC's brazen and unapologetic *transnational repression* efforts around the globe.

Topped by the method of *persuade to return* - a combination of pressure techniques employed on family members and loved ones in China, including collective punishment, as well as direct stalking, harassment and threats delivered to the target abroad by PRC agents or their proxies -, official annual accounts list well over **12,000 successful forced returns from over 120 countries and regions between 2014 and 2023** under operations overseen by the CCDI under the Sky Net umbrella.

On the exclusive basis of PRC State and Party sources, Safeguard Defenders retrieved **283** individual accounts of extrajudicial returns from at least **56** countries and **2** territories (Hong Kong and Macao), mainly under Sky Net. The stories of those individuals, combined with testimonies contained in other sources, form the backbone of this report as we examine the CCDI's defined methodology.

We further list individual accounts of (attempts at) forced returns through extrajudicial means as reported by non-PRC sources (e.g., media and Non-Governmental Organizations) since 2014. That separate database contains 49 individual cases of successful forced returns from or through 15 countries and 1 region (Hong Kong). An additional 38 individuals in 13 countries reportedly managed to avert that fate.

The report further documents various instances of mass **handovers** as well as **mass** *persuasion* **ops** under a targeted campaign against the endemic plague of telecom fraud targeting Chinese nationals both in- and outside the PRC. Between 2017 and 2023, such instances have been reported both by PRC entities and local media in the host country.

While not an exhaustive overview, they notable include the mass *persuasion* of 230,000 individuals to return between April 2021 and July 2022, and the mass handover (e.g. repatriation) of 77 individuals from Fiji in 2017, 6 from Vanuatu in 2019, 88 from Indonesia, 164 from Laos in 2023, as well as over 30,000 individuals from Myanmar between September and December 2023 alone.

The handovers in cooperation with counterparts in host countries are particularly relevant as the **PRC is still expanding its global policing and judicial cooperation footprint.** Cooperation that often undermines the very values and principles underpinning the international rulesbased order, in particular the principle of *non-refoulement*. Incredibly worrisome in that regard is the support provided by the **UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)** to the lead Chinese Communist Party-agency that authored the written legal interpretation around which this report is centered.

UNODC has repeatedly refused to release the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) it signed with this counterpart in October 2019. This report publishes the integral document and lays out the case against UNODC's cooperation on the basis of the mandatory UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy enacted by former UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon.

A democratic response to transnational repression is a fairly novel theme in global relations. It is only in recent years that a small number of nations have actively stepped up their efforts to adequately understand, map and counter the phenomenon. While this is obviously not a positive note, it does mean there is ample space for international coordination on the issue and the joint adoption of best practices.

The report therefore concludes with a brief travel advisory for targeted individuals and at-risk groups, as well as a series of policy recommendations centered around the acronym **WE CAN STOP TNR**: Whole of Government, Educate, Coordinate, Assess, Name, Speak up, Track, reach Out, Put on notice, Train and Report.

These recommendations are not exhaustive but may provide a useful initial guideline for countries that are yet to or just started to adopt countermeasures as to the breadth of issues that need to be tackled simultaneously. We firmly believe it is in any democratic country's national interest to do so.

As a further resource to assist in those efforts, a complementary annex to this report provides a summary overview of transnational repression-related charges against PRC actors and their proxies in a number of democratic countries.

Dedicated to the memory of Mihriay Erkin and the countless others who needlessly suffer at the hands of the CCP... and those that bravely stand up to them.




If you or anyone around you is the target of any of the methods described in this report, please contact your local authorities.

Reporting acts of transnational repression against you or others is an essential step in our ability to combat such acts. Reporting serves not only to defend yourself but may also protect others.

Under no circumstance should you hand over any personal details, money or other valuable information when approached by purported PRC agents.

For further guidance on the methods and available reporting avenues in some democratic countries, see our Pilot Reporting Guide⁴ in <u>simplified Chinese</u>, <u>traditional Chinese</u>, <u>English</u>, <u>Tibetan</u> and <u>Uyghur</u>.



If you are uncertain whether an act against you is an act of transnational repression or if you are unsure which authorities to report to, do not hesitate to reach us in a language of your choice at: **tnr@safeguarddefenders.com**

We welcome the communication of (new) reporting avenues for acts of transnational repression by democratic nations.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary 3	ł
Table of Content7	,
Introduction 8	\$
Background: Transnational Repression 14	4
Chapter 1: Playbook and Country Data18	8
A. Operations and Actors 2	:1
FOX HUNT 2	:1
SKY NET 2	25
B. Official numbers 3	5
C. PRC accounts of individual extrajudicial returns per country 3	8
Chapter2: Extraditions 55	8
Chapter 3: Repatriation 6	52
Chapter 4: Persuasion to Return 73	'3
Chapter 5: Irregular Measures 83	3
A. Luring and Entrapment 8	3
B. Kidnapping 8	86
Chapter 6: International Complicity – the case against UNODC 9	0
Chapter 7: A Glimpse into the Future? 10	04
Concluding Observations & Policy Recommendations 10	06
Concluding Observation 10	06
Policy Recommendations 11	10
Travel Advisory for at-risk individuals and targeted communities 11	13
Annexes 11	16
Annex I: Memorandum of Understanding between United Nations and the	
National Commission of Supervision of the People's Republic of China on	
Cooperation in Combating Corruption 11	16
Annex II: Overview of Criminal Charges for PRC Transnational Repression	
Activities 12	21
Annex III: (Attempted) Forced Returns Cases reported by Non-PRC Sources 14	48
Endnotes 15	55

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INTRODUCTION

Canada, 2014: Vancouver is beautiful and quiet in the Fall. The streets are full of red maple leaves and its deep blue lake looks like an oil painting.

Xin Ting opens the car window and inhales the crisp autumn air. Tall, beautiful and dignified, the thirty-year-old mother of twins takes in the scenery. Her mind wanders to a poem by Bian Zhilin: You are standing on the bridge looking at the scenery, the people looking at the scenery are looking at you from upstairs, the bright moon decorates your window, and you decorate other people's dreams...

She shakes her head. No time to indulge. Hers is an urgent mission. Only yesterday - was it only yesterday? - Fox Hunt team leader Wen Xiaohua had entrusted her with the task of retrieving a suspect that had been on the run for no less than fifteen years and persuading him to return.

One of the few women on the team, Xin is determined not to disappoint. After all, women are just as capable as the men on the team. With her colleague Peng Peng dispatched on a similar mission to Laos, she cannot and simply will not do any less than him on her first overseas assignment.

The job description had been simple. On October 10, 2014, the Ministry of Public Security, Supreme People's Procuratorate, Supreme People's Court and Ministry of Foreign Affairs had issued a joint Circular on Urging Fugitive Overseas Economic Criminals to Surrender.

Alleged loan fraud suspect Zhou Guoqing (pseudonym) who had fled to Canada in 1999 with 10,000 RMB had indicated a willingness to surrender, but insisted Chinese authorities come meet him in Canada to explain the procedure and offer further assurances.

Xin Ting looks at her watch. 3.30 PM local time. In half an hour, she will cross paths with the suspect.

"You are the Chinese police," Zhou Guoqing notes with a trembling voice.

"Yes," Xin replies within the confines of the Vancouver Consulate General where Zhou has shown up for the meeting. "We've come to pick you up and return you to your home country," she starts gently.

Zhou nods hesitantly. "You guys ... work hard."

Xin smiles. This might be easier than expected.

"How do I know I will be treated fairly once I return to the country? I still have to tell you that this matter has nothing to do with me. To this day, I really don't understand why the public security organs have opened a case against me."

"You always say that you are wrongly accused. Why don't you dare go back and clear your name? The legal system in our country is very sound. Nothing is stopping you from hiring the best lawyers to provide you with legal support and present counterevidence to the accusations," Xin posits.

Zhou isn't swayed. "You don't understand, those that accused me are very powerful. I won't get justice even if I try to set the record straight," Zhou unloads. "I am just a scapegoat, that money isn't even in my name, it's in their possession. But I have no proof, no proof!" Growing red, he continues: "And... among these people, there are some public officials. I can't fight them..."

He grows his resolve. The notorious challenges China's politicized judiciary poses to alleged culprits are all too well-known to Zhou. The young patriotic officer in front of him may still nurture an iron faith in the system, but his years on the run have left him without any illusions.

"I have obtained Canadian citizenship. If I do not take the initiative to return, you will not find it so easy to have me extradited!" he dares.

Ting clenched her teeth. Zhou is putting up more of a fight than expected. However, she is determined not to let her superiors down.

Her local liaison officer had already laid out the difficulties surrounding Zhou's status as a naturalized Canadian citizen. If the normal extradition procedures were to be followed, the process would not only be lengthy but also most cumbersome... As Wen Xiaohua told her: persuading him is the only option.

Ting represses her growing sense of desperation. She. Will. Not. Fail.

Feigning calm, her voice grows cold. "Old Zhou, let me ask you. Do you want to solve this problem from fifteen years ago or not?"

Zhou goes silent.

"If you want a quick fix, now is the time to find courage and take advantage of this opportunity. If you don't... You could continue to hide out in this beautiful part of Vancouver. But I should warn you. The next time we come back for you, I don't think we will be this gentle."

The not-so-veiled threat rings loud in Zhou's ears. His run has truly come to an end.

"What about amnesty? Some friends told me..."

"What friends?" Ting fires back. "There is no such thing. The only way to be free is by facing justice." Sensing Zhou's resolve is waning, she changes approach again. "Old Zhou, there is no such thing as amnesty in this world. Only if you accept the punishment in good faith can you obtain true forgiveness."

Zhou's shoulders sag. Weighing his fears over a return against the constant looking over his shoulder in Vancouver, he quietly asks Ting for a night of reprieve to think things over. Knowing she is close to completing her assignment, Xin agrees. But she does not rest overnight. Having heard Zhou's concerns over possible reprisals by other key actors in his case, she asks her colleagues in Beijing to send her information on their current judicial status.

The next day, she uses her new bargaining chips. "I can understand all of what you're saying, but to be honest, I think these fifteen years in Vancouver are the biggest failure of all. Not only did you not get the life you wanted and were you separated from your family, you also carried the guilt and hid for the faults of others. In fact, what you have to consider now is whether those friends who advised you not to go back are genuinely concerned with your own good or whether they are afraid that your return to China will have an impact on them. Chen Qi, Fan Hui, Kang Ende, you probably recognize these people, and they are all under our control…"

Zhou looks up sharply, his eyes shocked. "Well, I understand," he nods heavily. "I agree to return to China with you to turn myself in, there's a flight tomorrow morning, we'll meet at the airport."

The next morning, Xin Ting stands silently with two anxious police liaison officers at the departure gates of Vancouver International airport. "Xin, there won't be any changes, will there," one of the officers asks. "No way," Xin responds with confidence. Moments later, Zhou walks over with a huge suitcase, ready to board for return.

Her mission complete, Xin checks the messages in the WeChat group. Peng Peng has been equally successful in his Laos assignment. She smiles. Two young Chinese police officers simultaneously accomplished their bloodless battles in unfamiliar countries at opposite ends of the globe.⁵

In 2014, at the direction of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) and Head of the 2014 Fox Hunt operation Liu Dong, MPS officer Lu Zheng (吕铮) embedded himself within the newly established Fox Hunt team. The resulting publication provides a riveting insight into the ins and outs of their global *fugitive* chase. From officer Jin Wei's nasty diarrhea on a 24-hour mission to Colombia and Shandong Economic Investigation's detached officer Sun Peng's Ebola scare in Nigeria, to a shoot-out and car chase in the Philippines... or even the painful doubts over the intelligence of officer Xiao Ran's husband (we couldn't help but feel sorry for him): little detail is spared to express the heroics of their mission.⁶

Clearly serving propaganda purposes, Lu Zheng's publication *Operation Fox Hunt* (猎狐行动) is not a standalone in Chinese State or Party sources describing the glorious accomplishments of the international *fugitive* pursuit operations since the launch of Operations Fox Hunt (2014) and Sky Net (2015). While we and others previously reported on the official tally of *fugitive* returns released annually by the Party's Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), details surrounding these operations often remained elusive.

Despite the CCDI's recurring affirmation of *fugitive recovery operations* taking place in over 120 countries and regions around the world, we face a recurring question by democratic authorities: is it happening in my country (the short answer is: in all likelihood, yes), how is it happening, and where are the cases?

Following a year-long deep dive into PRC State and Party sources, this report seeks to answer some of those questions and raise further awareness in democratic nations lacking the political will to address, or even acknowledge, the persistent issue impacting their sovereignty and the fundamental rights they are bound to uphold.

While we are not remotely close to the CCDI's touted tally of over 12,000 successful *fugitive* returns from over 120 countries and regions under Operations Fox Hunt and Sky Net since 2014, we found individual accounts by PRC sources of **283 return cases from at least 56 countries and 2 territories** (Hong Kong and Macao), *through the extrajudicial methods of persuade to return, repatriation, and luring and entrapment.*

In addition, <u>Annex III</u> lists individual accounts of (attempts at) forced returns reported by non-PRC sources (e.g., media and Non-Governmental Organizations) since 2014. The database contains 49 individual cases of successful forced returns from or through 15 countries and 1 region (Hong Kong). An additional 38 individuals in 13 countries reportedly managed to avert that fate.

As readers will note, there is an apparent difference in typology of targets between the cases reported by PRC and non-PRC actors. Where it is relatively easy to recognize transnational repression and attempts at forced returns as instances of political persecution in cases where individuals self-report or the individuals involved have a high public profile prior to the persecution, that is much harder for forced returns of – usually – *allegedly corrupt individuals* claimed by the Party-state's propaganda.

This should obviously not come as a surprise: the Party-state may wish to tout its long-arm policing accomplishments across the globe as to dissuade or incite fear in members of the diaspora, but it is far more careful and secretive when it comes to its overseas activities surrounding notable political dissidents or ethnic and religious minorities.

Due to the deeply flawed and politicized nature of the Chinese judicial system, Safeguard Defenders cannot assert the veracity of the nature of alleged crimes in the data exclusively based on PRC sources. At no point do we wish to imply that the PRC is not facing serious or even endemic instances of corruption and other forms of (transnational and organized) crime, nor do we wish to imply every single individual listed is innocent of the allegations. However, as the scene-setter example of a French extradition proceeding will show, the lines between alleged financial crimes and politically motivated persecution are and may be flimsy across the board.

In fact, multiple observers, including democratic authorities, have long highlighted how the allegations of *corruption* are often used as a shorthand to do away with political rivals within the party system.

As Bertram Lang summarizes in his 2019 introduction to *China and global integrity-building: Challenges and prospects for engagement: "[...] engaging China in 'anti-corruption' should be rooted in a sound understanding of what the term 'corruption' means and how it is used in the Chinese political context. Formally, 'graft' (tanwu), 'bribery' (huilu), and 'embezzlement' (nuoyong gongkuan) are defined as criminal offences in the PRC Criminal Law in similar terms compared to Western countries. In contrast, the term most frequently used for 'corruption' in CCP* parlance is fubai (= 'rotten,' 'decay') which conveys a much broader, moralistic understanding of 'corruption' and particularly relates to state and party functionaries' misconduct and deviations from 'correct behaviour' as defined by the Party. The predominant position of the CCP's disciplinary apparatus in anti-corruption measures means that the prevention and punishment of economic crimes – i.e. bribery or embezzlement in a narrower sense – is inextricably blended with measures against acts of political misconduct or misbehaviour [...]."⁷

"Indeed, 'anti-corruption' has proven a crucial, and effective, tool for CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping to consolidate his own power and reinforce central, top-down control at the expense of local-level discretion."⁸

Similar observations have been made by democratic authorities with regard to targets of the operations described in this report, as statements contained in Chapter 2 document. Moreover, over the past years, a growing series of criminal charges have been filed against individuals engaged in them. A summary overview of such charges is contained in <u>Annex II: Overview of criminal charges for transnational repression activities.</u>

Woven around adaptations of individual stories contained in CCP propaganda and other sources, this report lays out the past ten years of the PRC's forced returns operations since the start of Operation in 2014. We hope it may provide further public insight into the methodology that underpins the People's Republic of China's long-arm policing efforts.

There are important lessons to be learned from these insights, as the exact same methods are constantly being discerned in overseas efforts against regime critics and political and religious minorities. In a certain sense, the PRC's own public records provide a safer route to report on these operations. While known instances of the tactics described in this report are ongoing across democratic nations, many if not most of its victims understandably refrain from publicly reporting on them as they fear worsening consequences for their relatives held in China.

Moreover, regardless of the nature and veracity of the alleged crime, the methods employed are more often than not in brazen violation of the judicial and territorial sovereignty of third nations, as well as the targeted individual's universal rights and the judicial protections host countries are obliged to provide them under the principle of *non-refoulement* in international law.

As we will see, a vital part of those efforts rest on the cooperation many authorities around the world continue to afford the Chinese authorities. While some have woken up to the dire reality of the CCP's *global fugitive hunt,* others tacitly close an eye to or willingly assist in their unlawful operations under a recent swathe of - often secretive - police cooperation agreements.

We mapped various instances of mass handovers as well as mass persuasion ops under a targeted campaign against the endemic plague of telecom fraud targeting Chinese nationals both in- and outside the PRC. Between 2017 and 2023, such instances have been reported both by PRC entities and local media in the host country.

While not an exhaustive overview, they notable include the mass handover (e.g. *repatriation*) of 77 individuals from Fiji in 2017, 6 from Vanuatu in 2019, 88 from Indonesia, 164 from Laos in 2023, and between 30 to 40,000 individuals from Myanmar between September and December 2023 alone; as well as the mass persuasion of 230,000 individuals to return between April 2021 and July 2022 with collective punishment measures meted out by local authorities across the country against family members. Measures that were recently deemed unconstitutional by

the PRC's Legislative Affairs Commission (LAC) of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress itself.

The CCP continues to innovate in its quest for virtually unlimited global policing powers *with Chinese characteristics.* Such innovations notoriously include the reinvention of its internal Party policing body CCDI as the focal point for international anti-corruption cooperation through the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

UNODC has refused to publish its 2019 Memorandum of Understanding with the National Commission of Supervision of the Central Commission of Discipline Inspection. This report reveals its content by publishing the full MoU in <u>Annex I</u> and makes the case for its urgent and immediate repeal in accordance with the mandatory UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy.

But before we delve in, how did we get here?

This year marks the 15th anniversary of Safeguard Defenders and its predecessor organization China Action, founded in Beijing in 2009. From the very start, our founding mission in the PRC's increasingly hostile environment has been to support human rights defenders and tell their stories to the wider world. As many of them have been and continue to be prime targets of the Chinese authorities' punitive measures, we consistently documented the state of the PRC's criminal justice system through the prism of the changes witnessed on the ground. After being forced out of the country in 2016, Safeguard Defenders carried on that mission and started to use its insights to defend those targeted abroad from *refoulement* to China.

The result and experience of those interventions to counter extraditions in judicial proceedings has been made available to all in our *Stop Extraditions to China Information and Help Center*¹⁴: a compendium overview of all relevant international legal provisions, judicial precedents, and reports on the PRC's criminal justice system relevant to counter extraditions to China in breach of the international principle of *non-refoulement*.

The Information and Help Center is currently available in Arabic, Bahasa, simplified Chinese, English, French, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, Russian, Thai and Turkish.

During many such proceedings, we came across instances of pressure being exerted on the individuals at risk to dissuade them from taking full advantage of the legal safeguards afforded to them. It were these instances that first led us to focus on the myriad of extra-judicial means used by the PRC and its proxies to coerce targets to return to China for prosecution, resulting in the 2022 publications *Involuntary Returns*¹⁵, *110 Overseas*¹⁶ and *Patrol and Persuade*¹⁷.

As always, our research outputs are based primarily on official Chinese State or Party sources or media controlled by them. All original sources are referenced throughout this report and archived links are made available in endnotes for independent verification.

Please note that as such, the materials credited as official State or Party sources are therefore not allegations by Safeguard Defenders, but accounts of official policy and activities by PRC authorities.

Let's get started!

BACKGROUND: TRANSNATIONAL REPRESSION

We cannot talk about the PRC's extrajudicial forced returns operations without a quick primer on how they fit into the wider context of transnational repression by authoritarian actors.

While the phenomenon, together with other forms of foreign interference, has steadily gained more attention over the past years, there is as of yet no single internationally recognized definition of transnational repression.

Freedom House⁹, which maintains the largest overall database of registered cases by various States around the world, describes it as: *the ways a government reaches across national borders to intimidate, silence, or harm individuals who they perceive as a threat and have a political incentive to control. Methods of transnational repression include assassinations, physical assaults, detention, rendition, unlawful deportation, unexplained or enforced disappearance, physical surveillance or stalking, passport cancellation or control over other documents, Interpol abuse, digital threats, spyware, cyberattacks, social media surveillance, online harassment, and harassment of or harm to family and associates who remain in the country of origin.*

While the People's Republic of China is not the only authoritarian actor engaging in such behavior, the sheer scale of its operations makes it by far the most prolific perpetrator.

Canadian Security Intelligence Services Director David Vigneault noted in December 2023:

"Some of our adversaries have virtually no limits to what they will attempt. They have no respect for human rights. They are persistent and we observe their continual and relentless efforts.

Each state uses their own 'playbook'. They don't all use the same tactics, but one of the most objectionable ones is when they target Canadians based on their ethnicity or religious background.

Individuals are harassed, intimidated and threatened. Even in a strong democracy such as ours, their human rights are being violated by foreign governments.

The leading actor conducting these activities is the People's Republic of China - the PRC.

The PRC's transnational repression efforts are vast, but one of its most appealing strategies is to use family and friends living in China as leverage. The threats against them are varied: they risk losing their jobs, being arrested, assaulted, or even disappearing.

Take the case of a Chinese-Canadian human rights activist living in Canada, who felt the wrath of the PRC when her family, based in China, was targeted. The PRC took measures against her family and restricted their travel. In turn, her own father asked her to stop speaking out against the PRC.⁷¹⁰

A recent resolution adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe¹¹, a regional organization covering 48 Member States, lists four main methods of this growing threat to the rule of law and human rights:

- Direct attacks by which an origin State carries out a targeted physical attack against an individual abroad, such as assassinations, assaults, enforced disappearances, physical intimidation or violent forced rendition.
- Co-opting other countries to act against a target using detention, unlawful deportation and other types of forced rendition, which are authorised through pro forma but meaningless legal procedures. This method includes misuse of INTERPOL Red Notices, extradition proceedings and other forms of interstate legal assistance such as anti-money laundering and anti-terror financing measures.
- Impediments to mobility such as passport cancellation and denial of consular services, preventing the target from travelling or causing them to be detained.
- Threats from a distance, including online intimidation or surveillance and coercion by proxy, in which a person's family, loved one or business partner is threatened, imprisoned or otherwise targeted.

The introduction to the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation's dedicated Threat Intimidation Guide¹² (available in 67 languages, including <u>simplified Chinese</u>, <u>traditional Chinese</u>, <u>Tibetan</u> and <u>Uyghur</u>) provides relevant examples of transnational repression from a law enforcement perspective:

Some countries' governments harass and intimidate their own citizens living in the U.S. These governments may also target naturalized or U.S.-born citizens who have family overseas or other foreign connections. This violates U.S. law and individual rights and freedoms.

Transnational repression may take the following forms:

- Stalking
- Harassment
- Hacking
- Assaults
- Attempted kidnapping
- Forcing or coercing the victim to return to the country of origin
- Threatening or detaining family members in the country of origin
- Freezing financial assets
- Online disinformation campaigns

Governments use transnational repression tactics to silence the voices of their citizens (or noncitizens connected to the country), get information from them, or coerce them to return to the country of origin.

The Australian Federal Police (AFP) describes the matter as Foreign Interference in the Community¹³, constituted by *threats and intimidation directed, supervised or financed by foreign governments and targeted towards CALD communities in order to cause harm and impact on Australia's multicultural way of life. Foreign governments may interfere in communities for a range of purposes:*

- to silence criticism of the foreign government's internal and external policies
- to monitor the activities (offline and online) of members of CALD groups

- to promote the views and policies of the foreign government
- to obtain information for the benefit of the foreign government
- to influence the views and opinions of the broader population.

Foreign interference in the community may take many forms, including:

- Assault or threats of assault
- Blackmail
- Kidnapping, unlawful detainment or deprivation of liberty
- Stalking and unwanted physical or electronic surveillance
- Coercion of an individual by threatening their family or associates overseas to force them to comply
- Online disinformation campaigns through social media to discredit an individual or group.

As all these descriptions highlight, forced returns by State actors are an integral part of what is generally considered transnational repression. Many of the means cited in the above descriptors are firmly embedded within the PRC's involuntary returns methodology. While this report is squarely focused on the latter phenomenon, it is worth noting that the use of overall transnational repression methods is not limited to diaspora members.

The PRC's forced returns toolkit ranges from the use and abuse of international judicial and police cooperation mechanisms, as well as immigration laws and administrative procedures, to threats and collective punishment of family members and contacts in China, direct surveillance, harassment and intimidation of targets overseas, and outright kidnappings abroad.

Throughout this report, we will describe all these methods with detailed examples sourced from around the world. Since the PRC authorities never tire of refuting such allegations by citing the presumed legality under their national laws, we will also highlight the myriad of violations to international human rights law, and to the territorial or judicial sovereignty of the third States involved.

Chapter 1 outlines the PRC's official methodological framework for forced returns and provides the annual data released by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, as well as **accounts of 283 individual forced returns cases from at least 56 countries and 2 territories** from 2014 onwards as claimed by PRC sources. Chapters 2 to 5 take an in-depth look at four out of five categories for PRC *international fugitive recovery:* **extradition** (Ch. 2), **repatriation** (Ch. 3), **persuade to return** (Ch. 4) and **irregular measures** (Ch. 5). In **Chapter 6**, we examine the terms of UNODC's agreement with the National Commission of Supervision of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, while **Chapter 7** takes a snapshot look at what to expect next on the basis of recent statements, before concluding with a series of **recommendations** for democratic authorities.

In addition, <u>Annex I</u> contains the integral Memorandum of Understanding between the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and the PRC's National Commission of Supervision. <u>Annex II</u> contains a summary overview of transnational repression-related charges against PRC actors and their proxies in various countries around the world. <u>Annex III</u> contains an overview of forced returns cases made public by non-PRC sources (e.g., media and Non-Governmental Organizations) since 2014.



天网恢恢,疏而不漏。 海外不是"法外之地",避罪没有天堂!

"The sky net is wide and vast, loose yet without loopholes. Overseas areas are not lawless places; there is no safe haven for fugitives!"¹⁸

CHAPTER 1 PLAYBOOK AND COUNTRY DATA

Italy, 2014: Ye is the former mayor of Chuanliao Town Government in Qingtian County, Zhejiang. Accused of bribery, he fled to Milan, Italy, in July 2001.

In December 2014, the Zhejiang Public Security Department and the Procuratorate sent a joint working group to Italy and Spain to carry out persuade to return operations of fugitives from the Lishui and Wenzhou areas.

After being persuaded face-to-face by the working group, Ye flew back to China with the working group to surrender himself on December 23, 2014.¹⁹

France, 2017: From 1997 to 2004, during her tenure as deputy head of the Finance Department of a hospital in Yueyang, Hunan, Zhou allegedly misappropriated public funds for stock trading. On February 13, 2004, Zhou fled abroad.

The Yueyang Procuratorate established a special taskforce for the international pursuit of Zhou. In January 2017, upon learning Zhou might be hiding somewhere in France, the taskforce arranged a meeting with Mr. Feng, a "French national of Chinese heritage and a prominent social activist".


Mr. Feng agreed to help the taskforce liaise with relevant comrades of the embassy in France and the Police Liaison Office. On 18 January 2017, an officer contacted the embassy in France for a preliminary assessment on the handling of the case.

After consideration and guidance from Luo Qing, Secretary of the Party Group and Procurator General of the Municipal Procuratorate, the taskforce decided not to go after Zhou through INTERPOL channels because in that case the arrest and transfer of the suspect would be subject to the judicial cooperation and extradition provisions between the two countries.

"Persuade to return first. If that doesn't work, we can 'Red Notice' her and work towards extradition."

The taskforce opted for the use of non-official channels to persuade Zhou to return: a combination of technical investigation methods and assistance from civil groups led them to information on Zhou and her family members in France.

Following extensive contact with and ideological work on her daughter and sonin-law, the taskforce finally convinced Zhou to meet with them in France on June 19, 2017, convincing her to return to China to surrender. On July 5th of that same year, Zhou surrendered herself to the Yueyang Procuratorate. In January 2018, Zhou was sentenced to two years in prison with a three-year probation.²⁰ For this deep dive into the PRC's forced returns playbook, we return to the methodological overview as laid out by the CCP's Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) itself.



Its Written Legal Interpretation to article 52 of the 2018 National Supervision Law²¹ cites five distinct methods:

In terms of conducting [anti-corruption] international fugitive repatriation, extradition is a formal channel and ideal way to acquire international criminal judicial assistance to carry out overseas fugitive repatriation. Repatriation, persuading to return, and remote prosecution are alternatives to extradition.

Firstly, **extradition** means, based on bilateral or multilateral treaties or reciprocity, requesting the country where the fleeing overseas suspects are located, and transferring the suspected criminals back for prosecution and punishment. Extradition has strict criteria. The current main principles include the principle of non-extradition of political prisoners, the principle of non-extradition of national citizens, and the principle of double criminality.

The second category is **repatriation**, also known as repatriation under immigration laws, which means that our country provides clues about fugitives' illegal and criminal activities and forging passports or other false identities to the countries where they are located so that these countries would deprive them of their residency status and compulsorily repatriate them to our country or the third country in accordance with immigration laws.

The third category is **remote prosecution**, which means, under the condition that our country cannot exercise its jurisdiction, and through transferring jurisdiction to the countries where our country's fugitives are located, to support these countries to convict and sentence them based on local laws and evidence provided by us. After being convicted and sentenced, fugitives would usually be compulsorily repatriated and then deported back to our country and brought to book.

The fourth category is **persuading to return**, which means persuading and educating fugitives so that they would return voluntarily to face prosecution, trials, or penalties. Persuading to return is ideological and political work. Its primary method is to persuade and educate criminal suspects, including convincing them with reasons, touching them with emotion, making them know the law, and giving them the prerequisites for lighter punishments to change their minds.

The fifth category is **irregular measures**. There are two common ways: (1) **kidnapping**, which means using methods of kidnapping to arrest fugitives and return them to the country; (2) **trapping and capturing**, which means luring criminal suspects to the territories of the destination country, the high seas, international airspace, or a third country which has an extradition treaty with the destination country, and then to arrest or extradite them. The above-mentioned ways could break the law in host countries and lead to the crime of illegal detention or kidnapping because the investigation activities are not approved by a sovereign state. They could also cause diplomatic disputes. Therefore, in practice, kidnapping or trapping and capturing are rarely used.

While the CCDI's written legal interpretation provides the most authoritative and comprehensive account of the PRC's international fugitive recovery operations, the methods are not novel to 2018²² and pre-date the acceleration of efforts following the launch of Operations Fox Hunt and Sky Net.

In 2009, the Anti-Corruption Bureau of Fangshan Procuratorate touted its achievement in being the first to successfully persuade a [alleged] *corrupt official to return from Germany through nondiplomatic means, after three years of transoceanic persuasion of her son by the Bureau.*²³

In October 2011, according to state media, alleged thief Yu X, from Longtian Town, Fuqing City (Fujian Province), returned from Ireland following years of persuasion efforts on and through his family, relatives and friends in China.²⁴

There appears to be some strife over who was truly the first among local Chinese authorities, as the Propaganda Department of the Luwan District Committee (Shanghai) claimed in 2013 that they had successfully persuaded its Deputy Director Xin Weimin to return from France in Fall 2008. It is not clear what or even whether Xin was accused of any crime at all.²⁵ The latter would not be surprising considering the standing of the individual and the growing measures Xi Jinping's leadership has since put in place to extend control over functionaries and State (company) employees through measures such as foreign travel restrictions for those inside China or the confiscation of passports for those deployed overseas.

Feats of successful persuasion ops have recurred throughout the years. The method accounts for the vast majority of secured surrenders, as official data further in this report will show. As we have reported before, while Chinese authorities boast these returns as *"voluntary surrender"*, a growing amount of evidence shows how these often come with extensive pressure being applied on the target, in particular through collective punishment of their relatives in China, and fall outside the scope of what traditional international law enforcement cooperation methods provide for, including through undeclared surveillance efforts and in-person covert operations by PRC officials or their proxies abroad.

A distant second in successful return methods are those based on international cooperation, both through formal extraditions and repatriation. While the first is under increasing pressure in the democratic world, repatriation appears to remain a favorite mechanism for countries willing to cooperate with or close an eye to the PRC's long-arm policing efforts. Evidence contained in this report points to how this method appears to be overwhelmingly as an extrajudicial shorthand for formal extradition or deportation measures, with utter disregard for minimal international human rights standards.

But before we look at the application of the CCDI's listed methods, let's briefly recap the what's what and who's who of the PRC's main international policing operations.

A. Operations and Actors

"Out of the country does not mean out of the legal system. Show your sword and punish even those in faraway lands."

Hu Ji, Wuhan Fox Hunt team, 2016²⁶

FOX HUNT

Fox Hunt is undoubtedly the most infamous of ongoing international policing operations.

Things officially kick off in January 2014 during the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), which emphasized *the need to strengthen the international pursuit of fugitives* and *"never let corrupt elements go unpunished"*.

The CCDI merged its Foreign Affairs Bureau and Corruption Prevention Office into the International Cooperation Bureau and announced the Fox Hunt 2014 campaign in May of that year together with the Supreme People's Court, the Supreme People's Procuratorate, the Central Bank and, last but not least, the Ministries of Public Security, State Security, and Foreign Affairs. In October, the Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the CCP adopted a decision that further emphasized the need to strengthen overseas efforts.²⁷

Mainly executed by central and local chapters of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) since July 22, 2014, the task force's mission is to track down fugitives and establish solutions for their apprehension, be it through the use of security cooperation mechanisms or urging of "voluntary" returns. The latter specifically includes involving the fugitive's relatives.²⁸

The **Ministry of Public Security** (MPS, 公安部) is responsible for public and political security in the PRC. Unlike its counterparts in democratic nations, it does not only act as a traditional law enforcement agency. Like all entities within the Party-state, maintaining the political stability of the CCP is among its core functions.²⁹

This goes hand in hand with grave, widespread and systematic human rights violations, from its role in the ongoing genocide in the Uyghur region, to its use (together with the Ministry of State Security, MSS) of *Residential Surveillance at a Designated Location* (RSDL, 指定居所监视居住).

The custodial system that precedes formal arrest and prosecution was formally written into law in 2013, following Xi Jinping's ascension to the Party apex. It allows for the disappearance of anyone (oftentimes human rights defenders, critics, and even foreigners) into secret facilities, denies them all contact with the outside world, including legal counsel and family, and interrogates them at will for a total of up to six months with virtually no oversight.

In the more than ten years since RSDL's introduction, UN bodies have repeatedly called on the PRC to repeal the system, citing serious human rights concerns. In 2015, the UN Committee Against Torture called on the PRC to repeal the measure as a matter of urgency. The PRC has since failed to submit its periodic reporting, due in December 2019, to the Committee. In 2018, ten UN Special Procedures, including the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, described RSDL as *"analogous to incommunicado and secret detention and tantamount to enforced disappearance; they expose those subjected to RSDL to the risk of torture and other inhuman and degrading treatment and other human rights violations".*³⁰

The harrowing conditions against individuals held in RSDL have been described on the basis of direct victim testimony in our graphic report *Locked Up.*³¹

Extrapolating official data from the China Judgments Online (CJO) database, run by the Supreme People's Court and established in 2013, Safeguard Defenders makes the following estimates for its widespread and systematic use across the country³²:

		Estimate		
Year	Baseline	Low	Medium	High
2013	322	510	622	869
2014	1,988	3,154	3,843	5,369
2015	2,488	3,948	4,810	6,721
2016	3,793	6,019	7,333	10,247
2017	4,024	6,386	7,780	10,871
2018	3,816	6,055	7,377	10,308
2019	2,975	4,721	5,751	8,037
2020	5,688	9,026	10,996	15,365
2021	3,326	5,278	6,430	8,986
2022*	1,043	1,656	2,017	2,818
2023*	210	333	405	566
Total	29,674	47,086	57,363	80,156

*Annual numbers for 2022 and 2023 are incomplete as data becomes available only after a case has completed the entire judicial process. There is no sign of a diminished use of RSDL for these years.

In addition, as Alex Joske highlights: "the MPS has a long and overlooked history of foreign intelligence operations. This is especially so under Xi Jinping, and deserves greater attention because of its implications for law enforcement cooperation, human rights and counterintelligence".³³

Since 2020, multiple charges have been brought within the United States against individuals accused of conspiring to act or acting as agents of the PRC in the surveillance, harassment, stalking, and coercion of certain US residents to return to the PRC as part of a global, concerted, and extralegal repatriation efforts under Operations Fox Hunt and Sky Net.³⁴

On April 17, 2023, a complaint was unsealed in federal court in Brooklyn, New York, charging two defendants in connection with opening and operating an illegal overseas police station, located in lower Manhattan, New York, for a provincial branch of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) of the People's Republic of China (PRC). As alleged in the complaint, defendants are charged with conspiring to act as agents of the PRC government as well as obstructing justice by destroying evidence of their communications with an MPS official.

Before helping to open the police station in early 2022, one of the defendants is alleged of having a longstanding relationship of trust with PRC law enforcement, including the MPS. Since 2015, and through the operation of the secret police station, the individual was tasked with carrying out various activities, including to assist the PRC government's repressive activities on U.S. soil, among which efforts to cause a purported PRC fugitive to return to the PRC and assisting the MPS in locating an individual living in California who is a pro-democracy activist.³⁵

That same day, a complaint filed by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of New York was unsealed in federal court in Brooklyn charging 44 defendants with various crimes related to MPS efforts to harass Chinese nationals residing in the New York metropolitan area and elsewhere in the United States. *The defendants, including 40 MPS officers and two officials in the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), allegedly perpetrated transnational repression schemes targeting U.S. residents whose political views and actions are disfavored by the PRC government, such as advocating for democracy in the PRC. In the two schemes, the defendants created and used fake social media accounts to harass and intimidate PRC dissidents residing abroad and sought to suppress the dissidents' free speech on the platform of a U.S. telecommunications company.³⁶*

(For an overview of charges brought around the world against transnational repression operations by PRC actors and their proxies, see <u>Annex II: Overview of Criminal Charges for PRC Transnational</u> <u>Repression Activities.</u>)

In 2015, Fox Hunt was folded into the overarching Operation Sky Net. It is renewed on an annual basis and continues to this day.

While more than a few democratic nations initially provided at least some level of cooperation with Fox Hunt efforts, resulting in multiple extraditions under the scheme from European countries among others or joint operations such as in Australia³⁷, Canada³⁸ and Italy³⁹, recent English-language sources abound as to the credible risks associated with the campaign. From think tank studies such as Freedom House's Special 2021 report *China: Transnational Repression Origin Country Case Study*⁴⁰ or the Center for American Progress' 2022 report *The Expanding International Reach of China's Police*⁴¹, and journalistic investigations such as The Globe and Mail's 2016 article *China's Fox Hunt in Canada strains trust that an extradition treaty is possible*⁴² or ProPublica's 2021 piece *Operation Fox Hunt: How China Exports Repression Using a Network of Spies Hidden in Plain Sight*⁴³ to, most significantly, law enforcement investigations and prosecutions.

In October 2020, a Brooklyn Federal Court charged eight individuals with conspiring to act as "illegal agents of the People's Republic of China", *allegedly acting at the direction and under the control of PRC government officials, conducting surveillance of and engaging in a campaign to harass, stalk, and coerce certain residents of the United States to return to the PRC as part of a global, concerted, and extralegal repatriation effort known as "Operation Fox Hunt.*"⁴⁴

Since then, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has repeatedly highlighted its grave concerns regarding the operation. In a January 2022 address at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Museum, FBI Director Christopher Wray reiterated: *"The Chinese government is increasingly targeting people inside the U.S. for personal and political retribution—undercutting the freedoms that our Constitution and laws promise. The kinds of people the Chinese Communist Party tends to go after are not those that a responsible government would make their enemies—refugees, dissidents, and Uyghurs—people with their own ideas, who speak or worship as their conscience dictates.*

One egregious example is a thing called Fox Hunt, which is a program that President Xi Jinping claimed in 2014 was created to stamp out corruption. But in reality—in reality, it targets, captures, and repatriates former Chinese citizens living overseas whom it sees as a political or financial threat. Over the past eight years, the Chinese government has hauled home more than 9,000 people worldwide, bringing them back to China, where they can be imprisoned or controlled.

And a big reason why it's been so effective is because—much like with its economic espionage—the Chinese government is willing to disregard diplomatic norms and international law when it comes to grabbing these victims. To start with, they often issue "red notices" through INTERPOL, using the international law-enforcement community to stop and hold people for extradition. Now, effective use of red notices brings real criminals to justice, but issuing red notices for political purposes is an abuse of the program.

Currently, there are hundreds of people on U.S. soil who are on the Chinese government's official Fox Hunt list and a whole lot more that are not on the official list. And most of the targets are green card holders, naturalized citizens—folks with important rights and protections under U.S. law.

But abusing red notices is bad enough. We're seeing the Chinese government resort to blackmail, threats of violence, stalking, and kidnappings. They've actually engaged criminal organizations in the U.S., offering them bounties in hopes of successfully taking targets back to China. China applies incredible pressure on the targets of those efforts, many of whom still have family back in

China. Some, unaware the Party was after them, have traveled back to China for a visit, only to find themselves suddenly trapped, and prevented from leaving.

Others—who are aware that they're targets—in those cases, the Chinese government has arrested their family members and imprisoned them, effectively holding the relatives hostage until the victim returns to China. Now, at the FBI, we know a lot about criminal tactics after 113 years, and this is right up there. And it's certainly not the kind of conduct you would expect from a responsible nation on the world stage.

As with the GE economic espionage example, maybe the most appalling thing about Fox Hunt is that it's just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to the Chinese government's transnational repression. For decades, the Chinese Communist Party has targeted, threatened, and harassed U.S.-based Tibetans and Uyghurs, Falun Gong members, pro-democracy advocates, and really any others who question their legitimacy or authority."⁴⁵

Similarly, Canadian authorities have warned about the operations as relayed in 2020 by The Globe and Mail: "The Canadian Security Intelligence Service says Beijing routinely uses undercover state security officials and "trusted agents," or proxies, to target members of Canada's Chinese community in an effort to silence critics of President Xi Jinping, including threats of retribution against their families back in China. The federal spy agency says these illegal activities in Canada are part of a global campaign of intimidation that constitutes a threat to this country's sovereignty and the safety of Canadians. One of the most high-profile efforts is Operation Fox Hunt, directed by Beijing's Ministry of Public Security, which has been under way since 2014."⁴⁶

In February 2021, Director David Vigneault of the Canadian Security Intelligence Services stated in public remarks to the Centre for International Governance Innovation: "A number of foreign states engage in hostile actions that routinely threaten and intimidate individuals in Canada to instill fear, silence dissent, and pressure political opponents. One notable example of this is the Government of China's covert global operation, known as Operation Fox Hunt which claims to target corruption but is also believed to have been used to target and quiet dissidents to the regime.

Those threatened often lack the resources to defend themselves or are unaware that they can report these activities to Canadian authorities, including us. Moreover, these activities are different from the norms of diplomatic activity because they cross the line by attempting to undermine our democratic processes or threaten our citizens in a covert and clandestine manner."⁴⁷

SKY NET

Operation Sky Net (天网) was launched in April 2015 and is renewed annually.⁴⁸ Often confused with Fox Hunt, Sky Net is a much larger and overarching campaign which includes the former.

In the years since its launch, Sky Net has added additional task forces, including a special operations team led by the MPS and Bank of China to crack down on money laundering; another led by the MPS and the Central Organization Department to crack down on fake passports⁴⁹; and one led by the Supreme Court, the Supreme Procuratorate and MPS focused on the confiscation of illegal income from those who have fled the country.⁵⁰

Between 2015 and 2017, Sky Net released an annual and widely publicized *Top 100* (百名红 通人员) list of wanted persons for which PRC had obtained Interpol Red Notices.⁵¹ However, in 2017, they stopped publicizing the list.⁵² On a total of sixty-four claimed captures by Chinese authorities,

fifty-nine were returned from abroad. According to PRC accounts, at least forty-four of them were returned through the extra-judicial means of *persuasion*, with another six by ways of *repatriation*.

Occasional announcements are still made with lists of pictured individuals and details on their suspected whereabouts, as a 2018 Announcement of the International Office of the Central Anti-Corruption Coordination Group still present on the Foreign Ministry's website shows.⁵³ The list of fifty individuals contains eighteen names not present in the original Top 100 list, five of which are claimed to have been persuaded to return in the meantime: Wu Qing (吴青) from Canada in 2018, Zheng Dongqiang (郑东强) from Hong Kong in 2018, Wang Junwen (王军文) from Hong Kong in 2019, Wang Dongsheng (王东生) from Australia in 2023, and Zhou Quan (周权) from the United States in 2023.

In April 2018, Sky Net was officially placed under the oversight of the newly inaugurated National Commission of Supervision (NCS),⁵⁴ a State front for Party-body CCDI, that had been overseeing execution of efforts by other State entities all along.

Put the political discipline and political rules of the Party in a prominent position, focus on political loyalty, political security, political responsibility and intra-party political life, resolutely correct political deviations, and eliminate political hidden dangers in a timely manner. Communiqué of the Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Communist Party of China, January 10, 2024.⁵⁵

The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI, 中国共产党中央纪律检查委员会) is the supreme supervisory body of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Directly under the control of the CCP Central Committee, it is tasked with defending the party constitution, enforcing innerparty regulations and coordinating anti-corruption work. As recently revised regulations reiterate, its most fundamental task is safeguarding Xi Jinping's core status, authority and leadership.⁵⁶⁻⁵⁷

As a Party body, it is not under the oversight of judicial or prosecutorial entities in the PRC, but rather has the power to investigate officials belonging to those entities.

Its officers are *non-judicial*, placing them outside the bounds of the PRC's minimal anti-torture provisions and judicial safeguards. The Party entity is literally above the law of the State and can act with impunity.

The CCDI's annual work report for 2023, delivered on January 8, 2024, stresses its task of "forging strong political consciousness, ideological consciousness and action consciousness of loyalty to the Party". In its efforts to deepen international cooperation and improve the level of systematic rectification and global governance, it highlighted how it held the third Belt and Road International Cooperation Summit Forum on the Clean Silk Road and signed a memorandum of understanding on anti-corruption cooperation with six countries.⁵⁸

The International Office of the Central Anti-Corruption Coordination Group is carried out by the CCDI's International Cooperation Bureau.

A 2018 constitutional review and adoption of the National Supervision Law expanded the extrajudicial powers of the CCDI beyond CCP members, now bundling all investigations over economic and duties-related crimes under this extra-judicial body with extensive investigative powers, including the documented growing use of the incommunicado detention system *Liuzhi* for a period of up to six months, without access to legal assistance or the outside world.

Depending on which limited statistic from the Chinese government is used – an estimated average of 16 to 76 people are put into the *liuzhi* detention system every single day.⁵⁹

These *liuzhi* detentions are by definition enforced and involuntary disappearances, as well as arbitrary detentions as they are not part of any judicial process. Torture inside these detentions is rife, and it took a mere five weeks after the system's inauguration before the first (known) death by torture inside the system was reported: a person placed into *liuzhi* not for being a suspect, but merely for being a potential witness.

In the words of the former chief of the CCDI's International Bureau and current *International Liaison Department* head Liu Jianchao: *"These are not criminal or judicial arrests and they are more effective."*

The system has been formally denounced by the UN Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances in a General Allegation Letter of September 2019⁶⁰ and reiterated in its 2020 report to the 45th Human Rights Council⁶¹, as well as its 2021 Fall Session report.⁶²

Alongside the expansion of its powers, the March 2018 National Supervision Law also created the **National Commission of Supervision** of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (NCS). The NCS has been formally charged with pursuing international judicial cooperation, including the signing of cooperation agreements or Memorandums of Understanding with countries and foreign law enforcement agencies.

While technically an individual body, the NCS does not operate independently and is merely an extension of the CCDI. They share both offices and staff (including commanding officers), with CCDI the name used when Chinese Communist Party members are investigated and the NCS name used when non-Party members are.

That no real distinction exists between Party organ CCDI and the NCS is further evidenced by the fact that the annual work reports are presented each year by the CCDI, without making any separation between the work of the NCS and CCDI 'branches', or in official representation capacities such as for example in multiple events hosted by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime.

On October 20, 2022, an eight-count indictment against seven individuals was unsealed in Brooklyn Federal Court. The accompanying press release summarizes how "lead defendant, Quanzhong An, allegedly acted at the direction and under the control of various officials with the PRC's government's Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection (Provincial Commission)—including Peng, Chen, Ming, and Hou—to conduct surveillance of and engage in a campaign to harass and coerce a U.S. resident to return to the PRC as part of an international extralegal repatriation effort known as 'Operation Fox Hunt'."

The alleged operation included threats to and harassment of the victim and his son, attempts to coerce the victim into returning to China, and forcing a family member of the victim to travel from China to the United States with the task of persuading their family member to return.⁶³

(For an overview of charges brought around the world against transnational repression operations by PRC actors and their proxies, see <u>Annex II: Overview of Criminal Charges for PRC Transnational</u> <u>Repression Activities.</u>)

In line with a longstanding tradition at both the central and local levels of Party control over anticorruption work conducted by other entities, the **CCDI's International Cooperation Bureau** took charge of the newly established **Fugitive Repatriation and Asset Recovery Office of the Central Anti-Corruption Coordination Group,** which also included the heads of the **Supreme People's Court** (SPC), the **Supreme People's Procuratorate** (SPP), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), the **Ministry of State Security** (MSS), **the Ministry of Justice** (MOJ) and **the People's Bank of China** (PBC).

Single overseas operations can be carried out by central level agencies, as well as their local counterparts, or a combination of both. Actors abroad include **PRC Embassy or consular personnel**, as well as **declared police liaison officers** stationed in the Embassies. They are often called upon to assist in liaising with local counterparts in host countries to arrange practical law enforcement cooperation, repatriation efforts, or provide logistical aid in (undeclared) overseas operations.

But operations do not rely solely on the work of official entities, who may well prefer to engage **proxies** to carry out their dirty work overseas in an effort to minimize risks and/or feign distance from illicit activities in case of local law enforcement probes and diplomatic incidents.

The most notorious outlier among the above-mentioned actors concerns the role of **overseas communities** in *fugitive return* efforts. Ranging from seeming spontaneous nationalistic responses to the wanted notices issued by PRC authorities, to the active use of international networks under the former Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (now incorporated in the United Front Work Department), and – in its most sinister form – the coercion of overseas Chinese to partake in surveillance and harassment efforts.

New Zealand, 2017: In May 2017, Chinese media, including CCTV⁶⁴, widely reported on the efforts of a columnist for the Shanghai-based web media Guancha, which were picked up by New Zealand Chinese-language media outfit⁶⁵ that provides excellent information and services and acts as a communication bridge between New Zealand and China in locating four individuals included on the PRC's Top 100 Wanted Fugitives' list.

From tracking company records to scouring signatories of an online petition to New Zealand's legislators, columnist Demon King (\mathbb{E}) spared no efforts to respond to the PRC's call, noting in conclusion: "The residents of small places in New Zealand are very gossipy. As soon as one person knows the other is a Chinese fugitive, the whole town will know. Therefore, these corrupt officials face a very difficult life in the future. As they may be recognized by people at any time, they do not dare to go out, just like if they were in prison. This should also be the purpose of China's exposure of their addresses, mobilizing the curiosity of local Chinese and the media, creating some public pressure on the fugitive corrupt officials, and finally forcing them to give up resistance and returning to China."⁶⁶ At least one of the targets identified in the reporting (Jiang Lei (蒋雷)) was successfully persuaded to return to China in 2018.

Demon King's concluding observation perfectly encapsulates the formal aim of PRC authorities, as expressed by Xu Jinhui, Director of the Anti-Corruption and Bribery Bureau of the Supreme People's Procuratorate (SPP), during a January 2015 press conference on the achievements of the previous year's special operation of international fugitives and stolen goods for duty-related crimes:

"It is more effective to carry out the offensive of chasing fugitives and recovering stolen goods in areas where there are many Chinese and overseas Chinese groups. [...] Carrying out aggressive strategies in areas that are popular among Chinese and overseas Chinese group can always form a chain effect in pursuing fugitives and recovering stolen goods. [...]

The procuratorial organs of Guangdong, Zhejiang and other provinces took advantage of the geographical advantages of hometowns of overseas Chinese [...], overseas chambers of commerce and overseas Chinese organizations. [...] For example, the procuratorate of Guangdong Province, through the extensive promotion of notices urging fugitive criminal suspects to surrender among overseas Chinese groups, urged Feng, the former vice chairman of the Kaiping CPPCC, to return from New Zealand to surrender.⁶⁷

But involvement of overseas civil society actors is not limited to the aggressive sharing of official notices among communities abroad. As the tally on single cases below will show, accounts of assistance provided by more or less willing overseas groups and individuals are a rare yet recurrent feature. Their (occasional) role in the PRC's overseas policing operations had already come to the forefront in our reports on the so-called overseas police service centers, which were explicitly mentioned as intermediaries for at least 83 persuasion ops⁶⁸, including in Spain⁶⁹, Serbia⁷⁰ and France⁷¹.

In 2016, another example of the use of overseas community groups through the former Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO) brings us to the Czech Republic, with an operation that likely came in at a significantly higher cost than the allegedly misappropriated funds:

Czech Republic, 2016: Yan, from Qingtian, Zhejiang, a former employee of the Qingtian County People's Court stood accused of misappropriating 66,000 RMB [roughly 8,500 €] of public funds. In November 1999, he fled to the Czech Republic.

Despite extensive efforts by the local procuratorate in communicating with Yan's relatives to persuade Yan to return, Yan refused to do so. Thus, a taskforce consisting of officials of the Qingtian discipline inspection body, the procuratorate and the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office traveled to the Czech Republic, where they enlisted the assistance of local overseas Chinese leaders to communicate with Yan directly.

On June 23, 2016, Yan returned to China by plane and surrendered to the procuratorate.⁷²

At this point, the explicit mention of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office's direct involvement should no longer raise any eyebrows. It should however inspire lackluster democratic authorities to recognize and engage on the variety of issues related to the CCP's United Front work overseas. Following our reports on their role in the setting up of liaison mechanisms between overseas groups and the country's public security and procuratorial bodies, some countries have taken the bull by the horns in actively investigating the issue. Others still seemingly fail at grasping the significance and various intersections that link this phenomenon to the broader range of the CCP's foreign interference.

It is not just human rights groups or think tanks that have repeatedly raised the alarm. In January 2022, a Federal Canadian court upheld a decision⁷³ "identifying the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO), an administration that is part of the CCP's United Front Work Department (UFWD), as an entity that engages in espionage and acts 'contrary to Canada's interests.' The ruling upheld a Canadian official's denial of permanent Canadian residence to a Chinese citizen owing to their more than 20-year employment with the OCAO. Officially, the OCAO manages overseas issues related to China, including liaising with the Chinese diaspora. However, in court, Canadian Immigration argued 'that the nature of OCAO's interactions with the overseas Chinese communities, the information gathered, and the intended use of the gathered information is surreptitious,' — an assertation the judge upheld. UFWD is the CCP agency responsible for ensuring Party control of PRC society, including Chinese businesspeople and members of the Chinese diaspora, and has been linked to cases of political interference around the world."⁷⁴

In this sense, as we highlighted in investigations *Patrol and Persuade*⁷⁵, and *China's Consular Volunteers*⁷⁶, the role accorded to such groups in providing services to the overseas community should at the very least be carefully monitored. Official engagement of these groups by host countries in providing assistance in administrative matters such as asylum requests should be avoided.

In other cases, individuals are dragged into the operations whether they like to or not. Embedded MPS officer Lu Zheng provides an account from Fox Hunt's earliest operations:

Laos, 2014: Fox Hunt officer Peng Peng has traveled to Vientiane to retrieve alleged fraud suspect Chen Bin (pseudonym) who fled China in 2012.

Following the issuance of the joint October 10th Circular on Urging Fugitive Overseas Economic Criminals to Surrender by the MPS, SPP, SPC and MFA, local public security bodies had worked without remit to persuade his friends and family in China to convince Chen Bin to return.

Finally, after much persuasion, Chen Bin reached out to the public security authorities and agreed to surrender, but... on the condition that public security officials travel to meet him in Laos to provide further assurances.

At the set meeting time, Chen Bin is a no-show. Frantic phone calls and text messages go unanswered.

Peng Peng's frustration is palpable. Knowing his colleague Xin Ting is in Vancouver, he is determined not to return empty-handed.

If they can use family and friends in China to persuade suspects, why not do the same overseas? After some conversations with staff at the Consulate, he summons a friend of Chen Bin.

"Old man Qiao," he greets the man. "We are the Chinese police, and here to pick Chen Bin up to return to China to surrender."

Old Qiao gazes at him. "Well... I know what you mean but, I don't know where Chen Bin is," he tries.

Peng smiled. "Turning off his phone and not showing up. Throwing a friend in front of the bus... It's not the best way to treat a guest, don't you think? Listen old man, I'm a straightforward person so I'll say what I have to say. You know the reason we came to Laos is to give your friend one last chance. As always, we are prepared for any situation. So whether your friend decides to surrender and maintain hope for some leniency, or whether he wants to continue evading us... we will, as always, complete our job. How we do that is up to him."

Old Qiao nodded with resignation. "I'll make sure to pass that on."

Hours later, a nervous Chen Bin finally gets back to Peng Peng. The message has arrived.

Five location changes later, they meet at an outdoor cafè. As Chen Bin requested, and to much objection of his public security colleagues, Peng Peng is alone. Chen Bin is not. Behind him two bodyguards for hire mark the exit.

"You should be embarrassed," Peng Peng did not spare time on niceties. "Do you think keeping those two bodyguards behind you will work? Do you think you're facing only me? Wrong! You're facing millions of Chinese police. If I want to arrest you, I can notify the Lao police immediately. There is no escape for you. Do you understand? This was your last chance to turn yourself in. I've put up with your shenanigans long enough."

Chen Bin lost all color.

Peng Peng pressed on. "Well then, I'll leave now! Next time we meet, I'll make sure I'm the one putting you in handcuffs!"

Panicked Chen Bin shouted "No, no officer Peng. You misunderstood. I didn't mean to... These are my drivers, yes, my drivers, not bodyguards." He was at a loss for words. "As you said officer Peng, I didn't think. I was wrong, so wrong. Let me go tell them to leave immediately," his hands reaching for Peng in a desperate plea.

"And give you a golden opportunity to escape?" Peng Peng bounced back.

Realization settled in. Chen Bin broke out in sweats. Peng Peng could smell his fear. He had him.

"There is no reason to be afraid if you comply from here on. According to the instructions I have received from the Fox Hunt leadership, I am here to execute plan A: persuade you to return to China to surrender. But, if you don't, we obviously have a plan B. If I cannot persuade you to come willingly, we will immediately arrest you with the help of the Lao police. What happens from here on is on you."

The next morning Peng Peng texted Xin Ting from the plane. His mission had been successful.⁷⁷

In July 2021, ProPublica's Sebastian Rotella and Kirsten Berg provided a graphic account of the events leading up to the October 2020 indictment in the United States — events that included the coercion of an individual to cooperate with an undercover operation to retrieve and persuade Green Card holders Xu Jin and his wife Liu Fang to return:

New Jersey, 2016: "On the hunt again, the cop from Wuhan rolled into New Jersey on a secret reconnaissance mission.

Hu Ji watched the suburban landscape glide past the highway. He was in his early 40s, about 6-foot-1, smooth and confident-looking. His cases had led from Fiji to France to Mexico, making headlines back home. The work was riskier here; in fact, it was illegal. But he knew the turf. He'd identified himself as a Chinese police officer on his tourist visa, and the Americans hadn't given him any trouble. Sometimes, it was best to hide in plain sight.

Hu's driver took an exit into a wooded subdivision, cruising by big homes set back from the two-lane road that wound through one of the country's wealthiest enclaves. The driver was a new recruit, a boyish-looking Chinese immigrant in his late 20s who lived in Queens and called himself Johnny. Johnny's uncle in Houston had been a target of Hu's covert team. Two months earlier, they had "persuaded" the uncle, a former chief accountant for a provincial aviation agency, to return to China to stand trial for alleged crimes. Hu had essentially offered a brutal deal to Johnny and his relatives: If you want to help your family, help us destroy someone else's.

So in September 2016, Johnny became an indentured spy. He'd already done surveillance to prepare for this visit. Stopping the car, Johnny pointed out the location. The cop surveyed the large lawn, the trees flanking a brick path, the two-story house behind bushes.

Don't tell anyone you brought me here, he said.

Locked onto his new target, Hu mobilized his team. It grew to at least 19 American and Chinese operatives: hired muscle, private detectives (including a former New York Police Department sergeant), and undercover repatriation specialists who slipped in and out of U.S. airports with ease. The team did stakeouts while the unsuspecting neighborhood slept. They employed aliases and cover stories to relay money, intelligence and threats. When the stage was set, they brought their target's frail and elderly father from China to New Jersey as human bait — a high-stakes gambit known as an 'emotional bomb'. [...]"⁷⁸



Coercion-to-cooperate tactics are not limited to family members of Fox Hunt targets. In the 2023 guest investigation Targeted in Türkiye: China's Transnational *Repression Against Uyghurs*⁷⁹, researcher Yalkun Uluyol describes how the PRC seeks to monitor and control Uyghurs in Türkiye through the use of established networks in both countries.

Interviews conducted by Yalkun with Uyghurs show that one of these networks involves police and Neighbourhood Working Groups in China as well as Chinese mission staff and informants in Türkiye. Leveraging intelligence gathered on Uyghurs living in Türkiye and their fear for the safety of family members back in China, Chinese authorities coerce or threaten them into stopping their activism work; producing pro-China propaganda; and/or spying on other Uyghurs in Türkiye.

Among the coercive techniques used to pressure them into cooperating with the Chinese authorities against fellow members of their community: threats to punish family members in China and threats to refuse passport renewal. Positive incentives may

also be offered: be it monetary or, most effective in communities forcefully separated from their loved ones in China, rare gifts such as safe entry into their homeland to visit with loved ones.

These tactics effectively produce a vicious circle of transnational repression, distancing the Chinese authorities from the risks associated with conducting illicit operations abroad first-hand, and putting severe strain and division on diaspora communities where seemingly innocuous matters to a Western audience such as visits with family members, or the renewal of a passport by a system known for its weaponization of such "favors" create further suspicion and distrust.



因人斯时代。以为近年同志为杨心可笑中央有反基因国际合作的人主要从产出先,无共 通过遗忘反应是日本自己感觉,其外互致论的失乏意思。"打杀"相关"感觉"多数下, 但这些明明的是中国相关,由于中国国人的人,更是个可能的服务,它是中国国人的人们中国 高田原原が市際市内・デオ市田市、気灯ドインズニードス回転、アメリコロ・ドスロロンドの人の の形成人、高田原原ム15公元、百名に広人式、石利の人口茶、和市会国国の学者販売店 つか、いから、1930年、1930年、日本の一日、ロックロットの中の、1930年の日本の中の日本の日本 下時、以后本上回转了面积分子"來了原則、我了氣了"的状況、對為意思的增分高度量其該 ~ 一冊一號"讓快和力保障,即當意吃一些為其某件、当該当年方指突回的是可以做出」 和目的時間中期中國公司和下回、如果和中国公司和中国公司和中国公司和 (1) 中國國際委員員委示范工程。約查達國國全國內國政府政府國政所,目對一世活分別政府 第一百二百美國中,現代國家國家政府登訪,反當將國政府在立於已成委員及政府政府 第二百一百美國中,國家政府政府政府政府政府政府政府政府政府政府政府政府政府政府政府政府政府政府 思。在工作实践中,我们接来越深影响在影,这里的国际合作之间已是现有"国际历史因素吗啡 国家们,因本在于习近年最有记录影响是是,在于习近年最好代中国中的社会主义思想科学 能感到行,但不在于习近中却否记得职家呢。在于习近早都时代中间的包括实为了 指引,"两个确立"是我们应用一切不确定性的最大确定性。最大意气,最大意气。

来源:中国纪检监察报

本刊记者 窦克林 宋榮綠

关键词1 攻坚期和深水区

这是中央追逃办对追逃追赃工作形势的科学研判。

近年来,追逃追赃的成果可以说是迭创新高。数据可以充分证明这一点: 2018年全国共 回外逃人员1335人,其中职务犯罪人员307人,"百名红通人员"5人,追回赃款35.41亿元人 6, 追逃人数和追赃金额均创历史新高。尤为引人瞩目的是, 缉捕、遣返追逃分别比2017 #增长了30%、34%,引渡更是从2017年1人增长到17人。

首页 上一页 1







B. Official numbers

Quantifying the PRC's overall transnational repression efforts and their forced returns remains an elusive task. While qualitative evidence is widely recognized as pointing to the biggest concentrated State effort in this regard, the logical absence of data on the Chinese authorities' side and the continued lack of data gathering by many democratic authorities through dedicated and coordinated reporting mechanisms means we are only looking at the very tip of the iceberg.

The hope remains that reports such as this one will encourage more democratic countries to take the threat to the fundamental freedoms of those residing on their territories seriously and adopt or develop best practices to respond to a phenomenon that truly spans the entire globe as official tallies provided by PRC authorities on their principal *fugitive recovery operations* since 2014 show.

Annual numbers are not reported in a consistent fashion, are inconsistent at times, and only rarely provide a detailed breakdown of the type of targets or modes of return. However, in combined fashion, they paint a damning picture of the PRC's disregard for international human rights norms and the territorial and judicial sovereignty of other nations.

For reasons of clarity, the below table provides a summarized tally of main operations and does not include occasional data on other specialized operations which are referenced elsewhere in this report (for example, Operation Cloud Sword instituted in 2019 to combat the endemic issue of telecom fraud, and which reportedly led to the mass persuaded return of no less than 230,000 individuals by the MPS between April 2021 and July 2022 alone⁸⁰).

Partial numbers on other operations mentioned in this report can be made available upon request.

Notes on data presented below:

- Reported Sky Net numbers are understood to be inclusive of those reported under annual Fox Hunt operations.
- In some instances where more detail was provided by the Supreme People's Procuratorate (SPP) on their Operation for the International Pursuit and Recovery of Fugitives (starting in September 2014, placed under the supervision of the CCDI in 2018), some reported "returns" concern apprehension within or at China's borders. This is the case for example for the operation running between September 2014 and December 2015⁸¹, where out of 108 reported apprehensions, only 73 can be definitively attributed to overseas operations (e.g. 70 cases of persuade to return and 3 repatriations from ~ 29 countries).
- For their 2017 operation (January to November), the SPP reports the successful capture of 51 individuals⁸², listing 3 of those as "extradited or apprehended in China" without making the distinction (full tally: 40 persuaded, 5 repatriated and apprehended, 3 extradited and apprehended in China, from 14 countries).
- Similarly, a unique detailed breakdown by the CCDI of its 2018 operation (see details in table below) lists an original tally of 1335 successful apprehensions under the Sky Net program. However, only about 935* of those are accounted for as having been retrieved from abroad.

- Both the 2015 SPP number and the 2018 CCDI number thus present a gap of about 30% between the full annual tally and the number of individuals that would have been retrieved from outside Chinese borders. Where such detail was available, in-country apprehensions have been detracted from the numbers presented in below table.
- There are discrepancies between the cumulative numbers based on the summation of annually reported data and those reported occasionally in later years. This is most likely a consequence of the fact that data are usually reported annually in Fall of any given year and thus do not account for the full calendar year, leading to a correction for the full year in comprehensive data presented at a later date.
- For its final cumulative account of ~12,292 successful apprehensions under Sky Net from over 120 countries, Safeguard Defenders uses the summation of the comprehensive tally presented by the CCDI in Fall 2022 and the CCDI's account for operations in 2023 as published in early 2024.
- Both the 2015/2017 SPP and 2018 CCDI breakdown show a very clear majority of cases are returned through the persuade to return method. While the amount of detail provided over the years is limited, they confirm the consistent affirmations made by Chinese authorities regarding the prominent use of this "completely Chinese" technique (see Chapter 4 Persuade to Return).

YEAR	OPERATION	COMMANDING AUTHORITY	REPORTED RETURNS	COUNTRIES	BREAKDOWN (where provided)	CUMULATIVE	SOURCE
2014	FOX HUNT (Jul. to Dec.)	MPS	680	69	Surrender: 390 Apprehension: 290		MPS SPP
2015	SKY NET	CCDI	1023				<u>NCS</u>
	FOX HUNT (Apr. to Dec.)	MPS	857	66			<u>CCDI</u>
2016	SKY NET	CCDI	1032				<u>NCS</u>
	FOX HUNT	MPS	951	72			<u>Xinhua</u>
2017	SKY NET	CCDI	1300				<u>NCS</u>
	FOX HUNT (Mar. 28 to Nov. 2)	MPS	829	Over 120		2,488 (since the CCP's 18th National Congress (November 2012) to March 27, 2017) 3,317 from over 120 countries (since the CCP's 18th National Congress (November 2012) to November 2, 2017)	<u>Xinhua</u> <u>People's</u> <u>Daily</u>
2018	SKY NET	CCDI	935* (*retrieved from abroad on a total annual arrest tally of 1335)		Extraditions: 17 Repatriations: 66 Prosecution overseas: 1 Persuasion: 500 Voluntary surrender: 76 - 307 Party members and State employees (incl. 5 Top 100 wanted Red Notices)		<u>CCDI</u> <u>Xinhua</u>
	FOX HUNT	MPS	1020	Over 80		Over 4600 (Fox Hunt)	<u>MPS</u>
2019	SKY NET	CCDI	2041		~ 860 Party members and state employees (incl. 40 Red Notice & 4 Top 100 wanted Red Notices)	7242 from over 120 countries and regions Party members and state employees: 1923	NCS MOJ
2020	SKY NET	CCDI	1421		- 314 "supervising targets" (e.g., Party members and State employees) (incl. 28 Red Notices)		<u>Xinhua</u>
2021	SKY NET	CCDI	1273		~ 318 "supervising targets" (incl. 22 Red Notices)		<u>CCDI</u>
2022	SKY NET (Jan. to Nov.)	CCDI	840		~ 132 Party members and State employees (incl. 21 Red Notices & 1 Top 100 wanted Red Notice wanted)	10,668 (Sky Net recoveries between the 18th and 20th National Congress of the CCP – November 2012 / October 2022)	CCDI CCDI
	FOX HUNT	MPS	Over 700				<u>MPS</u>
2023	SKY NET	CCDI	1624				
2923				Over 120 countries and regions		~12,292	

C. PRC accounts of individual extrajudicial returns per country

As stated at the outset of this report, while coming nowhere near the total of over ~12,000 individual returns from over 120 countries and regions accounted by the Chinese authorities, clues about these principal fugitive recovery operations are hiding in plain sight.

The below table presents an overview of single country accounts using the methods of persuade to return from within China (**PCN**), persuasion ops overseas (**POS**) and/or repatriation (**REP**) since the start of Operation Fox Hunt in 2014, retrieved exclusively from online public sources of PRC authorities or State and Party media, with accounts of **a total of 283 successful returns from at least 56 countries and 2 territories** (Hong Kong and Macao) under the Sky Net umbrella.

The absence of mentions for specific countries by no means suggests that such instances have not occurred. The below country overview is limited to PRC claims that provide enough detail to assert a successful return under a particular extrajudicial method. In some instances, not enough detail was provided to make a definitive determination as to the method, as for example in the case of Portugal, where Henan authorities asserted that during their 2017 Fox Hunt operation they had taken *"extradition, border control, persuasion, repatriation, arrest and other measures, and successfully arrested 27 fugitives from New Zealand, Australia, Poland, Portugal, South Korea and other countries and regions".*⁸³

The country database should therefore be read in strict conjunction with the above comprehensive Sky Net data overview, in particular the recurring affirmation that returns have taken place from over 120 countries and regions around the world.

The data, including assertions of host country cooperation, is presented as recounted by the PRC source and does not constitute proof such cooperation effectively took place in that form or manner.

Methods that fall within the scope of formal international judicial cooperation, e.g. *extradition*, have not been included in this dataset, except when PRC authorities undermined the legal proceedings by conducting a persuasion op on the side.

Such was for example the case for former Xinchang County (Shaoxing City, Zhejiang Province) Deputy County Executive Yao Jiinqi. Following an Interpol Red Notice, he was apprehended by Bulgarian authorities on October 17, 2018. During the extradition process, the Shaoxing City Fugitive Repatriation Office assigned agents to conduct consular visits with Yao. They succeeded in persuading Yao to sign a voluntary surrender note to the Court. On November 30, 2018, Yao was extradited.⁸⁴

Safeguard Defenders' database on the use of extraditions by the Chinese authorities is available with many other pertinent resources in our **Stop Extraditions to China Information and Help Center**.

LEGEND

- Persuasion operation conducted from within China through telecommunication and pressure on family and relatives back home (PCN)
- Persuasion operation conducted overseas in direct contact with the target abroad by PRC agents or their proxies (POS)
- Repatriation operation without legal remedies conducted by PRC agents abroad in conjunction with local counterparts (REP)
- Luring or Entrapment operations conducted by PRC agents in cooperation with local counterparts (L&E)
- Formal extradition proceedings with simultaneous persuasion to induce the target to refrain from fully enjoying judicial safeguards (ET)
- Names are maintained exactly as provided in the cited source, including indication of pseudonyms and "X" or "XX" for omitted given names.
- Numbered entries highlighted in **pink** indicate claimed successful return operations; entries in **blue** indicate a claimed failed attempt.

#	Country	Year	Name CN	Name Pinyin	Foreign Nationality	Return Method	Target country collaboration	Operation	Data source
1	ANGOLA	2018	甘某	Gan X		POS	Overseas community: Angola-Nantong Chamber of Commerce through "Domestic and Overseas Police - Qiao Liaison Service Center"		<u>Local media CN</u>
	AUSTRALIA	2014	董峰	Dong Feng		PCN - POS			Local media CN
	AUSTRALIA	2014	(杨晓梅)	Yang Xiaomei		PCN - POS			Local media CN
2	AUSTRALIA	2014	陈某	Chen X		PCN		Fox Hunt	<u>State media CN</u>
3	AUSTRALIA	2015	李某	Li X		PCN - POS - REP	Australian police and immigration administration	Fox Hunt, Interpol Red Notice	Party media CN
4	AUSTRALIA	2016	唐东玫	Tang Dongmei		PCN		Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	Local media CN
5	AUSTRALIA	2016	郭廖武	Guo Liaowu		PCN		Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	Procuratorate CN
6	AUSTRALIA	2018	赖明敏	Lai Mingmin		PCN		Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	Local supervisory commission <u>CN</u>

#	Country	Year	Name CN	Name Pinyin	Foreign Nationality	Return Method	Target country collaboration	Operation	Data source
7	AUSTRALIA	2018	黄国勇	Huang Guoyong	Australian	PCN			Local media CN
8	AUSTRALIA	2018	秦湘衡	Qin Xiangheng		PCN		Sky Net	<u>State media CN</u>
9	AUSTRALIA	2018	李某	Li X		PCN		Sky Net	Local supervisory commission CN
10	AUSTRALIA	2018	梁广松	Liang Guangsong		PCN			Local supervisory commission <u>CN</u>
11	AUSTRALIA	2018	周国权	Zhou Guoquan		PCN			Local supervisory commission CN
12	AUSTRALIA	2018	胡玉兴	Hu Yuxing		PCN		Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	Party media CN
	AUSTRALIA	2018	刘富才	Liu Fucai		PCN		Interpol Red Notice	Local supervisory commission CN
13	AUSTRALIA	2019	王某某	Wang XX		POS		Fox Hunt	<u>Local media CN</u>
14	AUSTRALIA	2023	李某某	Li XX		PCN		Fox Hunt	Local media CN
15	AUSTRALIA	2023	李某某 之妻	Li XX's wife		PCN		Fox Hunt	Local media CN
16	AUSTRALIA	2023	王东生	Wang Dongsheng		PCN		Sky Net Interpol Red Notice	<u>CCDI CN</u>
17	AUSTRALIA	2023	郭洁芳	Guo Jiefang		PCN		Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	<u>State media CN</u>
18	BANGLADESH	2017	蔡某	Cai X		PCN		Fox Hunt	Local media CN
19	BENIN	2020	王某	Wang X		PCN		Fox Hunt	Police notice CN
20	BRAZIL	2017	王某霞	Wang X-xia		PCN		Fox Hunt	Local media CN
21	BULGARIA	2018	姚锦旗	Yao Jinqi		POS - ET	Bulgarian law enforcement, judiciary and immigration authorities	Sky Net, Interpol Red Notice	Local supervisory commission <u>CN</u>

#	Country	Year	Name CN	Name Pinyin	Foreign Nationality	Return Method	Target country collaboration	Operation	Data source
22	CAMBODIA	2014	徐俊杰	Xu Junjie (pseud.)		REP	Cooperation with Police General Administration	Fox Hunt	Lu Zheng [吕铮], Operation Fox Hunt [猎狐行动] (2015)
23	CAMBODIA	2014	尹一夫	Yin Yifu (pseud.)		REP	Cooperation with Police General Administration	Fox Hunt	Lu Zheng [吕铮], Operation Fox Hunt [猎狐行动] (2015)
24	CAMBODIA	2014	吴洪涛	Wu Hongtao (pseud.)		REP	Cooperation with Police General Administration	Fox Hunt	Lu Zheng [吕铮], Operation Fox Hunt [猎狐行动] (2015)
25	CAMBODIA	2014	钱某	Qian X		PCN		Fox Hunt	<u>Local media CN</u>
26	CAMBODIA	2014	朱某	Zhu X	Vanuatu	PCN		Fox Hunt, Interpol Red Notice	Local media CN
27	CAMBODIA	2014	孔某	Kong X	Guinea- Bissau	PCN		Fox Hunt, Interpol Red Notice	Local media CN
28	CAMBODIA	2015	孙新	Sun Xin		REP	Cambodian authorities, Chinese company management in Cambodia	Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	Local supervisory commission CN
29	CAMBODIA	2020	牛某某	Niu XX		PCN		Fox Hunt	Local media CN
30	CAMBODIA	2020	钟某某	Zhong XX		PCN			Party media CN
31	CAMBODIA	2020	张某某	Zhang XX		PCN			Party media CN
32	CAMBODIA	2020	万某	Wan X		PCN		Fox Hunt	Local police CN
33	CAMBODIA	2020	林某某	Lin XX		PCN			Local media CN
34	CAMBODIA	2021	孟某	Meng X		PCN		Fox Hunt	Local police CN
35	CAMBODIA	2023	董某某	Dong XX		PCN		Fox Hunt	Local police CN
36	CANADA	2014	周国庆	Zhou Guoqing (pseud.)	Canadian	PCN - POS		Fox Hunt	Lu Zheng [吕铮], Operation Fox Hunt [猎狐行动] (2015)
37	CANADA	2014	李弘	Li Hong		PCN		Fox Hunt	Local media CN
38	CANADA	2014	关某	Guan X		PCN			Supreme People's Procuratorate CN

#	Country	Year	Name CN	Name Pinyin	Foreign Nationality	Return Method	Target country collaboration	Operation	Data source
39	CANADA	2015	杨立虎	Yang Lihu		PCN		Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	Local supervisory commission CN
40	CANADA	2015	孔宪振	Kong Xianzhen		PCN		Fox Hunt	Local media CN
41	CANADA	2015	牛丽英	Niu Liying		PCN		Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	<u>CCDI CN</u>
42	CANADA	2015	方翠英	Fang Cuiying		?		Sky Net 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	Party media CN
43	CANADA	2015	曲某某	Qu XX		PCN		Sky Net	<u>State media CN</u>
44	CANADA	2016	储士林	Chu Shilin		PCN - POS		Sky Net	Local government CN
45	CANADA	2016	常征	Chang Zheng		PCN		Sky Net 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	Local supervisory commission CN
46	CANADA	2016	蒋谦	Jiang Qian		PCN - POS	Canadian law enforcement bilateral cooperation (issued arrest warrant)	Sky Net 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	<u>CCDI CN</u>
47	CANADA	2016	曾子恒	Ceng Ziheng		PCN		Sky Net 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	<u>CCDI CN</u>
48	CANADA	2016	巴连孝	Ba Lianxiao		PCN		Sky Net 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	<u>State media CN</u>
49	CANADA	2017	贺俭	He Jian		PCN		Sky Net 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	Local supervisory commission <u>CN</u>
50	CANADA	2017	李世乔	Li Shiqiao		PCN		Sky Net 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	<u>State media CN</u>
51	CANADA	2017	李文革	Li Wenge		PCN		Sky Net 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	<u>CCDI CN</u>

#	Country	Year	Name CN	Name Pinyin	Foreign Nationality	Return Method	Target country collaboration	Operation	Data source
52	CANADA	2017	王林娟	Wang Linjuan		PCN		Sky Net 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	<u>State media CN</u>
53	CANADA	2018	王清伟	Wang Qingwei		PCN		Sky Net 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	Local media CN
54	CANADA	2018	吴青	Wu Qing		PCN		Fox Hunt	<u>Party media CN</u>
55	CANADA	2018	周某	Zhou X		PCN		Fox Hunt	Local media CN
56	CANADA	2018	张某业	Zhang X-ye		PCN			Local Supervisory Commission CN
57	CANADA	2019	刘宝凤	Liu Baofeng		PCN		Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	<u>State media CN</u>
58	CANADA	2020	谢某	Xie X		PCN		Fox Hunt	<u>State media CN</u>
59	CANADA	2020	海涛	Hai Tao		PCN		Sky Net, Interpol Red Notice	<u>CCDI CN</u>
60	CANADA	2021	魏奇	Wei Qi		PCN			Local media CN
61	CANADA	2022	张岩	Zhang Yan		PCN		Interpol Red notice	<u>State media CN</u>
62	CANADA	2023	王某某	Wang XX		PCN			Local media CN
63	CHILE	2014	陈因	Chen Yin (pseud.)		PCN		Fox Hunt	<u>State media CN</u>
64	COLOMBIA	2014	王志伟	Wang Zhiwei (pseud.)		REP	Local police cooperation, transit through Frankfurt airport, Germany	Fox Hunt	Lu Zheng [吕铮], Operation Fox Hunt [猎狐行动] (2015)
65	COLOMBIA	2014	邹双庆	Zou Shuangqing (pseud.)		REP	Immigration police cooperation	Fox Hunt	Lu Zheng [吕铮], Operation Fox Hunt [猎狐行动] (2015)
66	CYPRUS	2014	孙某	Sun X		PCN		Fox Hunt	Web Forum CN
67	CYPRUS	2020	李某	Li X		PCN		Fox Hunt	Local media CN

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68	CZECH REPUBLIC	2016	颜某军	Yan X Jun		PCN - POS	Overseas Chinese community leaders in the Czech Republic		Local media CN
69	DR CONGO	2014	秦天祥	Qin Tianxiang (pseud.)		REP	Immigration police cooperation, transit through Ethiopia	Fox Hunt	Lu Zheng [吕铮], Operation Fox Hunt [猎狐行动] (2015)
	FRANCE		杨湘洪	Yang Xianghong		POS	Assistance from French Overseas Chinese community	Sky Net,100 most-wanted Red Notice list	<u>State media CN</u>
70	FRANCE	2015	王某	Wang X		PCN		Sky Net	<u>Local media CN</u>
71	FRANCE	2015	王某某	Wang XX		PCN		Fox Hunt	<u>Local media CN</u>
72	FRANCE	2017	周某红	Zhou X-hong		PCN - POS	Assistance from civil groups, in particular Mr. Feng, a "French national of Chinese heritage and prominent social activist".	Sky Net	Local media CN
73	FRANCE	2020	邹文海	Zou Wenhai		PCN		Sky Net	<u>State media CN</u>
74	FIJI	2015	王某	Wang X		POS			<u>Local media CN</u>
75	GEORGIA	2016	林某	Lin X (pseud.)		REP	Georgian authorities	Fox Hunt	<u>MPS CN</u>
76	GERMANY	2019	洪某(化 名)	Hong X (pseud.)		PCN			Local supervisory commission CN
77	GHANA	2015	赵汝恒	Zhao Ruheng		REP	Ghana law enforcement	Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	<u>State media CN</u>
78	GREECE	2016		N/A		PCN		Sky Net	Local Procuratorate CN
79	GUINEA	2015	裴健强	Pei Jianqiang		REP	Cooperation Guinean Homeland Security	Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	Local media CN
80	HONG KONG	2014	金某	Jin X		PCN			<u>Supreme People's</u> Procuratorate CN
81	HONG KONG	2015	聂某	Nie X		PCN		Fox Hunt	<u>State media CN</u>

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82	HONG KONG	2017	孔广生	Kong Guangsheng		PCN		Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	Local media CN
83	HONG KONG	2018	叶某某	Ye X		PCN			Local supervisory commission CN
84	HONG KONG	2018	郑东强	Zheng Dongqiang		PCN		Sky Net	<u>CCDI CN</u>
85	HONG KONG	2019	王军文	Wang Junwen		PCN		Fox Hunt	<u>State media CN</u>
86	HONG KONG	2020	关贵森	Guan Guisen		PCN			<u>CCDI CN</u>
87	INDIA	2016	巴桑此里	Basang Cilai		PCN		Sky Net	Local media CN
88	INDIA	2019	王某	Wang X		PCN		Fox Hunt	Local media CN
89	INDONESIA	2017	宋密秋	Song Miqiu		REP	Indonesian police		Local Public Security CN
90	INDONESIA	2019	魏某培	Wei X-pei		PCN - REP	Indonesian police & immigration administration	Fox Hunt	Local media CN
91	IRAN	2014	崔某山	Cui X-shan		PCN		Fox Hunt	<u>Local media CN</u>
92	ITALY	2014	姚某	Yao X		PCN		Fox Hunt	Local media CN
93	ITALY	2014	叶某	Ye X		POS			<u>Procuratorate CN</u>
94	ITALY	2014	谢某	Xie X		PCN		Fox Hunt	Local media CN
95	ITALY	2014	叶某荣	Ye X Rong		PCN - POS			Local media CN
96	ITALY	2015	毛某	Мао Х		PCN			<u>State media CN</u>
97	ITALY	2015	王靖苏	Wang Jingsu		PCN		Sky Net	Procuratorate CN
98	ITALY	2015	姜超凡	Jiang Chaofan		PCN - ET	Italian police and other law enforcement agencies	Fox Hunt	Party media CN
99	ITALY	2018	朱立新	Zhu Lixin		PCN		Sky Net	<u>Central government CN</u>
100	ITALY	2018	蒋某	Jiang X		PCN			Overseas Chinese language media

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101	JAPAN	2017	宋国权	Song Guoquan		PCN		Sky Net, Interpol Red Notice	<u>CCDI CN</u>
102	JAPAN	2021	沈某	Shen X		PCN			<u>State media CN</u>
103	KENYA (ETHIOPIA)	2015	钱增德	Qian Zengde	Sudan	L&E - REP	Kenyan law enforcement and Ethiopian authorities	Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	<u>State media CN</u>
104	LAOS	2014	陈斌	Chen Bin (pseud.)		PCN - POS	Pressure on a Chinese businessman and friend of Chen Bin in Vientiane to persuade Chen Bin to meet the MPS officer.	Fox Hunt	Lu Zheng [吕铮], Operation Fox Hunt [猎狐行动] (2015)
105	LAOS	2014	程某某	Cheng XX		PCN - POS	Laotian diplomatic, civil aviation, and police authorities	Fox Hunt	Local media CN
106	LAOS	2014	叶某某	Ye XX		PCN - POS	Laotian diplomatic, civil aviation, and police authorities	Fox Hunt	Local media CN
107	LAOS	2015	庞顺喜	Pang Shunxi		POS	Lao police	Sky Net	<u>CCDI CN</u>
108	LAOS	2015	安慧民	An Huimin		POS	Lao police	Sky Net	<u>CCDI CN</u>
109	LAOS	2015	常国华	Chang Guohua (pseud.)		PCN - POS	Lao police	Fox Hunt	MPS CN (Lu Zheng's "Fox Hunt 2015")
110	LAOS	2015	万慧君	Wan Huijun (pseud.)		PCN - POS	Lao police	Fox Hunt	MPS CN (Lu Zheng's "Fox Hunt 2015")
111	LAOS	2016	张某某	Zhang XX		POS			Local media CN
112	LAOS	2017	龙嘉华	Long Jiahua		REP?	Lao police	Sky Net	<u>State media CN</u>
113	LAOS	2019	蒋某	Jiang X		PCN			<u>State media CN</u>
114	LAOS	2020	殷某某	Yin XX		PCN			<u>State media CN</u>
115	LIBERIA	2014	甘某	Gan X		PCN			<u>Supreme People's</u> <u>Procuratorate</u>
116	ΜΑϹΑΟ	2015	吴权深	Wu Quanshen		PCN	Macao police	Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	Local supervisory commission <u>CN</u>

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117	MADAGASCAR	2016	刘某	Liu X		REP	Madagascar police	Fox Hunt, Interpol Red Notice	<u>State media CN</u>
118	MADAGASCAR	2016	张某	Zhang X		REP	Madagascar police	Fox Hunt, Interpol Red Notice	<u>State media CN</u>
119	MADAGASCAR	2016	刘某之子	Son of Liu & Zhang X		REP	Madagascar police	Fox Hunt, Interpol Red Notice	<u>State media CN</u>
120	MADAGASCAR	2016	N/A	N/A		REP	Madagascar police	Fox Hunt, Interpol Red Notice	<u>State media CN</u>
121	MALAWI	2014	王刚	Wang Gang (pseud.)		REP	Immigration police cooperation	Fox Hunt	Lu Zheng [吕铮], Operation Fox Hunt [猎狐行动] (2015)
122	MALAYSIA	2015	詹再生	Zhan Zaisheng		REP	Law enforcement cooperation	Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	<u>State media CN</u>
123	MALAYSIA	2018	梁某	Liang X		REP	Law enforcement cooperation	Fox Hunt, Interpol Red Notice	Local police CN
124	MALAYSIA	2018	黄某	Huang X		REP	Law enforcement cooperation	Fox Hunt, Interpol Red Notice	Local police CN
125	MALAYSIA	2019	元某	Yuan X		PCN		Operation Cloud Sword (fighting telecom fraud)	Local media CN
126	MALAYSIA	2019	李某豪	Li X-hao		PCN		Fox Hunt	Local police CN
127	MALAYSIA	2020	黄金山	Huang Jinshan		PCN		Sky Net	<u>Central Government CN</u>
128	MEXICO	2014	陈某	Chen X		PCN		Fox Hunt	<u>State media</u>
129	MONGOLIA	2023	乌某某	Wu XX		PCN - REP	Mongolian law enforcement	Fox Hunt	<u>Local media CN</u>
130	MOZAMBIQUE	2022	俞某	Yu X		PCN			Local media CN
131	MYANMAR	2014	赵崇塔	Zhao Chongta		PCN - POS	Burmese authorities	Sky Net	<u>Procuratorate CN</u>

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132	MYANMAR	2015	尚某某	Shang XX		PCN			Local Supervisory Commission CN
133	MYANMAR	2015	高某	Gao X		PCN		Fox Hunt	<u>State media CN</u>
134	MYANMAR	2016	付汉顺	Fu Hanshun		PCN	Burmese authorities	Sky Net	Local media CN
135	MYANMAR	2017	姚正清	Yao Zhengqing		PCN			Local government CN
136	MYANMAR	2018	李庆	Li Qing		PCN			<u>CCDI CN</u>
137	MYANMAR	2020	强涛	Qiang Tao		REP	Burmese authorities	Sky Net, Interpol Red Notice	<u>CCDI CN</u>
138	MYANMAR	2020	李建东	Li Jiandong		REP	Burmese authorities	Sky Net, Interpol Red Notice	<u>CCDI CN</u>
139	MYANMAR	2021	段某娜	Duan X-na		PCN	Burmese authorities	Fox Hunt	<u>Party media</u>
140	MYANMAR	2021	陈某飞	Chen X-fei		PCN	Burmese authorities	Fox Hunt	<u>Party media</u>
141	MYANMAR	2021	胡某	Hu X		PCN		Fox Hunt	Local media CN
142	MYANMAR	2022	蔡某某	Cai XX		PCN		Fox Hunt	Party website CN
143	MYANMAR	2023	苗某	Miao X		PCN		Fox Hunt	Local media CN
144	NEW ZEALAND	2014	冯润深	Feng Runshen		PCN			Supreme People's Procuratorate CN
145	NEW ZEALAND	2015	葛宝伟	Ge Baowei		PCN			<u>State media CN</u>
146	NEW ZEALAND	2016	云健	Yun Jian		PCN		Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	Procuratorate CN
147	NEW ZEALAND	2016	闫永明	Yan Yongming		POS	New Zealand law enforcement	Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	<u>CCDI CN</u>
148	NEW ZEALAND	2016	郭某	Guo X		PCN	New Zealand law enforcement	Fox Hunt, Interpol Red Notice	<u>State media CN</u>

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149	NEW ZEALAND	2018	蒋雷	Jiang Lei		PCN		Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	<u>CCDI CN</u>
150	NEW ZEALAND	2018	陈龙	Chen Long		PCN		Fox Hunt	Party media CN
151	NEW ZEALAND	2019	于善福	Yu Shanfu		PCN		Interpol Red Notice	Local supervisory commission CN
152	NEW ZEALAND	2019	黎健雄	Li Jianxiong		PCN			Local supervisory commission CN
153	NEW ZEALAND	2021	冯某	Feng X		PCN		Fox Hunt	Local media CN
154	NIGERIA	2014	穆中兴	Mu Zhongxing (pseud.)		REP	Immigration police cooperation	Fox Hunt	Lu Zheng [吕铮], Operation Fox Hunt [猎狐行动] (2015)
155	NIGERIA	2014	张青山	Zhang Qingshan (pseud.)		REP	Immigration police cooperation, transit through Dubai	Fox Hunt, Interpol Red Notice	Lu Zheng [吕铮], Operation Fox Hunt [猎狐行动] (2015)
156	NIGERIA	2023	管某某	Guan XX		PCN - REP	Police cooperation	Fox Hunt	<u>State media CN</u>
157	PERU	2016	张丽萍	Zhang Liping		POS	Peruvian authorities	Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	<u>State media CN</u>
158	PHILIPPINES	2014	梁倩	Liang Qian (pseud.)		REP	Criminal and immigration police cooperation	Fox Hunt	Lu Zheng [吕铮], Operation Fox Hunt [猎狐行动] (2015)
159	PHILIPPINES	2014	程国栋	Cheng Guodong (pseud.)		REP	Cooperation with NBI Philippines	Fox Hunt	Lu Zheng [吕铮], Operation Fox Hunt [猎狐行动] (2015)
160	PHILIPPINES	2014	林海生	Lin Haisheng (pseud.)		PCN - POS	Cooperation with NBI Philippines	Fox Hunt	Lu Zheng [吕铮], Operation Fox Hunt [猎狐行动] (2015)
161	PHILIPPINES	2014	张晓英	Zhang Xiaoying (pseud.)		PCN - POS	Cooperation with NBI Philippines	Fox Hunt	Lu Zheng [吕铮], Operation Fox Hunt [猎狐行动] (2015)
162	PHILIPPINES	2014	钱正平	Qiang Zhengping (pseud.)		PCN - POS	Cooperation with NBI Philippines	Fox Hunt	Lu Zheng [吕铮], Operation Fox Hunt [猎狐行动] (2015)
163	PHILIPPINES	2014	康弘	Kang Hong (pseud.)		POS		Fox Hunt	Lu Zheng [吕铮], Operation Fox Hunt [猎狐行动] (2015)



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164	PHILIPPINES	2014	刘霞	Liu Xia (pseud.)		POS		Fox Hunt	Lu Zheng [吕铮], Operation Fox Hunt [猎狐行动] (2015)
165	PHILIPPINES	2014	陈慧娟	Chen Huijuan (pseud.)		REP	Cooperation with Philippine Bureau of Immigration	Fox Hunt	Lu Zheng [吕铮], Operation Fox Hunt [猎狐行动] (2015)
166	PHILIPPINES	2014	梁大民	Liang Damin (pseud.)		REP	Cooperation with Philippine Bureau of Immigration	Fox Hunt	Lu Zheng [吕铮], Operation Fox Hunt [猎狐行动] (2015)
167	PHILIPPINES	2014	谢春亮	Xie Chunliang (pseud.)		REP	Cooperation with Philippine Bureau of Immigration	Fox Hunt	Lu Zheng [吕铮], Operation Fox Hunt [猎狐行动] (2015)
168	PHILIPPINES	2014	高强	Gao Qiang (pseud.)		REP	Davao Immigration Bureau cooperation	Fox Hunt	Lu Zheng [吕铮], Operation Fox Hunt [猎狐行动] (2015)
169	PHILIPPINES	2014	龚某	Gong X		PCN			<u>State media CN</u>
170	PHILIPPINES	2014	李某	Li X		PCN - POS		Fox Hunt	<u>State media CN</u>
171	PHILIPPINES	2014	周某	Zhou X		POS	Philippine immigration authorities	Fox Hunt	Local media CN
172	PHILIPPINES	2016	金某某	Jin XX		PCN		Fox Hunt, Interpol Red Notice	<u>Local media CN</u>
173	PHILIPPINES	2016	邓某	Deng X		REP	Philippine law enforcement agencies	Fox Hunt, Interpol Red Notice	<u>State media CN</u>
174	PHILIPPINES	2019	谢浩杰	Xie Haojie		REP	Philippine authorities including Immigration Administration and Police	Sky Net	<u>State media CN</u>
175	PHILIPPINES	2021	谢某	Xie X		PCN		Fox Hunt	Local government CN
176	PHILIPPINES	2022	孙锋	Sun Feng		REP	Philippine authorities	Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	<u>State media CN</u>
177	PHILIPPINES	2023	赖某某	Lai XX		PCN			Local police CN
178	PHILIPPINES	2023	王某	Wang X		PCN		Fox Hunt	Local government CN
179	PHILIPPINES	2023	江某	Jiang X		PCN		Fox Hunt	Local government CN
180	POLAND	2018	卫君仁	Wei Junren		PCN		Sky Net	Local supervisory commission CN



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181	ROMANIA	2015	陈浩然	Chen Haoran		PCN			<u>Central government CN</u>
182	RUSSIA	2014	金某	Jin X		PCN		Fox Hunt	Local media CN
183	RUSSIA	2014	李某	Li X		PCN		Fox Hunt	Local media CN
184	RUSSIA	2015	于某	Yu X		PCN		Sky Net	<u>State media CN</u>
185	RUSSIA	2016	陈某	Chen X		PCN	Russian law enforcement	Interpol Red Notice	Party media CN
186	RUSSIA	2023	伍某	Wu X		PCN		Fox Hunt	Party website CN
187	RUSSIA	2023	许某	Xu X		ET	Russian law enforcement		<u>State media CN</u>
188	SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS	2017	任标	Ren Biao		PCN - POS		Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	<u>Party media CN</u>
189	SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES	2016	付耀波	Fu Yaobo			Local law enforcement	Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	<u>State media CN</u>
190	SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES	2016	张清曌	Zhang Qingzhao			Local law enforcement	Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	<u>State media CN</u>
191	SERBIA	2018	夏某	Xia X		PCN - POS	Qingtian Overseas Police Service Center	Fox Hunt	Local media CN
192	SIERRA LEONE	2021	张某	Zhang X		PCN		Fox Hunt, Interpol Red Notice	Local police CN
193	SINGAPORE	2015	李华波	Li Huabo		PCN - REP	Singapore Attorney- General and Immigration Administration	Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	Local media CN
194	SINGAPORE	2015	徐爱红	Xu Aihong		PCN	Singapore Attorney- General and Immigration Administration	Sky Net	Local media CN
195	SINGAPORE	2015	黄水木	Huang Shuimu		PCN		Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	Local supervisory commission

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196	SINGAPORE	2015	韩建鹏	Han Jianpeng		PCN		Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	Local supervisory commission
197	SOUTH KOREA	2014	黄某	Huang X		PCN		Fox Hunt	Local media CN
198	SOUTH KOREA	2015	沈某	Shen X		PCN		Fox Hunt	<u>State media CN</u>
199	SOUTH KOREA	2015	李远寿	Li Yuanshou		REP		Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	<u>State media CN</u>
200	SOUTH KOREA	2016	彭某	Peng X		REP	South Korean law enforcement agencies	Fox Hunt, Interpol Red Notice	<u>State media CN</u>
201	SOUTH KOREA	2016	倪某	Ni X		REP	South Korean law enforcement agencies	Fox Hunt, Interpol Red Notice	<u>State media CN</u>
202	SOUTH KOREA	2018	李某	Li X		PCN		Fox Hunt	Local media CN
203	SPAIN	2014	孙大洪	Sun Dahong (pseud.)	Permanent residence holder Spain	PCN - POS	No cooperation, but Fox Hunt officers Wan Fang and Hao Yan used the opportunity of their meeting with the Deputy Director General of the Spanish Ministry of Justice in Madrid to travel on to Barcelona to persuade target.	Fox Hunt	Lu Zheng [吕铮], Operation Fox Hunt [猎狐行动] (2015)
204	SPAIN	2015	阙某	Que X		PCN			<u>State media CN</u>
205	SPAIN	2018	徐少斌	Xu Shaobin		PCN			<u>State media CN</u>
206	SPAIN	2020	刘某	Liu X		PCN - POS	Qingtian city Hometown Association of Spain (QHAS)		Overseas media CN
207	SPAIN	2020	樊某某	Fan XX		PCN		Fox Hunt	Local police CN
208	SURINAME	2016	钱某	Qian X		POS		Fox Hunt, Interpol Red Notice	<u>State media CN</u>

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209	TAIWAN	2018	金某	Jin X		PCN		Fox Hunt	Local media CN
210	TAIWAN	2018	郭某	Guo X		PCN		Fox Hunt	Local media CN
211	THAILAND	2014	庞小燕	Pang Xiaoyan		REP	Immigration police cooperation	Fox Hunt	Lu Zheng [吕铮], Operation Fox Hunt [猎狐行动] (2015)
212	THAILAND	2014	张子琪	Zhang Ziqi		REP	Immigration police cooperation	Fox Hunt	Lu Zheng [吕铮], Operation Fox Hunt [猎狐行动] (2015)
213	THAILAND	2014	姜明	Jiang Ming (pseud.)		REP	Criminal police cooperation	Fox Hunt, Interpol Red Notice	Lu Zheng [吕铮], Operation Fox Hunt [猎狐行动] (2015)
214	THAILAND	2014	程红霞	Cheng Hongxia (pseud.)		REP	Criminal police cooperation	Fox Hunt	Lu Zheng [吕铮], Operation Fox Hunt [猎狐行动] (2015)
215	THAILAND	2014	姜雪	Jiang Xue (pseud.)		REP	Criminal police cooperation	Fox Hunt	Lu Zheng [吕铮], Operation Fox Hunt [猎狐行动] (2015)
216	THAILAND	2019	邓某	Deng X		PCN		Fox Hunt	<u>Local media CN</u>
217	THAILAND	2019	曾某	Ceng X		PCN			<u>State media CN</u>
218	THAILAND	2020	邹某某	Zou XX		PCN		Fox Hunt	Local police CN
219	THAILAND	2021	馮某	Feng X		PCN		Fox Hunt	Local police CN
220	THAILAND	2023	林某平	Lin X-ping		PCN - REP	Thai authorities	Interpol Red Notice	Local media CN
221	UGANDA	2014	于静	Yu Jing (pseud.)		REP	Criminal police cooperation, transit through Dubai	Fox Hunt	Lu Zheng [吕铮], Operation Fox Hunt [猎狐行动] (2015)
222	UGANDA	2014	连魁	Lian Kui (pseud.)		REP	Local police cooperation (Interpol National Bureau), transit through Dubai	Fox Hunt	Lu Zheng [吕铮], Operation Fox Hunt [猎狐行动] (2015)
223	UNITED KINGDOM	2015	邱渤海	Qiu Bohai		PCN		Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	Local media CN
224	UNITED KINGDOM	2016	陈祎娟	Chen Yijuan		PCN - POS		Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	<u>State media CN</u>

#	Country	Year	Name CN	Name Pinyin	Foreign Nationality	Return Method	Target country collaboration	Operation	Data source
225	UNITED KINGDOM	2017	张靖川	Zhang Jingchuan		PCN		Sky Net, Interpol Red Notice	Local supervisory commission CN
226	USA	2014	王国强	Wang Guoqiang		PCN		100 most-wanted Red Notice list	<u>State media CN</u>
227	USA	2014	张朝晖	Zhang Chaohui		PCN			<u>State media CN</u>
228	USA	2014	张某	Zhang X		PCN			Supreme People's Procuratorate
229	USA	2015	黄玉荣	Huang Yurong		PCN	U.S. authorities	Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	<u>State media CN</u>
230	USA	2015	于某	Yu X		PCN		Sky Net	<u>State media CN</u>
231	USA	2015	林某民	Lin X-min		PCN		Fox Hunt	Local media CN
232	USA	2015	杨进军	Yang Jinjun		REP	U.S. authorities	Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	<u>CCDI CN</u>
233	USA	2016	张大伟	Zhang Dawei		PCN - POS		Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	Local government CN
234	USA	2016	朱海平	Zhu Haiping		PCN		Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	<u>State media CN</u>
235	USA	2016	林详华	Lin Xianghua		PCN		Fox Hunt	Local police CN
236	USA	2017	李某某	Li XX		PCN			Local supervisory commission <u>CN</u>
237	USA	2017	陳富錦	Chen Fujin		PCN		Sky Net, Interpol Red Notice	Local media CN
238	USA	2017	叶丽宁	Ye Lining		PCN		Sky Net	<u>State media CN</u>
239	USA	2017	袁梅	Yuan Mei		PCN		Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	Local supervisory commission <u>CN</u>
240	USA	2017	徐雪伟	Xu Xuewei		PCN		Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	Local media CN



#	Country	Year	Name CN	Name Pinyin	Foreign Nationality	Return Method	Target country collaboration	Operation	Data source
241	USA	2017	刘常凯	Liu Changkai		PCN		Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	Local supervisory commission CN
242	USA	2017	王佳哲	Wang Jiazhe		PCN		Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	<u>CCDI CN</u>
243	USA	2017	王诚建	Wang Chengjian		PCN		Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	<u>State media CN</u>
244	USA	2017	黄红	Huang Hong		PCN		Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	<u>State media CN</u>
245	USA	2018	陈翔	Chen Xiang		PCN			<u>State media CN</u>
246	USA	2018	张勇光	Zhang Yongguang		PCN		Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	Local supervisory commission CN
247	USA	2019	郑锡恩	Zheng Xi'en		PCN		Sky Net	Local government CN
248	USA	2019	莫佩芬	Mo Peifen		PCN		Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	Local supervisory commission CN
249	USA	2020	黄平	Huang Ping		PCN	Assistance from Overseas Chinese community: "The Shantou City Fugitive Repatriation Office utilized the network of the Overseas Chinese community to help gather Huang's information about Huang's overseas identity, real estate, and occupation."	Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	Local media CN
250	USA	2020	吴健	Wu Jian		PCN			Local government CN
251	USA	2021	黎某鹏	Li X-peng		PCN		Fox Hunt	Local media CN
252	USA	2023	周权	Zhou Quan		PCN		Sky Net	<u>CCDI CN</u>

#	Country	Year	Name CN	Name Pinyin	Foreign Nationality	Return Method	Target country collaboration	Operation	Data source
253	VIETNAM	2014	廖菲	Liao Fei (pseud.)		REP	Public security cooperation	Fox Hunt	Lu Zheng [吕铮], Operation Fox Hunt [猎狐行动] (2015)
254	VIETNAM	2014	冯翔	Feng Xiang		REP	Immigration police cooperation	Fox Hunt	Lu Zheng [吕铮], Operation Fox Hunt [猎狐行动] (2015)
255	VIETNAM	2015	陈维森	Chen Weisen		PCN			Procuratorate CN
256	VIETNAM	2017	刘某崇	Liu X-chong		PCN - REP		Fox Hunt	<u>Local media CN</u>
257	VIETNAM	2017	刘某健	Liu X-jian		PCN - REP		Fox Hunt	Local media CN
258	VIETNAM	2017	刘某镇	Liu X-zhen		PCN - REP		Fox Hunt	Local media CN
259	VIETNAM	2018	王某	Wang X		PCN		Fox Hunt	Local government CN
260	VIETNAM	2019	吴云	Wu Yun		PCN		Sky Net	Local supervisory commission CN
261	VIETNAM	2020	覃亭	Qin Ting		PCN	Vietnamese law enforcement, Overseas Chinese community in Vietnam	Interpol Red Notice	Local police CN
262	VIETNAM	2020	覃亭	Hu Yipin		REP	Vietnamese law enforcement	Sky Net, Interpol Red Notice	<u>CCDI CN</u>
263	VIETNAM	2021	姜某刚	Jiang X-gang		PCN - (REP?)	Vietnamese law enforcement		Local media CN
264	VIETNAM	2023	何某某	He XX		PCN		Fox Hunt	<u>Party media CN</u>
265	ZAMBIA	2022	黄某	Huang X		POS	Nantong Domestic and Overseas Police and Overseas Chinese Linkage Service Center (南通市海内外警侨联动 服务中心), Angola-Nantong Chamber of Commerce (安哥 拉南通商会), Zambia Chamber of Commerce (赞比亚通商 分会), Overseas Chinese Association of Zambia (赞比亚 华侨联合会).		<u>Local media CN</u>
266	UNKNOWN	2014	徐某某	Xu XX		PCN			<u>Local media CN</u>

#	Country	Year	Name CN	Name Pinyin	Foreign Nationality	Return Method	Target country collaboration	Operation	Data source
267	UNKNOWN	2016	李某	Li X		REP	Foreign law enforcement agencies of multiple countries	Fox Hunt, Interpol Red Notice	<u>State media CN</u>
268	UNKNOWN	2016	姜某	Jiang X		REP	African country law enforcement	Fox Hunt	<u>State media CN</u>
269	UNKNOWN	2020	曲志林	Qu Zhilin		PCN		100 most-wanted Red Notice list	<u>State media CN</u>
270	UNKNOWN	2020	程宣	Cheng Xuan		PCN		Interpol Red Notice	<u>Party media CN</u>
271	UNKNOWN	2020	钱建芬	Qian Jianfen		PCN			<u>CCDI CN</u>
272	UNKNOWN	2020	张纪华	Zhang Jihua		PCN			<u>CCDI CN</u>
273	UNKNOWN	2020	梁荣富	Liang Rongfu		PCN		Interpol Red Notice	<u>CCDI CN</u>
274	UNKNOWN	2021	罗卫民	Luo Weimin		PCN		Interpol Red Notice	<u>State media CN</u>
275	UNKNOWN	2021	朴哲浩	Pu Zhehao		PCN		Sky Net 2021	<u>CCDI CN</u>
276	UNKNOWN	2021	黄某鸿	Huang X-hong		PCN	Foreign law enforcement agencies	Red notice	Local police CN
277	UNKNOWN	2021	郑某坚	Zheng X-jian		REP		Fox Hunt, Interpol Red Notice	Local media CN
278	UNKNOWN	2021	王某	Wang X		REP	Foreign authorities	Fox Hunt, Interpol Red Notice	Local media CN
279	UNKNOWN	2021	姜某升	Jiang X-sheng		PCN		Fox Hunt, Interpol Red Notice	Local media CN
280	UNKNOWN	2021	金京文	Jin Jingwen		PCN			Local media CN
281	UNKNOWN	2022	屈健玲	Qu Jianling		REP	International law enforcement cooperation	Interpol Red Notice	<u>CCDI CN</u>
282	UNKNOWN	2022	汪健波	Wang Jianbo		PCN			Local media CN
283	UNKNOWN	2023	郭启刚	Guo Qigang		PCN		Sky Net	Local media CN



CHAPTER 2 EXTRADITIONS

France, 2020: On July 7, 2020, the Dongguan Public Security Bureau (Guangdong Province) requests INTERPOL to issue a Red Notice on money laundering charges in view of an extradition request on individual X (name redacted in court records). On March 22, 2021, X is placed under provisional arrest by the French police upon landing at Bordeaux-Mérignac airport and subsequently granted conditional release within the Gironde region for the duration of the judicial extradition process.

During the judicial proceedings, X receives various phone calls from PRC and Hong Kong authorities the defense team makes sure to record under the control of a bailiff:

"As long as you cooperate in clarifying Sun Lijun's affairs, you will not be held responsible for any other matters. There will be no criminal sanctions, no detention, no restrictions on your freedom," the director of criminal investigations of the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau assures X. These words not only directly contradict the alleged criminal grounds that led to the request for a Red Notice, violating INTERPOL's statute and reinforcing the defense lawyers' argument that not a single criminal element has been brought forward by any Chinese authority, they also point to the political nature of the persecution.

Former Public Security Vice-Minister Sun Lijun had been arrested in April 2020 for "grave discipline violations", allegedly over 2018 requests for a 40 million Hong Kong dollar investment in the Hong Kong security firm Asia Pacific Security Services Limited with the aim of maintaining order in the Special Administrative Region, including through the recruitment of former police officers that had been fired over their abuse against demonstrators.

In another call, Deputy Director for National Security in Hong Kong Li Jiangzhou further clarifies the request in response to X's questions:

"Question: Is it for the SUN Lijun case? Response: It is to cooperate in testifying... You are exempt from criminal responsibility. The most important thing is to clarify things concerning Sun. It is to testify, haven't you understood yet?"

Months later, Li Jiangzhou reiterates the message: "First of all we are talking about the Sun affair. The special investigation unit clearly told you... Come in and clarify the matter. The "bad guy" deceived you." X had more than one reason to doubt the sincerity of the reassurances that there would be no personal consequences if only he would testify against the former Vice-Minister, given X's cousin had previously served nine months in prison for similar reasons.

But there is a price to be paid for his resistance: in March 2021, as judicial proceedings in France are ongoing, a call comes in warning X his family members may face arrest in his stead if he does not make an immediate return to China. The threats are not empty. A mere four days later, X's sister is detained in the Second Detention Center of Dongguan.

As if the connection between events wasn't clear enough, another call is placed, to make sure the message sinks in. X should make no mistake that his sister's fate is bound to his willingness to cooperate: "Stop arguing, your life belongs to the State. I am offering you the best chance of your life. [The alternative] will kill both you and your family."

The above are excerpts from the Bordeaux Court of Appeal's records⁸⁵, which denied X's extradition on three substantial grounds related to violations of the bilateral extradition treaty and French law.

First, the alleged money laundering charge can only constitute a crime under French law as an accessory crime to a primary one. No evidence of a primary crime was provided by the Chinese authorities.

Second, recorded conversations between Chinese public security authorities and the wanted individual indicated the political nature of the persecution, as the individual was assured multiple times that he was wanted only as a witness against former public security vice-minister Sun Lijun, accused of violating Party discipline.

Third, with regard to its human rights obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights, the Court noted that the documentation provided by the Chinese authorities regarding *progress in the judicial protection of human rights* did not help to verify the reality of conditions and extensively cited Safeguard Defenders' reports on the use of Residential Surveillance at a Designated Location (RSDL) and Liuzhi -- both incommunicado detention systems -- to highlight the serious risk of torture or other inhumane and degrading treatment if X were to be returned.

It must furthermore be highlighted that pursuing an individual through Interpol channels is abusive under the Organization's Statutes if that pursuit is not based on the real intent to have the person extradited on actual criminal charges.

The PRC has invested heavily in expanding its global footprint of bilateral extradition treaties, mutual legal assistance treaties, prisoner swap treaties and various law enforcement cooperation agreements at both the bi- and multilateral level over the past years.

Beyond the stated aim of such agreements, they come with important added bonuses.

They contribute to extending its long-arm policing capacities and convey a very precise message to those targeted that *"nowhere is safe"*. Secondly, they legitimize China's judicial system, with PRC authorities claiming the signing of such agreements *effectively demonstrates China's good image and the confidence of the international community in China's rule of law.*⁸⁶

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Despite the grave and ongoing violations of civil and political rights, the ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity in the Uyghur region, persecution on political, ethnic or religious grounds, the widespread and systematic use of enforced disappearances and torture to extract forced confessions, the absence of an independent judiciary, the lack of access to lawyers of one's own choosing, and a consistent criminal conviction rate just shy of 100 percent as denounced repeatedly by a myriad of democratic Governments and Parliaments, regional and multi-lateral bodies, UN Human Rights Mechanisms, Courts and non-governmental organizations, one might shrug at that last point.

The issue is that such legitimization has proven to be worth a whole lot more than a pat on the back. It contributes directly to the expansion of the PRC's global long-arm policing footprint.

In 2015, an Italian Court of Appeal ruled in favor of extradition to China and dismissed the defense's claims of risk of torture and other inhuman and degrading treatment by stating that the "advanced stage of legislative approval of the bilateral extradition treaty signed between Italy and the People's Republic of China on October 7, 2010, demonstrates the political will of the State parties to extradite wanted individuals [...] on the basis of mutual reliance on the effective recognition of fair trial standards and the full respect of fundamental human rights in the respective detention facilities".

Similarly, standing extradition treaties with democratic nations have directly contributed to the PRC's ability to entice more countries into entering the *growing web of international judicial and police cooperation. During a 2020 court hearing in Cyprus, a representative for the Ministry of Justice testified how little attention had been paid to examining the human rights situation on the ground before the conclusion of the extradition treaty, as the fact that other European Member States maintained them was found to be sufficient ground to proceed with the signing.*

Since then, things have radically changed in both countries, with consistent denials of extradition requests to the PRC since 2023, following the European Court of Human Rights' landmark Liu v. Poland judgment⁸⁷ that virtually renders any extradition to China from the 48 Council of Europe Member States impossible.

In its judgment, the Court defined the PRC's judicial and penitentiary system as a *"general situation of violence"*. Extraditing any individual to the country would constitute a violation of the principle of non-refoulement under article 3 of the European Convention on human rights.

Non-refoulement is an absolute and core principle of international refugee and human rights law that prohibits States from returning individuals to a country where there is a real risk of being subjected to persecution, torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or any other human rights violation.

Similar assessments have been consistently made by relevant UN Human Rights Procedures with regard to individuals at risk of extradition to China: "No State has the right to expel, return or otherwise remove any individual from its territory whenever there are 'substantial grounds' for believing that the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture in the State of destination, including, where applicable, the **existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights.**"

However, with bilateral extradition treaties with the PRC and Hong Kong still in place in a fair amount of EU Member States and around the world, uncertainty and fear remains for potential targets.

Even when a target does manage to successfully beat a request for extradition to the PRC, the cost that is imposed in terms of temporary – and potentially lengthy - deprivation of their liberty during judicial proceedings is incredibly high. A cost some may choose to avoid in the first place by resorting to limiting their freedom of movement or speech.

In fact, the European Court of Human Rights' *Liu v. Poland* judgment further condemned Poland for the lengthy deprivation of liberty during the judicial proceedings on the request of extradition, ruling it to have constituted *arbitrary detention* in violation of article 6 of the Convention.

In recent years, citizens of multiple democratic nations have been expressly warned against traveling to countries with standing extradition treaties with the PRC or Hong Kong. These include activists, dissidents and sitting Members of Parliament in the United Kingdom and Denmark. Within the European Union alone, ten Member States⁸⁸ – including the seat of many European institutions, Belgium – maintain active extradition treaties with China, while two – Czech Republic and Portugal – maintain active extradition treaties with Hong Kong.

Numerous reports have consistently denounced the Chinese authorities' abuse of international judicial and police cooperation mechanisms (such as Interpol) to persecute human rights defenders, political opponents and individuals belonging to ethnic or religious minorities, exposing them to the risk of arbitrary detention in other countries' jurisdictions.

Since May 2021, at least seven European Parliament resolutions calling for the immediate suspension of all bilateral extradition treaties with the People's Republic of China and Hong Kong have been adopted by overwhelming majorities. Following Beijing's imposition of the National Security Law in Hong Kong in 2020, ten democratic nations suspended their extradition treaties with Hong Kong as part of a package of responses to the new security law China has imposed on the region.

For more information on the state of extraditions to the PRC and effective ways to counter them, please visit our permanent online *Stop Extraditions to China Information and Help Center*.

CHAPTER 3 REPATRIATION

Laos, 2023: Former Radio Free Asia journalist Yang Zewei(Qiao Xinxin) lived in exile in Laos. Founder of Ban the Great Firewall (BanGFW), he is the co-author of a manual on how to climb China's Great Firewall.

Yang worked with a small team of exiled Chinese activists and volunteers in Southeast Asia, the U.S., Canada and The Netherlands to assist people inside China circumvent the great firewall and to advocate for an end to its censorship.

In April 2023, his brother texted to alert him that Chinese authorities were harassing and threatening their family in China. Desperate, he asked Yang to stop his activism.

"This is the era of big data, everything can be traced, everything can be monitored. Don't think you're safe just because you're overseas. Your parents are still living at home, think about them."

On May 28th, Yang visited Vientiane's Chinatown. The next day, his phone stopped working so he told his friends he was going out to buy a new SIM card.

On June 2nd, his friends realized it had been 48 hours since he'd posted on Twitter or messaged any of them. One of them rushed to his home.

Upon arrival, it was too late. Yang's neighbor told him two Laotian and six Chinese police officers had come to Yang's house a few days earlier, handcuffed him and took him away.

When Yang's friend called the public security authorities in Yang's hometown in Lingguan Town, Hengyang City, Hunan, they confirmed Yang had been returned and was being handled by a special task force.

Feng Ye, an activist who worked with Yang in Vientiane before fleeing the country, told Voice of America that according to unconfirmed information from the Hunan Chamber of Commerce in Laos, someone within the overseas Chinese community affiliated with the Chamber covertly collaborated with Chinese public security officials in the capture and repatriation of Yang by providing the authorities with Yang's address, daily habits and other useful details.^{89 - 90}

Repatriation is a big favorite in the CCP's playbook for forced returns. A preference apparently shared with countries happy to close an eye to the violations of the international human rights standards they are bound to respect, as the detail on cases examined for this report indicates.

While the CCDI's definition on the measure refers to the use of immigration law - e.g., the deportation of individuals on the grounds of violations of entry or residence requirements in the host country, which would afford individuals some remedies and safeguards - both counterparts seem to be far more liberal in its practical application and use it as a shorthand for extra-judicial deportations.

Philippines, 2014: Yang Chen made his way through the hustle and bustle of Manila's night life. It had been two days since he and fellow officers Xu Zhongwei and Fan Ying had arrived, yet little progress had been made in their pursuit of economic crime suspects Liang Damin and Xie Chunliang (pseudonyms).

After they'd fled the country, the Fox Hunt team had worked closely with the Embassy in the Philippines and the Philippine Bureau of Immigration, but it was as if the two fugitives had evaporated from the face of the earth...

That is until Liang's philandering ways finally provided them with a clue. Only a week ago he had reached out to one of his many girlfriends inside China. When the Fox Hunt team came knocking, she'd had no choice but to provide them with his phone number... a number located in the Philippines.

As the night grew thicker, their surroundings were pitch black, with occasional flashes of traffic bringing in a little light.

"Well, anything yet?" Yang asked. "No, he hasn't been online so far," technology expert Fan responded.

"Girl, will this even work?" Xu spoke gruffly. He'd been a special forces soldier before he changed careers and was skeptical of the petite young woman. In his eyes, overseas arrest work should be carried out by men like himself.

Fan trained her eyes on her phone, willing Liang to open the text message she'd sent him. There! He'd fallen into the trap she'd set. "We have a location!"

"Let's waste no time. Political Commissar Xu, notify the Philippine Immigration Police immediately and tell them to meet us there," Yang Chen said. Xu Zhongwei's nickname was Political Commissar Xu, something he did not dispute as he used his broken English to relay the orders to his local contact.

As they found themselves waiting in front of a row of high-rise apartment buildings, Xu could no longer contain his curiosity. How had Fan managed to obtain Liang's location with such ease?

"So... I'm a bit confused. You can lock into his location with just a simple text message?"

Fan flushed with pride. "Hehe, there are many things you don't understand,

so I won't explain them all."

Xu choked. "Hey! I ... "

"It's a trojan I developed. It operates through spam text messages. As long as the recipient opens the message, the phone will automatically reply and provide its location," Fan laughingly relented. "However, after careful observation of his ways, team leader Yang and I found that Liang is semiliterate, so we couldn't be sure he'd actually open it, so…" "So what?" Xu pressed greedily. Fan shook her head. "This has to be kept secret, not just anyone can know."

Xu's protests were interrupted by the arrival of their colleagues with the Philippine Immigration Bureau. A new problem had arisen: under local laws, they could not enter the premises without a warrant authorized by the Court.

"Might it be possible to work around this limitation with a small ruse to pinpoint the suspect's precise location in the apartment building?" Yang asked Philippine team leader Sandy. "Say, go in to inquire about renting a unit?"

Sandy mulled it over for a second and nodded. "Yes, that should do the trick."

Sandy and Yang entered the building and soon found the property owner. Fortune willed it he was a Chinese American who, to Yang's delight, spoke Chinese quite well.

Oblivious to his visitors' true aims, he happily accompanied them upstairs to look at an available unit. As they made their way through the tenth floor, he chitchatted away. "What brings you to this place?"

"Ah, a friend of mine lives here and said that the property service is very good, so here we are," Yang jumped on the opportunity. "What? You guys have friends who live here." The property owner laughed. "Who is it? Do I know him?"

Yang quickly handed him a picture of Liang enjoying a quiet fishing trip. "That's him." "Ah sure, this guy! I know him." "Haha, right, he is an old resident here," Yang interjected. "The floor he lives on is so nice. Any chance you have any units left there?"

The property owner shook his head. "The twenty-fourth floor you mean? No more, I'm sorry." "Well... what unit was he in again? I always forget," Yang tried. "Haha, 2401, the first one out of the elevator."

Satisfied the two men quickly left the building to inform their comrades of the inroads they'd made. Not only had Liang been located, the property owner had also offered up some most useful information on his habits! All they had to do now was to wait until he'd go for his usual morning walk around 4 AM.

Yang and his team were determined they would not let this cunning fox slip through. Overnight stake-out it was.

Finally, the sky turned fish-belly white. At 4:26 AM, a man in a short-sleeved tracksuit jogged out of the apartment. Yang's battle nerves immediately tensed up. "That's him. That's Liang Damin."

"Sandy, time to move!" Yang signaled the Philippine immigration officer.

They quickly exited their cars and closed in on their unguarded target like tigers on the hunt.

"What's your name?!" In shock, the man stuttered. "My name is Liang... Liang Damin." "Well, we are with the Chinese police. We have come to pick you up and return you to your country." "You... are you really police officers? I'm not... not being kidnapped?"

Sandy smiled and flashed his credentials. "They're immigration police, you see?" Yang showed his Chinese police ID.

"Alas... I understand..." Liang nodded helplessly. "From the beginning of your Operation Fox Hunt, I have been following the national news. I knew this day would come but... I didn't think it would come so quickly." "Sooner or later, you have to pay for your sins. It is inevitable," Yang said coldly.

However, despite his dire situation, Liang was not all out of luck. The officers had yet to find their first clue on the whereabouts of Xie Chunliang. He was all too eager to offer his alleged accomplice up in exchange for the promise of some leniency.

He quickly arranged a meeting with Xie to discuss business at a local café.

Hours later, both suspects were in Fan's custody and on their way back to China. For Yang and Xu, another and far more dangerous mission awaited them in Davao.

Xu felt ready for whatever lay ahead. Before parting ways he'd taken advantage of a moment of distraction to examine Liang Damin's cell phone. As he stretched his legs under the seat in front of him, he couldn't help but smile at the image of the beautiful girl with which Fan had tricked the man into giving up his prized location.⁹¹

Lu Zheng's 2015 publication is filled to the brim with stories of local authorities' cooperation in repatriation operations. From far-away locations in Colombia, Congo, Malawi, Nigeria and Uganda, to the closer-by destinations of Cambodia, Laos, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam.

A propaganda video shared on WeChat by the Jilin provincial public security department⁹² - uncovered by ASPI's Cyber, Technology and Security Analyst Daria Impiombato -, and accompanying media articles celebrate the mass repatriation operation of seventy-seven individuals from Fiji on August 5, 2017.⁹³⁻⁹⁴



In August 2023, The Washington Post's Matthew E. Miller and Matthew Abbott took us into the events that unfolded six years prior:

Fiji, 2017: "When four Chinese detectives breezed into police headquarters here in the middle of 2017, it quickly became apparent they weren't in Fiji's capital merely to help with an inquiry. Instead, the officers planned to carry out the investigation - into Chinese national suspected of running internet scams from the South Pacific island - pretty much as if they were back in China.

'Everything was done by them,' said a former Fijian police officer who was in the Suva headquarters at the time, speaking on the condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to comment publicly. 'Fiji police was only here to assist in the arrest, nothing else. All the statements, recordings and the uplifting of all exhibits was done by the Chinese.'

The case was a harbinger of China's ambitions in the wider Pacific as well as its willingness to conduct investigations and project its police power overseas, sometimes with little regard for local authorities. But the case also became a catalyst for Fiji standing up to Beijing and assert its sovereignty.

Weeks after the initial four landed in Fiji, scores more Chinese police officers arrived in the island, and 77 suspects, many of them young women, were marched in handcuffs and hoods across the tarmac at a local airport before being flown to China. None was given an extradition hearing. There was no proper documentation, no Interpol involvement, the former Fijian officer said. 'They just came and did whatever they wanted,' added another, more senior officer.

China's domineering role in the investigation, followed by arrests that human rights activists and Fijian opposition leaders likened to a mass kidnapping, was the culmination of Beijing's most extensive security partnership in the Pacific, one based on a secretive memorandum of understanding on police cooperation between Beijing and the government of then-Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama.

[...]'We didn't even know there was an agreement,' Aman Ravindra-Singh, a lawyer who was one of the few public figures in Fiji to speak out against the arrests at the time, said of the memorandum. 'The next thing we knew, there were knocks on people's doors in [the city of] Nadi and there were Chinese people in full uniform arresting people. It was unheard of. It's almost like we were invaded.'

The police cooperation between China and Fiji that began in 2011 with the six-page MOU would continue for more than a decade. [...] The police agreement provided a blueprint for China to grow its security presence 5,600 miles away in Fiji - from the soft power of people-to-people exchanges to the hard power of arrests, extrajudicial deportations and the transfer of high-tech equipment such as closed-circuit cameras, surveillance and drones.

[...} 'China is seeking to create an alternative security network across the Pacific,' said Anna Powles, a Pacific expert at New Zealand's Massey University, noting that in a part of the world where few countries have militaries, the police are a key avenue of influence. 'In that respect, the early MOU signed with Fiji in 2011 laid the groundwork.' [...]"⁹⁵

In December 2022, Bainimarama lost the elections. One of the first announcement new Fijian Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka made in January 2023 was his intention to terminate the police agreement with Beijing. In an interview to The Washington Post he stated *"he made the decision because he feared the MOU risked 'treading on people's personal rights'. He also suggested that his predecessor's close ties to China had undermined Fijian sovereignty and increased corruption."*⁹⁶

The Fijian conundrum highlights the risks of open-ended police cooperation with the PRC as it presses to expand its global security footprint. And episodes such as the August 2017 one are far from limited to Fiji.

In July 2019, Dan McGary reported in Vanuatu's Daily Post:

Vanautu, 2019: "Under a veil of secrecy, China has convinced Vanuatu to enforce Chinese law within its own borders.

Six Chinese nationals were arrested, detained without charge on the premises of a Chinese company with numerous large government contracts. Without access to the Vanuatu courts, they were escorted out of Vanuatu with Chinese police holding one arm and Vanuatu Police holding the other. Neither Chinese nor Vanuatu police were in uniform.

Five men and one woman were marched onto the tarmac at Port Vila's Bauerfield airport yesterday and bundled into a privately owned Airbus 320 aircraft.

The jet, owned by Deerjet Ltd, landed in Port Vila at 4:30pm Wednesday, and departed yesterday at 2:30pm with the six detainees on board, accompanied by 11 Chinese law enforcement officials.

The Daily Post repeatedly sought clarification from Vanuatu government and Chinese government sources concerning who these law enforcement personnel were, what agency or organisation they belong to, and what their role and activities were in Vanuatu. No details have been provided.

Internal Affairs Minister Andrew Napuat told the Daily Post that because the six detainees were not charged with any crime in Vanuatu, they would not be fronting up to a Vanuatu court. But any person within Vanuatu's jurisdiction has the right to confront their accuser as a matter of natural justice.

The Daily Post has tried to ascertain whether the six were given access to legal counsel, but again, no information has been provided.

At this time, it appears Chinese authorities have succeeded in placing Chinese law and legal standards above those of Vanuatu. This is sure to be a worrying development for political or religious dissidents, or indeed anyone who raises the ire of authorities in Beijing. [...]"⁹⁷

Vanuatu's then-Minister for Internal Affairs Andrew Napuat later told RNZ that Vanuatu authorities were shown arrest warrants by Chinese officials but had not been told if any charges had been laid or what crime the people were alleged to have committed.⁹⁸

McGary's concerns are far from unfounded. That the method is used not only on alleged criminals is testified by the case of Xing Jian, as reported by *Radio Free Asia*.

Thailand, 2019: Xing Jian is the son of Xing Wangli, a long-time human rights activist from Xinyang City in Henan Province who has gone through multiple spells of detention. Xing Jian went into exile in 2015 and obtained UNHCR refugee status in Thailand in 2016.

In November 2019, more than ten uniformed police officers from Thailand and plainclothes Chinese officers from Jiangsu Province raided Xing Jian's residence in Bangkok. After searching his house for over two hours, Xing was beaten and handcuffed. The Chinese officers showed him a detention certificate from the Lianshui County Detention Center in Jiangsu Province on charges of *picking quarrels and provoking trouble*.

After being detained in a refugee detention center in Thailand for a week, Xing Jian was asked to fill out a voluntary repatriation form, which he refused to do. Thanks to the prompt intervention of another Chinese refugee, who submitted surveillance footage of the incident to the UNHCR, Xing Jian flew to New Zealand in January 2020 to start a new life.⁹⁹

A similar cooperation to the Fiji and Vanuatu incidents was reported between August and September of 2023 in Indonesia, with the arrest of 88 individuals for repatriation.¹⁰⁰ Eight MPS officers reportedly took part in the operation, which one Indonesian official stated was *"a concrete step taken after the 17th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) held in East Nusa Tenggara Province, Indonesia".¹⁰¹*

Days prior to human rights defender Lu Siwei's illicit deportation to China, on September 22, 2023, Laos rendered 164 individuals in one fell swoop. Fifteen others had already been deported in weeks prior.

As the Global Times reports: "In July, the MPS dispatched police officers from Hebei, Anhui, Henan, Chongqing, and other public security organs to Laos, where they carried out law enforcement cooperation with the Laotian police to combat cross-border telecom fraud. With the strong coordination of the police liaison officer at the Chinese Embassy in Laos, the team has worked together with the Laotian police and continuously increased efforts in assisting the Laotian police in conducting multiple rounds of arrests.

Work teams combating cross-border telecom fraud have been sent to countries and regions such as Thailand, the Philippines, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and Indonesia to carry out law enforcement cooperation.¹¹⁰²

But the list is topped by successful returns secured from Myanmar. On November 21, 2023, the MPS reported on a total of 31,000 telecom fraud suspects who had been handed over in an operation that started in September of that same year.¹⁰³

In all these cases, repatriations take place in a matter of days, if not hours, following the capture of the suspects. There isn't a shadow of a possibility to mount a legal or administrative defense against the repatriations in any of the cases reviewed by Safeguard Defenders for this report. Few targets can put up a fight. However, there are exceptions...

Colombia, 2014: It was supposed to be another lightning operation. With the assistance of the Colombian Immigration Police, Fox Hunt officers Lin Kun and Jin Wei had successfully tricked the suspect into leaving the premises of his house and apprehended him.

A mere forty hours after departing Beijing, Zou Shuangqing (pseudonym) was in custody at the Bogota Immigration Bureau, ready for a swift return on the first available flight later that night.

The two officers enjoyed the brief pause, smoking away outside the Immigration Bureau. But not for long. Local immigration colleague Eddie rushed out.

"There's some friends of the suspect here. They seem to have impressive backgrounds... would you meet them?"

"I don't think that will be necessary," Lin Kun reassured Eddie. "I hope we won't be meeting any obstacles..."

Eddie nodded. He remembered this team's strength from the operation he'd carried out with their team leader Wen Xiaohua a couple of months earlier. "Don't worry.

I've got your back."

The reassurance didn't last long. Soon after, Embassy counselor Tu shook Lin Kun's hand tightly: "I won't waste more words on congratulations, I've received word that Zou Shuangqing has certain connections in the area. What we need to do now is to escort him back to the country as soon as possible to prevent a long night."

Lin Kun frowned at Tu's worried expression. "What do you mean, the night is long? Are you expecting any incidents?"

"It's too soon to tell, but according to the information I have, a woman who lives with Zou Shuangqing is working to hinder your efforts to escort him back. So... it is most urgent to repatriate him immediately. I will cooperate fully, and you all must act quickly as well."

Lin Kun sighed. Gone was the relaxed triumphant atmosphere. He resigned to go meet Zou's friends.

"Who are you guys and what gives you the right to take him away," one of the men snaps as soon as Lin Kun walked in.

"We are Chinese police, and he is going back to his country because he is under investigation for violation of Chinese law."

"I don't care, you just can't take him away!"

Lin Kun recognizes the woman from the house they lured Zou away from earlier that day. He squints his eyes: "Let me tell you. Our next investigative step will be to look at how he used illegal funds in this country. If it were found that anyone here profited from those funds, they would be co-suspects and also be repatriated to China. So let me ask you...," he pauses, "what money paid for that nice villa we saw you at this morning?"

At that, Lin Kun turned around, leaving the friends frozen in place.

Unease keeps plaguing Lin Kun as the evening progresses. Something tells him this is not over. Before returning to the hotel to pack and have a quick dinner, he had looked Zou in the eyes again and he hadn't liked what he'd seen. Zou seemed too confident, as if he hadn't yet played all his cards.

The rest of the team barely took note of Lin's pensive mood.

Remembering last time's digestive issues, the three of them bantered over instant noodles, ham sausage and squash. Jin Wei boasted of their successful apprehension to their Fox Hunt team members over WeChat. Despite the time difference, Hao Yan, Meng Jin, Peng Peng and Yang Chen were still up. They had just finished their overtime and were having drinks and dinner at a restaurant in Xinjiang.

The evening turned into night. One hour later they stood with Counselor Tu at the departure gate of Bogota Eldora International Airport. Relief flooded Lin Kun's system as Eddie walks towards them with Zou Shuangqing. Ha, his connections had not corrupted his Colombian colleagues!

"Alright, the plane will take off in less than an hour, let's go."

Now positively relaxed, the team of four kept their more than reluctant suspect close as they approached the boarding gate.

"Sorry, you are not allowed to board." Several Z Air personnel blocked the gate entrance.

"What?", Lin Kun was stunned.

"The plane has been overbooked. You cannot board. You will have to take a next flight."

"Jin Wei, call Counselor Tu immediately and ask him to come back immediately. Lao Yin and Lao Shen, take Zou Shuangqing to his seat and wait while I go coordinate with the airport personnel," Lin Kun tried to regain control over the situation.

But the situation did not improve as Counselor Tu hadn't been able to move the airliner either and that the first available flight by the company was at the same time tomorrow. As the doors of the plane closed, Lin Kun couldn't shake the feeling this was all too coincidental to his liking.

Resigned, the team retreated to one of the immigration offices in the airport and placed Zou in a small room of about ten square meters, designed to act as a temporary holding point for repatriation targets. However, there was no lock on the door or any other means to restrict Zou's movement. As the Colombians had already handed him over to their custody, from now until they could successfully manage to board a plane, the task of guarding him fell on their shoulders.

It would be a long night and day.

In the morning, Counselor Tu brought some good news: "After coordination with the leadership of the Embassy, the leadership of Bogota's Immigration Department has contacted Z Air, which has assured us that you will be the first to board the plane tonight, to ensure a smooth procedure."

Lin Kun wasn't convinced. His doubts proved correct. As they approached the boarding gate at 8 PM, a Z Air security officer stopped them: "You must report 48 hours in advance in order to escort a suspect on board."

Z Air was making things deliberately difficult. Zou's friends were resourceful indeed. But they were more so.

Spending another night in the cold immigration office, Lin Kun hatched a plan to confound their cunning opponents. As the Embassy made reservations for another round of flights on Z Air for the following night, unbeknownst to all the office in Beijing booked an alternative route on another airliner.

Twenty-four hours later, a stunned Zou Shuangqing and the team were on their way back to China.¹⁰⁴

Details of the specific case aside, the fight put up in the airport is an interesting episode as it presents a potential point of entry for democratic authorities keen on countering the practice of coerced returns.

While there is little detailed evidence on the flightpaths taken by the Fox Hunt teams and their targets, Lu Zheng's accounts show that the groups flew commercial airliners and transited through airports in third countries, with explicit mention of Addis Ababa, Dubai and Frankfurt.

CHAPTER 4 PERSUADE TO RETURN

"Extradition and repatriation take a long time and the procedures are tedious. In contrast, persuading to return can effectively save judicial costs. Persuade to return is completely Chinese. Unlike extradition and repatriation, which are subject to bilateral treaties and the legal system of the host country, persuading to return is a matter of mutual consent. Using a policy that combines leniency with strictness and launches a psychological war against fugitives to persuade them to return and surrender is of course best."

Ma Chengyuan, current Professor at the School of International Law of China University of Political Science and Law and Researcher at the G20 Research Center for Anti-Corruption, Fugitive Repatriation and Asset Recovery of Beijing Normal University, October 10, 2014¹⁰⁵

"The bilateral treaties are very cumbersome and Europe is reluctant to extradite to China. I don't see what is wrong with pressuring criminals to face justice..." Shanghai Foreign Affairs official to Spanish newspaper El Correo in response to Safeguard Defenders' 110 Overseas investigation, October 9, 2022¹⁰⁶

Australia, 2019: Wang XX from Changyuan County (Henan Province) fled to Australia following accusation of contract fraud.

Handan City's Public Security Bureau (Hebei Province) set up a taskforce to persuade her to return.

Following repeated communications, Wang agreed to meet the officers in person. Under the guidance and coordination of the Ministry for Public Security, a team was assembled to travel to Australia.

With the assistance of the Chinese Embassy and Consulates-General in the host country, the officers flew in and met with Wang. Through patient persuasion, Wang gave in and returned to China in June 2019.¹⁰⁷

"Since the launch of the special operation [...], the situation is as follows: First, the success rate of persuading fugitive criminal suspects to return is relatively high. Among the 49 criminal suspects who have returned to China and surrendered, 36 of them, accounting for 73.5%, voluntarily returned to China after persuading them, their family members and important relations." Xu Jinhui, Director of the SPP Anti-Corruption and Bribery Bureau, January 19, 2015¹⁰⁸

"The means for fugitive pursuit are relatively singular. Most of them are persuasion to return."

CCDI, April 13, 2019¹⁰⁹

United Kingdom, 2017: Zhang Jingchuan, from Wuhan (Hubei Province), was a cashier at the Finance Department of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law. In September 1996, Zhang allegedly made unauthorized withdrawals of 751,100 CNY in student tuition fees and fled. He arrived in the UK in 2005.

In April 2017, Interpol issued a Red Notice for him.

Under the coordination of the Hubei Party Committee's Fugitive Repatriation Office and the instruction of the Wuhan Party Committee's Fugitive Repatriation Office, the Wuchang District Procuratorate and the public security authorities in Wuhan used a variety of methods, including legal deterrence, policy persuasion and appeals to family ties, to persuade Zhang to return. On November 14, 2017, Zhang returned to China and surrendered.¹¹⁰

While it is natural authorities would question family members or associates of alleged fugitives, or may even ask them to reach out to encourage a suspect to turn themselves in, there is not only the issue of the potential political, ethnic or religious nature of the PRC's persecution. Its *persuade to return* technique surpasses any boundaries of legality under international law.

At least, under current international law. The PRC makes no secret of its ambition to change the global rulebook, something it is already keenly doing through many of its bilateral law enforcement cooperation mechanisms.

In 2016, in relation to the G2O High-Level Principles on Cooperation on Persons Sought for Corruption and Asset Recovery, then Deputy Director of the CCDI's International Cooperation Bureau Cai Wei stipulated that its "articles 6 to 10 are focused on the operational level, requiring each member country to create favorable conditions for fugitive recovery and asset recovery efforts. This includes conducting cooperation in areas such as information and intelligence exchange, individual case collaboration, **persuasion for return**, and asset restitution."¹¹¹ Creating favorable international conditions for the PRC to conduct its overseas policing operations with impunity is what it's all about. And sometimes, they might even snatch themselves a treat while they're at it.

Barcelona, 2014: Fox Hunt officers Wan Fang and Hao Yan relaxed aboard the highspeed train en route to Barcelona. The views of the golden Fall colors in the distant forests were a joy to take in.

They felt quite pleased with themselves. Only a few hours earlier they had an in-depth exchange with the Deputy Director General of the Spanish Ministry of Justice in Madrid on deepening cooperation between China and the West in the pursuit of fugitives. Both felt confident the results of the negotiations would be fruitful.

In the meantime, however, their team leader Wen Xiaohua had entrusted them with another mission. Soon they would have to halt their respective daydreams over Don Quixote and Lionel Messi. Action awaited them at their destination.

Fifty-year old Sun Dahong had left his hometown in Zhejiang Province and obtained a permanent residence permit in Spain. That would complicate the matter of his return significantly. Persuasion was the only way, but it would be difficult.

Difficulties the Consulate General in Barcelona made sure to remind them of as soon as they arrived to consult with the local staff. Things had not started off in the best way. Sun Dahong hadn't picked up their repeated phone calls.

It wasn't until late that evening they finally got a hold of him. They shall meet in one hour.

As they rush through the city, Hao Yan's heart jumps at the electrifying buzz all around them: home team Barcelona is playing at Camp Nou! What a pity he cannot join in with the thousands of festive fans around him...

Instead, an unknown suspect awaits him in an unfamiliar environment. Too many variables, he sternly reminds himself as his mind returns to the mission at hand.

Sun Dahong already awaited them in a café abandoned by the crowds. The man looked defeated. Showing twice his age, the operation suddenly looked a lot easier than anticipated.

Seeing Wan Fang and Hao Yan enter, Sun Dahong hurriedly got up to welcome them, hesitating for a moment before stretching out his trembling hands, as if not to show courtesy, but waiting to be handcuffed.

The conversation did not take long. The man had already given up. Just in time for a smiling Hao Yan to rejoice in the cheers of his idol Messi's first goal as they exited the café. That night, the lights at the Consulate General stay on. Sun Dahong had lost his Chinese documents, so new ones needed to be issued as soon as possible to ensure his smooth return to China the next day.

The next morning, Sun Dahong's wife and eighteen-year-old son came to see him off at the airport.

With tears in his eyes, he hugged his family for a long time. "I will come back," he kept whispering in their ears.¹¹²

The methods for persuasion have been described in detail in our January 2022 report *Involuntary Returns*¹¹³ and include online surveillance, threats and harassment; surveillance, extensive interrogation and repeated visits of and to family members in China; (collective) punishment of relatives in China; or direct threats, surveillance and harassment of the target abroad by (undeclared) PRC agents or their proxies.

It is by far the most pervasive among the means deployed by PRC authorities not only for their overseas pursuits, but for exercising long-arm control over the rapidly growing diaspora in general, creating a global *chilling effect* on their free expression.

The same effect is obtained or enhanced through the inevitable ties that link overseas nationals to the State apparatus. Administrative sanctions such as the refusal to renew passports may not only come in handy for persuade to return operations, but also serve as a powerful deterrent to any Chinese national residing abroad: every so many years, they are forced to engage with authorities boasting their ability to keep an eye on community activities.

Their job is made even easier in the case of nationals residing abroad in the employment of a Statecontrolled company. There is no stronger assurance of employee loyalty and commitment to return when ordered to than through the iron-fisted control over or (standard?) confiscation of passports by an executive leadership of Party members.

Such administrative measures (including abusive criminal records) do not only impact individuals' freedom of movement. It may effectively limit their ability to apply for permanent residency or asylum abroad, and enjoy the social, economic and cultural rights associated with such a status. They may not be able to get married or formally recognize their children. They may be limited in their future employment...

The list of ways in which fundamental rights are violated or put at risk by the widespread application of methods from the persuade to return playbook is long. Too long.

Moreover, not only does *persuade to return* occupy the top spot in the PRC's playbook, it also allows the authorities to apply a low – if any – standard to the burden of proof required to launch an international pursuit.

Canada, 2015: Kong Xianzhen, a native of Zhifu District, Yantai City in Shandong province, had fled to Canada on June 8 to reunite with his son who was pursuing a degree there. Suspected of embezzlement crimes, his run would be a very short one.

Within days, the Zhifu public security department mobilized. Kong's hometown associate became the subject of persistent communications. Surely, there were enough known precedents for him to understand how Kong's son's studies and future career would be utterly ruined were he not to return immediately.

The insistent pressure proved fruitful. Kong's associate gave in and assisted in persuading Kong to return. On June 23rd, barely three weeks after his escape, Kong surrendered.

But, in a rare plot twist, the public security authorities had overplayed their hand. Not once, but twice the procuratorate returned Kong's case to their desks, citing unclear facts and insufficient evidence.

More than six years of legal uncertainty later, on September 3, 2021, the public security bureau was forced to give up their case.

During his victory lap, Kong told media that a simple financial dispute among company shareholders had been fabricated into an allegation of economic crimes. An allegation making him a Fox Hunt target and the subject of an INTERPOL Red Notice.

His lawyer expressed his indignance at the inclusion of such a seemingly ordinary dispute in the Fox Hunt Operation. How could a Red Notice ever have been issued for such a case?¹¹⁴

Kong's case is exceptional. In fact, the PRC's conviction rates in criminal cases are at an all-time high. According to publicly available data, in 2022, some 1,430,000 criminal verdicts were issued by a court of first instance. Only in 354 of those did the trial result in a non-guilty verdict, putting overall conviction rates at a record 99.975%.¹¹⁵

With such rates, it is clear there are very few ways for a suspect to escape certain conviction once an arrest has been made. A rare exception, applied in Kong's case, lies in the Procuratorate's discretion to remove a case due to insufficient evidence. The Supreme People's Procuratorate Work Report for 2022 provides a five-year total of prosecutions dropped under such circumstances. With an average of around 45,000 per year, this represents less than 3% of total known prosecutions.

Hardly a number to put a brake on an overzealous public security apparatus. Prosecution may not even be on their mind when launching a mass persuade to return campaign.

As previously reported in 110 Overseas, in April 2021, following an annual session on combating telecom-related crimes (国打击治理电信网络新型 违法犯罪工作会议), local governments started issuing return persuasion announcements.

These regarded in particular any Chinese nationals staying in the so-called nine forbidden countries. Since the end of November 2021, those that do not have any proven strict necessity or

communicated *emergency reason* to travel to or stay in those countries were required to return to China as soon as possible.¹¹⁶ Wang Bo (pseudonym), a Hunan public security official working on the campaign, admitted to media outlet Southern Weekend that the police did not actually hold any evidence of crimes for some of the suspects targeted by the persuade to return campaign.¹¹⁷

Yet in the span of just over a year (April 2021 to July 2022), no less than 230,000 individuals¹¹⁸ were reportedly persuaded to return under the scheme. The methods were crude and reminiscent of the threats made to Kong's associate.

In July 2022, the government of Wenchang City, Hainan province, issued a notice disclosing the names and pictures of Wenchang citizens *"illegally in northern Myanmar"* and warned them to return. If they did not contact their local police stations by August 10, 2022, collective measures would be taken against their family members.

In February 2022, Laiyang city in Shandong province, issued a notice instructing any citizens illegally staying in northern Myanmar to return by March 31, 2022. If they ignored the notice or their relatives failed to cooperate with the persuade to return efforts, a series of measures would be taken against any direct family member, including children.¹¹⁹

According to an estimate by outlet Southern Weekend¹²⁰, over 110 announcements were issued across the country. These announcements provide damning insight into the euphemistic *persuasion* terms around plays on *familial emotions* used in more cryptic propaganda accounts of successful returns.

Some of the regulated collective punishment measures we found are:

- Suspension of family members' eligibility for healthcare subsidies;
- Placement of limitations on their family members' banking use;
- Barring them from obtaining bank loans;
- Denying their children access to schools;
- Banning their family members from public-sector employment;
- Restrictions on new housing.¹²¹

Phnom Penh, March 2022: Li Qingqing (pseudonym) had left her Yuanzhuang township in Xianyou County, Fujian Province, to run a restaurant in the Cambodian capital.

She stared incredulously at the request to return from the Yuanzhang police in her hand. She hadn't committed any crime.

No matter, public security authorities told her. She was residing in one of the nine fraud-related countries. Hence, she was required to return unconditionally.

For weeks Qingqing resisted the ensuing messages from the authorities and stayed put. Alas.

On May 5th, they informed her she had been formally included on the telecom-fraud suspect list and warned her mother's house would be cut off from power and water supplies if she did not immediately come back.

Days later, her mother called her in tears. Her house had been spray-painted with the words "house of telecom fraud" for the whole township to see. Next to the graffiti message, a police notice was posted.

The village committee jumped into action. Her mother was summoned to appear before them and tasked with persuading Qingqing to return by May 31^{st} .

Whether Qingqing did return remains unknown.¹²²

Her case was not an isolated incident. As early as 2021, Chinese media reported on public security forces going around fraud suspects' hometowns and spray-painting the homes of relatives with the words "shameful fraud" and cutting off power supplies.¹²³

The widespread measures of collective punishment usually reserved for human rights defenders and dissidents¹²⁴ led to uproar across the country.

Following multiple citizen complaints, on December 26, 2023, the *Legislative Affairs Commission* (LAC) of the *Standing Committee of the National People's Congress* issued a stunning rebuke to local government's growing use of collective punishment (or "kin punishment" (连坐) in the fight against telecom fraud, expressly stating the measures run counter to the PRC's Constitution.¹²⁵

As reported by NPC Observer, which monitors the work of the National People's Congress, the body reached the following conclusion:

Under the NPCSC's "recording and review" (R&R) (备案审查) process, its Legislative Affairs Commission (LAC) reviews the constitutionality of legislation and other official documents at the request of Chinese citizens. In this case, the LAC sided with the challengers. In its annual report on R&R to the NPCSC this week, the LAC disclosed the following conclusion:

After study, we believe that any legal responsibility for unlawful or criminal conduct must rest with the perpetrator him or herself, and must not be extended or attributed to others; such is one of the fundamental tenets of modern rule of law. By restricting multiple rights of the family members of those involved in crimes, the relevant circulars violated the principle of bearing responsibility solely for one's own crimes, were inconsistent with the principles and spirits of the provisions in Chapter II of the Constitution concerning "citizens' fundamental rights and obligations", and were inconsistent with the principles and spirits of national laws and regulations governing matters such as education, employment, and social insurance.¹²⁶

While limited in scope to local government's anti-Telecom Fraud campaigns and burdened by the LAC's lack of authority to effectively revoke any law or regulation (it does state in its report that it is working with relevant departments to rectify the situation), this is a stunning decision that undermines the tenets of the PRC's persuade to return campaigns.

Not only do they run counter to international law, according to the spirit of this rebuke, the collective punishment measures adopted against family members and friends inside China to coerce individuals into returning run counter to the PRC's own constitution.



Will this alleviate the pressure felt by human rights defenders and dissidents in the diaspora? Unlikely so.

The methods deployed for persuasion ops are arguably the ones most frequently deployed against those critical of the regime and the diaspora in general. In select cases, with the aim of returning them. But in many others, their use – or even just the specter of their use – serves a broader purpose: silence and control.

From frequent interrogations and having tea with authorities, incessant surveillance, home evictions, kicking children out of school, and employment restrictions, to exit bans, physical violence, enforced disappearances and arbitrary detention... The list of punishments meted out to loved ones inside China is long and painful.

Too many human rights defenders pay a huge price for their courage to stand up against the CCP regime. For telling the world what is happening in their homeland. For testifying to the atrocities taking place. For advocating and defending the universal rules on which our global order is based.

Japan, 2019: Mihriay Erkin is the niece of Abduweli Ayup, a high-profile Uyghur human rights activist and scholar in exile.

Mihriay studied in Japan and became a researcher at its Nara Institute of Science and Technology. All was set for a successful career and rewarding life away from the horrors in her homeland.

The PRC's State Security apparatus decided otherwise. In August 2019, as authorities exercised pressure on her parents, she was forced to return to Xinjiang.

Just over a year later, she died in detention. The authorities in charge of her case attributed her death to a *"disease hidden from them by her family"*, adding a falsified medical record to the official report in cover-up.

A source told Radio Free Asia (RFA), which reported the events, Mihriay had texted a friend prior to leaving Japan, saying she felt morally bound to stand by her parents' side. She also harbored no illusions as to what fate she might encounter upon her return, telling the same friend a bouquet of roses would mark her grave if she were to die.

"Mihriay died in November 2020 while in detention and after she died, authorities told the family members to remain silent about it," a source told RFA on condition of anonymity citing fear of reprisal.

"Reports of her death came out on December 20th, the same day she was buried under local police surveillance. Three family members participated in the burial."

According to the source, the day after Erkin's burial, police told family members that if they spoke out about her death, they would be "imprisoned" for "disclosing state secrets" and "defaming the police".

Members of the Uyghur diaspora see Mihriay's detention and successive death as part of the PRC's efforts to intimidate her uncle, Abduweli Ayup. A few months prior to her return to Xinjiang, she had repeatedly urged him to give up his activism. Abduweli remains convinced she made those comments as a result of the pressure authorities were exerting on her family, including her mother.¹²⁷

"A fugitive is like a kite. Even though he is abroad, the string is held in China. He can always be found through his family."

Shanghai public security officer Li Gongjing (李公敬)¹²⁸

For most, silence may seem like an appropriate price to pay for keeping their family safe or safeguard their administrative status overseas. In a similar fashion to the approach adopted to quell dissent inside China – punish one to teach a thousand - the negative impact transnational repression has on the enjoyment of civil and political freedoms goes way beyond the individuals directly targeted by such efforts and spreads across communities like wildfire.

An excellent and rare quantifiable example of this effect is the case of social media activist *"Teacher Li is not your teacher".*¹²⁹

Italy, 2023: Having risen to prominence during the 2020 White Paper protests that shook the country and brought an abrupt end to the PRC's zero-covid policies, Li dutifully reports events happening around China.

As CNN reports, "Li's account has become a go-to source for news censored in China. His followers send him photos and videos from Chinese social media before they are wiped by censors, and Li reposts them on X, offering a rare and unflinching glimpse into aspects of Chinese life that Beijing doesn't want the world - or its own citizens - to see. Li's X feed documents everything from school scandals and factory fires to protests by migrant workers demanding overdue wages - creating a parallel world to the sanitized version of reality presented by the Chinese government."¹³⁰

Boasting over 1,6 million followers, he quickly became a target for PRC authorities: constant surveillance and frequent interrogations of his parents, the freezing of his bank accounts, online discrediting and slander campaigns,

the questioning of friends and any old contact in China ... No efforts are spared to pressure the young artist into giving up his activities.

A pressure that comes at a severe personal cost to Li, but one that so far, he has chosen to bear much alone. Heightening fear in the online community that has flocked to his account might be the only thing worse than the extent of the incessant transnational repression he faces.

However, in recent months, the authorities stepped things up a notch. Not having achieved the desired result so far, they started targeting his social media followers in China directly.

Li felt he had a duty to warn and protect. On February 25, 2024, he posted a notice to his followers¹³¹, warning them that Public Security authorities were going through his followers' list and summoning over one hundred of his followers to have tea since December 2023.

"I suggest anyone who feels scared to just unfollow me, you can bookmark one of my tweets or search my account name to read about the day's news in the future."

The effect was immediate. Over the course of just a few days, about 200,000 accounts unfollowed his — a phenomenon eerily reminiscent of the online chilling effect felt by Hong Kong pro-democracy activists following the 2020 imposition of the National Security Law.

"I certainly knew it would cause some panic, but I didn't expect the panic to reach such an extent," Li told CNN. "It shows that fear is more deeply rooted in our hearts than freedom."

It is a most thorough means of long-arm information control, effectively expanding the climate of political terror that reigns inside China to all corners of the globe.

And that is of course what makes these measures - be it in their forced returns application, be it in their wider transnational repression scheme - such a favorite for PRC authorities.

Beyond their effectiveness, they come cheap. The cost is not only measured in the strict monetary terms Ma Chengyuan referred to at the outset of this chapter, but also in terms of risk and accountability. Much of the persuade to return efforts through punishment meted out on family members, digital or administrative measures can be safely conducted from behind China's sovereign walls. After all, what is a diplomatic slap on the wrist if found out?

The persuade to return method indeed poses the greatest difficulty for democratic countries seeking to counter the practice. The sad reality is that as long as loved ones are under the physical control of the CCP, a risk outside host country's control will always exist. There are however a number of options and best practices that can be adopted to mitigate the effects of some of the techniques used or, at the very least, seek to understand and map them (see <u>Concluding</u> <u>Observations & Policy Recommendations</u>).

CHAPTER 5 IRREGULAR MEASURES

A. Luring And Entrapment

Kenya, Ethiopia, 2015: Qian Zengde, former chairman of Jiangsu Zhonghuai Construction Group Co., Ltd., was under investigation by the People's Procuratorate of Huai'an City (Jiangsu Province) for bribery.

Qian had fled to Sudan in 2006, obtaining the Sudanese nationality. PRC authorities had obtained a Red Notice for him through Interpol and listed him as one of the 100 most wanted fugitives.

On 21 July, 2015, as he was about to leave the country, Qian was detained at Jomo Kenyatta International Airport in Nairobi, Kenya. Following negotiations between authorities, it was decided that Kenyan police would escort Qian back to China.

However, continuous phone calls from Qian's family and friends in Africa requesting his release and obstructing the repatriation, the escort team missed the scheduled flight.

Following urgent communications between China's Central Anti-Corruption Coordination Group, the Chinese Embassy in Kenya and the Kenyan authorities, a new plan was immediately put in place.

Qian would be detoured through Ethiopia, and then escorted back to China.

In their communications with Qian however, Kenyan police officers pretended they would deport him back to Sudan following a necessary transit stop in Ethiopia.

After Qian agreed to the fake plane, he was escorted back to China via Ethiopia on 25 July 25, $2015.^{132}$

An extradition treaty between Kenya and the PRC went into effect in 2023, while the PRC's bilateral extradition treaty with Ethiopia entered into effect in 2017. Both States therefore had no active extradition treaties. However, given the fight put up against his repatriation in Kenya, it evidently was easier to lure the Sudanese national to a third country where he could not lean on his connections to halt the process.

Morocco, 2021 - 2024: Uyghur human rights defender Yidiresi Aishan (Idris Hasan) was en route to finding a safer haven for himself and his family.

Hoping to make it to a European country, he was unaware of the Interpol Red Notice that had been hanging over his head since March 2017.

Transiting in Casablanca airport on the evening of July 19, 2021, he was detained by the Moroccan authorities.

After graduating in Xinjiang, Aishan moved to Turkey in 2012 where he worked as a computer engineer and lived with his wife and three children. Members of the Uyghur community state he was frequently active in assisting other members from the exile community in translation efforts with local authorities. At least from 2016 onwards he becomes active in an Uyghur diaspora newspaper in Turkey, assisting other activists in media outreach and collecting testimonies on the atrocities in Xinjiang, and speaks publicly at Uyghur diaspora events.

Aishan had expressed repeated fear of being deported, both due to direct requests made to him by local county police in Bugur County, Xinjiang, and a document marked secret from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Turkish Ministry of Justice (with copy to the Head of the Turkish National Intelligence Agency) of March 26, 2020, citing:

"Within the scope of the Joint Security Cooperation Mechanism (Ortak Güvenlik İşbirliği Mekanizması - OGIM) established between the delegations of Turkey and the People's Republic of China [...], it is requested to share the details of the judicial process carried out regarding the individuals named Idris Hasan, [...]"¹³³

Spooked and feeling increasingly unsafe, Aishan attempted to leave Turkey three times prior to boarding his fateful July 19th flight to Casablanca.

Upon arrival at Casablanca Airport he was immediately detained and transferred to Tiflet Detention Centre from where he called his wife on July 24th stating he had been informed that he was to be deported to the People's Republic of China.

During his formal deposition on July 20th, Aishan stated: "I have been informed of the international arrest warrant regarding a terrorism affair, but I am not aware of its subject. This is my first visit to Morocco. I have been accused of this because of my Muslim religion and if I am extradited to China, I will be executed."

Moroccan authorities moved ahead with the extradition request nonetheless.

Aishan's case was the very first since the entry into force of the Extradition Treaty between Morocco and the PRC, following China's ratification in January 2021. The Treaty had been signed on May 11, 2016, in the framework of a strategic partnership between the two countries with no less than fifteen agreements signed on the same day by King Mohammed VI and Xi Jinping at the People's Palace in Beijing, relating in particular to the judicial, economic, financial, industrial, cultural, tourist, energy, infrastructure and consular fields.¹³⁴ Morocco ratified the extradition treaty in 2017.

In the meantime, following public outcry in international media, Interpol finally took to reviewing the Red Notice, something it was obliged to have done prior to its issuance in 2017. A response letter¹³⁵ from Moroccan authorities to four UN Special Procedures who had issued an urgent appeal against Aishan's extradition details Interpol's proceedings:

"On July 29, 2021, the Special Group Notices and Diffusions, reporting to the General Secretariat of the ICPO-Interpol, sent a message to the General Directorate of National Security (DGSN) (DPJ/BCN) indicating that the red notice under which Mr. Yidiresi AISHAN was arrested in Morocco was subject to a legal review, aimed at ensuring its compliance with the Statute and regulations of Interpol, and that pending the conclusion of this review, the notice has been suspended."

"On August 11, 2021, the Special Group Notices and Diffusions of Interpol informed the National Central Bureau (BCN) - Rabat that after its examination, the red notice in question was canceled, on the grounds that it was, according to them, non-compliant with the provisions of Articles 2 (1) and 3 of the Statute of this Organization, and its regulations on data processing."¹³⁶

Article 2 (1) of Interpol's Constitution expressly binds the Organization to the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, whereas its Article 3 strictly forbids the Organization "to undertake any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character".

Despite the cancelation of the Red Notice and numerous appeals by UN human rights mechanisms and human rights organizations, on December 15, 2021, the Rabat Court of Cassation disregarded the arguments made by his legal defence regarding the existence of "foreseeable, real and personal" risks of torture Aishan faced if returned to China and approved the request for extradition.

On December 16th, Safeguard Defenders and Mena Rights Group filed an urgent request for interim measures with the UN Committee Against Torture.

The measures were issued on December 20, 2021, measures requesting Morocco not to extradite Idris Hasan to China while the complaint is being fully examined by the Committee. As a State party that has declared the Committee's competence under Article 22 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Morocco is bound under its international obligations to respect these measures.

At the time of writing, Aishan's case is still pending before the UN Committee Against Torture.

He has been trapped inside a Moroccan jail for well over two and a half years.

A lot of ink has been spilled over the past years to describe the various ways in which the CCP seeks to exploit international judicial cooperation mechanisms for its *fugitive recovery* operations.

Interpol has traditionally received the brunt of that attention. Deservedly. Idris' case serves as a prime example of the severe impact its failure to uphold its Statute can have on the lives of innocent individuals. Moreover, concerns over authoritarian abuse of its Red Notices and diffusions are far from limited to the PRC.

The increased attention on the abuse of Interpol mechanisms over the past years does appear to have yielded some initial results. To its merit, in a sharp departure from its usually defensive and less then proactive stance on the issue, within hours following the issuance of arrest warrants and bounties on the heads of eight overseas Hong Kong activists, the organization issued a press release that it would not grant any potential requests by the Hong Kong authorities.

But, while allowing for some prudent optimism, it is far from the only mechanism through which the PRC seeks to expand its global long-arm policing footprint and engage in rewriting the international rulebook on the matter.

From various multilateral mechanisms to bilateral extradition treaties, mutual legal assistance treaties, targeted bilateral law enforcement cooperation accords and even joint police patrols... the list runs well over hundreds of agreements and memorandums of understanding. Since Xi Jinping came to power, the PRC has continued to push their enactment, often in a luring combined package of economic, tourist and cultural cooperation, in particular in the *Global South*.

In combination with extradition and repatriation methods, the myriad agreements are an important part of what makes the format of *luring and entrapment* tick. Hard to navigate both for their number and their varying nature, they undermine the freedom of movement for human rights defenders, regime critics and other at-risk groups.

Safeguard Defenders aims to make more appropriate and detailed resources for travel risk assessment available for such groups in the near future.



B. Kidnapping

Thailand, 2018: When the Hong Kong publisher specialized in titillating tomes on China's political elite and Swedish citizen Gui Minhai¹³⁷ left Hong Kong on October 6th, he thought he was simply going on a writing trip to his holiday home in Thailand.

After a four-night stopover in Bangkok, he arrived at his second home, the Silver Beach Condo in Pattaya. His apartment, D, on the 17th floor boasts impressive views of the Gulf of Thailand.

Days later he told his colleague Lee Bo, a UK citizen - who would later be kidnapped in Hong Kong - that he would be back in the city by October 25th as he had some visitors arriving.

But Gui would never go back to Hong Kong.

The last time he is seen is when an unknown Chinese man appears at his condo and drives off with him.

On January 17, 2016, he appears in a forced televised $confession^{138}$ beamed across the world by Chinese State media.

Safeguard Defenders collated all available evidence and clues¹³⁹, but until this day, no one knows exactly what happened or how he was returned to China.

In a poem shared with his daughter, he alludes to such a journey. He made the same hints in several phone calls they shared. Called, "A night by the Mekong River", he speaks of being "captured" by the banks of the river, traveling upstream, often by night.

He may have tried to escape when he realized that he was running out of chances as they got closer to China: he writes about being beaten, tied up, and how a hood was placed over his head.

In the poem, he wonders when he will pass Luang Prabang in northern Laos, a city he had visited before. He then wonders about how he will travel toward Myanmar. The poem doesn't describe what happens then.

At that point they likely switched to a car since the Mekong becomes difficult to navigate in the final stretch near the notorious golden triangle area, although it remains possible he was smuggled into China by boat.

How he really did the journey is something that we will likely not know for a long time, for the simple reason that Gui's kidnapping, his enforced disappearance, and torture are all "state secrets".

Partially freed in October 2017, Gui is snatched again in even more dramatic fashion on a Beijing-bound bullet train in the company of two Swedish diplomats on January 20, 2018.

As The Guardian recounts: "At just after 3pm, the train pulled into Jinan West station in Shandong province, about 400km shy of its destination. The doors slid open and a gaggle of plainclothes agents pushed into the carriage. As they lifted the bookseller from his seat, an English-speaking female officer announced a police operation was underway."


"They had no uniforms and no credentials," said one source with knowledge of the day's events. "They simply took him."

Within seconds Gui Minhai was gone."¹⁴⁰ Three weeks later he appears in yet another forced televised confession.¹⁴¹

In 2020, he was sentenced to 10 years in prison on trumped up charges of "illegally providing intelligence overseas".

METHODOLOGICAL OVERVIEW

Relevant (local) entity takes charge of case on a wanted overseas target



Persuade target to forego afforded legal remedies

CHAPTER 6 INTERNATIONAL COMPLICITY - THE CASE AGAINST UNODC

In addition to the use of extradition, repatriation, off-site prosecution and persuasion, "the Supreme People's Procuratorate has set up a series of international judicial assistance platforms in recent years. In the recovery of fugitives abroad, local procuratorates can also use the mechanism of the United Nations Convention against Corruption, the mechanism of the International Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities, the mechanism of the Prosecutors General of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Member States, the mechanism of the China-ASEAN Prosecutors-General, and Interpol."

People's Daily Online, October 29, 2014¹⁴²

"Nothing in this Convention shall entitle a State Party to undertake in the territory of another State the exercise of jurisdiction and performance of functions that are reserved exclusively for the authorities of that other State by its domestic law."

Article 4 UN Convention against Corruption¹⁴³

Recent uproar from human rights organizations in response to new (or renewed) bilateral cooperation agreements highlights how a fundamental question over the compatibility of equal participation between democratic and authoritarian actors in international law enforcement and judicial cooperation mechanisms will always continue to loom large.

While recognizing the legitimate need for democratic nations to tackle transnational law enforcement issues of significant concern to the safety and well-being of their populations – and for the sake of space, ignoring the question of whether the PRC has any authentic intent to actually provide any meaningful cooperation in that sense -, at the very least heightened vigilance and safeguards around the associated risks to the fundamental rights and freedoms of those it may seek to suppress are warranted.

Vigilance that one may, or should, expect from UN organizations. Bound by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, they ought to be the last to act as a vehicle for the promotion and expansion of authoritarian entities engaged in grossly abusive behavior both at home and abroad. Especially an organization seeking to *"contribute to global peace and security, sustainable development and human rights by helping to make the world safer from drugs, crime, corruption and terrorism, by centering its efforts "on protecting people and our planet from criminal exploitation through inclusive, sustainable, human rights-based approaches"¹⁴⁴.*

The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), headquartered in Vienna with a network of over 130 offices around the world, is the UN agency tasked with providing technical assistance, research and normative support to Member States in response to complex and interconnected threats at the national, regional and global level. As its name indicates, these transnational threats include combating organized crime and drugs.

But, most topical in the ambit of this report, the agency also acts as the guardian of the UN Convention Against Corruption and supports the Global Operational Network of Anti-Corruption Law Enforcement Authorities (GlobE) Network, which "serves as a platform to exchange information between frontline anti-corruption law enforcement practitioners in all countries across the globe to track, investigate, and prosecute cases of cross-border corruption"¹⁴⁵ of which the PRC is a member.¹⁴⁶

Welcome to the United Nations		中文 English Français Русск	ий Español
United Office on Dru Nations	ugs and Crime	Search the site	٩
Topics 👻 What we do 👻 Information For 👻 Ab	oout us 👻 Field Offices 👻 Quick Links 👻	Executive Director	
>> What we do >>> International Cooperation >>> Networks			
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With its vast network, facilitating "international cooperation in criminal matters has been at the centre of UNODC's work".¹⁴⁷ This has practical implications as UNODC highlights for example that "throughout the cooperation between GlobE Network and GPTOC programme, several mutual legal assistance requests in corruption cases were facilitated by making possible direct consultations between central authorities".¹⁴⁸

UNODC thus acts as a trusted intermediary to *build trust and create contacts among practitioners*¹⁴⁹ around the world. A crucial role that would presume such trust is warranted and that the counterparts encountered through these networks abide by the dictates of the UN Convention Against Torture (UNCAC), such as the *Protection of Sovereignty* in article 4, and international human rights law.

Topics - What we do - Information For - About us - Field Offices - Quick Links - Executive Director						
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governance framework strengthen communica	n of the National Commission of Supervision and supports the UNCAC as the main aver ation with the UN system so as to jointly ens up practical cooperation with the UN in the a d capacity building."	ue for international anti-corruption coop ure the effective and better functioning	peration. China stands ready to a of the UNCAC Implementation	further Review		

The PRC acceded to UNCAC in October 2005, just prior to the Convention's entry into force on December 14, 2005. At the time, the role of focal point under the Convention befell the Supreme People's Procuratorate (SPP).

The PRC's accession was warmly welcomed and the SPP's bet to use it (also) as a vehicle to expand its bilateral cooperation network paid off. As a 2014 People's Daily article points out: as the central liaison for international cooperation under UNCAC's framework, the SPP *"signed more than 100 bilateral cooperation agreements or memorandums on judicial cooperation with foreign judicial and procuratorial bodies".*¹⁵⁰

In October 2019, roughly one year after the adoption of the PRC's National Supervision Law that expanded the CCDI's oversight power over vast swathes of Chinese society and created its National Commission of Supervision front for the CCDI to lead international judicial cooperation efforts, UNODC signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on cooperation in combating corruption.¹⁵¹


Having spent a significant amount of time documenting the CCDI's grave, widespread and systematic human rights violations inside China and cognizant of its role in overseeing international *fugitive recovery operations* in blatant and admitted violation of the sovereignty of other nations through official policies that explicitly include kidnapping, Safeguard Defenders repeatedly inquired with UNODC to request the release of the content of the MoU and provide information on the nature of the counterpart entity.


To no avail. UNODC's Treaty Affairs Director not only categorically refused to do so, but also pointed out that the National Commission of Supervision (NCS) had been appointed as the PRC's *focal point* for all work under UNCAC, a faculty stated to be in the purview of each State party to the Convention.

It appears hard to reconcile such an approach with the dictates of UNCAC's articles 6 and 36, which in describing the preventive anti-corruption bodies and specialized authorities clearly spell out the need for these bodies to *be granted the necessary independence as to carry out their functions effectively and free from any undue influence.*

The NCS is neither of those. As pointed out in Chapter 2, it is but a front for the CCP's CCDI. It does not even have its own offices or personnel, let it be any independence. It is a Party body, in all but name, that stands above any control by judicial entities (rather, the CCDI has the power to investigate them).

One might argue UNODC is or was unaware of its nature. That however proves to be untrue as even at the international level the CCDI made literally zero efforts to hide the absence of any real distinction between the two entities as UNODC meeting documents prior to the signing of the MoU demonstrate.^{152 - 153 - 154.}





But let's gloss over the glaring issue of granting such discretionary power to allow a Chinese Communist Party body to act as the formal liaison in relations between States, providing such entity with excellent opportunities to rub shoulders and expand its connections with the representatives of legitimate State entities. (Do try and imagine the reaction if a political party in any other country would nominate an internal Party policing body to act in such capacity.)

Further serious questions must be raised as to how such a cooperation agreement could be signed or maintained under UNODC's own human rights obligations. It must be pointed out that counter to former NCS Director, CCDI Deputy Secretary and Politburo member Yang Xiaodu's statement in UNODC's press release on the occasion of the signing of the MoU, in its correspondence with Safeguard Defenders, its Treaty Affairs Division maintained the agreement "does not foresee anticorruption cooperation at an operational level".

That appears to be factually untrue according to the terms of **the MoU**, which is made fully public for the first time in <u>Annex I</u> to this report.

According to UNODC's website, human rights are at the core of its work as a UN agency.^{155 - 156}

"Curbing corruption is [...] vital and, to be effective and enjoy legitimacy anti-corruption laws and policies must be implemented in accordance with international human rights law. Human rights are not an obstacle to effective anti-corruption measures, as is sometimes said; rather human rights and anti-corruption measures complement each other."⁵⁷

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Human rights are at the core of all the work of the United Nations system and - together with peace and security and development - represent one of the three, interlinked and mutually reinforcing pillars of the United Nations. There is virtually no aspect of the work of the United Nations that does not have a human rights dimension.

UNODC's role in supporting States to build capacity in preventing and addressing crime, corruption, terrorism, and drugs abuse and illicit trafficking is based on the respective international legal instruments and the related United Nations Standards and Norms and is in full conformity with the UN Charter, international law and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

In implementing its mandates and supporting States to address crime, corruption, drugs and terrorism, and in coordination with the entire United Nations system, UNODC works systematically in upholding human rights through its programmes and activities throughout the world. We work with justice institutions and other actors in the criminal justice system, while paying particular attention to adherence with human rights. [Read More]

HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW

Human rights are the values that make society fair, just and equal. They protect all of us. They protect **YOU**.



Welcome to the United Nations

THE WORK OF UNODC

The normative foundation of the United Nations' work on the rule of law is the Charter of the United Nations and the body of international law, including international human rights law, international criminal law, international refugee law, and international humanitarian law. Responses to drugs, crime and terrorism must be based on the rule of law and must, therefore, also incorporate human rights law, norms and principles.


The interrelated, indivisible, and interdependent characteristics of human rights and complexity of required responses, make holistic and interlinked approaches indispensable. With the respect of the human dignity of all persons as a foundational principle, the prevention and reduction of all forms of violence, exploitation, corruption and abuse should be at the heart of any agenda that fully recognizes the centrality of human security, both as a human rights imperative and as being integral to development.

For all these reasons, UNODC is committed to a human rights-based approach that integrates respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, into all areas of its work.

UNODC mandates, as enshrined in the drug control conventions, the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) and the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto (UNTOC), all reaffirm the importance of full respect for human rights. UNODC's governing bodies, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) and the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ) have further consistently provided UNODC with specific mandates, such as the need to integrate human rights in responses to drugs, crime and terrorism.

Furthermore, as a UN agency, it is bound to the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations Security Forces (HRDDP) issued by the UN Secretary General on February 23, 2015.¹⁵⁸

The **mandatory** Policy, complemented with a 2015 inter-agency guidance note, provides principles and procedures for all UN agencies in their cooperation with non-United Nations Security Forces: it "sets out **measures that all United Nations entities must take** in order to ensure that any support that they may provide to non-United Nations forces is consistent with the purposes and principles as set out in the Charter of the United Nations and with its responsibility to respect, promote and encourage respect for international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law."¹⁵⁹



Distr.: General 5 March 2013

Original: English

General Assembly Sixty-seventh session Agenda item 69 Promotion and protection of human rights Security Council Sixty-eighth year

Identical letters dated 25 February 2013 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the General Assembly and to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces (see annex). Member States were advised of my decision to institute this policy by means of a note verbale dated 25 October 2011.

The policy sets out measures that all United Nations entities must take in order to ensure that any support that they may provide to non-United Nations forces is consistent with the purposes and principles as set out in the Charter of the United Nations and with its responsibility to respect, promote and encourage respect for international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law.

Given the fact UNODC accepted the National Commission of Supervision of the CCDI (NCS/CCDI) to act as the PRC's focal point for all work under the Convention, does this mandatory Policy apply to its relations with the entity?

The Policy provides the following definitions:

"For the purpose of this policy, "non-United Nations security forces" include: (a) National military, paramilitary, police, intelligence services, border- control and similar security forces; (b) National civilian, paramilitary or military authorities directly responsible for the management, administration or command or control of such forces; [...]."

As evidenced in the preceding chapters, while not formally a State law enforcement (or judicial) entity, not only does the CCDI have expansive policing powers over vast swathes of society within the PRC, allowing them to hold individuals for up to six months in incommunicado detention, under Operation Sky Net it also maintains controlling oversight of the international policing operations carried out by State entities, including the MPS and SPP. This would place it under the purview of the Policy.

In fact, in order to gauge its applicability, the Guidance Note encourages: a "common sense" approach is advisable when UN entities analyse the scope of application of the policy with regard to support recipients, including in order to avoid sending the wrong signals to the recipients of support. For example, although not explicitly mentioned in the policy, the UN support provided to prison or correction officers falls within the HRDDP scope of application, in view of the nature of their functions and keeping in mind the objectives of the HRDDP.⁶⁰

That brings us to the second question. Does UNODC provide support to the NCS under its MoU with the entity?

"Support' is understood to mean any of the following activities: (a) Training, mentoring, advisory services, capacity- and institution-building and other forms of technical cooperation for the purpose of enhancing the operational capabilities of non-United Nations security forces; (b) Ad hoc or programmatic support to civilian or military authorities directly responsible for the management, administration or command and control of non-United Nations security forces [...]."

Despite UNODC's assertions to Safeguard Defenders that the 2019 Memorandum *does not foresee anti-corruption cooperation at an operational level,* the inclusion of i.a. technical assistance, trainings and capacity-building cooperation in the MoU¹⁶¹ very much does constitute support under the above HRDPP definition:

Article 4 - Areas of cooperation

2. The Parties have agreed to the following preliminary overarching themes for this MoU:

a. Promoting information sharing and exchange on prevention of corruption, including by conducting analysis and research, collecting international best practices, providing technical assistance on both policy and practice basis, and organizing joint training and capacity building programmes in this area;

b. Enhancing information sharing and exchange on trends in the investigation, evidence collection, extradition, mutual legal assistance and international law enforcement cooperation related to corruption offences, including through meetings, panel discussions and personnel training;

c. Enhancing cooperation concerning recovery of stolen assets through information sharing and exchange on good practices, technical assistance provided by UNODC, including through the joint UNODC and World Bank Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative (StAR), and other cooperation projects;

d. Supporting the National Commission of Supervision on activities related to the prevention and fight against corruption within UNODC's mandates and carrying out mutually beneficial cooperation against corruption in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative, subject to the availability of resources.

e. Strengthening dialogue and communication on the implementation of UNCAC;

f. Cooperating to establish a communication platform under the online directory of UNCAC competent national authorities, with a view to promoting exchange of experience, dialogue and effective cooperation among anti-corruption authorities of the States parties.

Keeping the prescribed common-sense approach in mind, these MoU terms would make the HRDDP applicable to UNODC's dealings with the NCS/CCDI under the present agreement. So where does that lead us?

[Original: English and French] Human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces I. Core principles 1. Support by United Nations entities to non-United Nations security forces must be consistent with the Organization's purposes and principles as set out in the Charter of the United Nations and with its obligations under international law to respect, promote and encourage respect for international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law. Such support should help recipients to attain a stage where

and refugee law. Such support should help recipients to attain a stage where compliance with these principles and bodies of law becomes the norm, ensured by the rule of law. Consistent with these obligations, United Nations support cannot be provided where there are substantial grounds for believing there is a real risk of the receiving entities committing grave violations of international humanitarian, human rights or refugee law and where the relevant authorities fail to take the necessary corrective or mitigating measures. For the same reasons, if the United Nations receives reliable information that provides substantial grounds to believe that a recipient of United Nations support is committing grave violations of international humanitarian, human rights or refugee law, the United Nations entity providing such support must intercede with the relevant authorities with a view to bringing those violations to an end. If, despite such intercession, the situation persists, the United Nations must suspend support to the offending elements. Notwithstanding the present policy, existing obligations of human rights, humanitarian and refugee law continue to apply to all United Nations activities.

The very core principle of the Policy, spelled out in its first article, states in no uncertain terms:

"Consistent with these obligations, **United Nations support cannot be provided where there are** substantial grounds for believing there is a real risk of the receiving entities committing grave violations of international humanitarian, human rights or refugee law and where the relevant authorities fail to take the necessary corrective or mitigating measures.

For the same reasons, if the United Nations receives reliable information that provides substantial grounds to believe that a recipient of United Nations support is committing grave violations of international humanitarian, human rights or refugee law, the United Nations entity providing such support must intercede with the relevant authorities with a view to bringing those violations to an end.

*If, despite such intercession, the situation persists, the United Nations must suspend support to the offending elements.*¹⁷⁶²

Grave violations are defined as:

(a) In the case of a unit:

(i) Commission of "war crimes" or of "crimes against humanity", as defined in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, or "gross violations" of human rights, including summary executions and extrajudicial killings, acts of torture, enforced disappearances, enslavement, rape and sexual violence of a comparable serious nature, or acts of refoulement under refugee law that are committed on a significant scale or with a significant degree of frequency (that is, they are more than isolated or merely sporadic phenomena); or

(ii) A pattern of repeated violations of international humanitarian, human rights or refugee law committed by a significant number of members of the unit; or

(iii) The presence in a senior command position of the unit of one or more officers about whom there are substantial grounds to suspect:


- Direct responsibility for the commission of "war crimes", "gross violations" of human rights or acts of refoulement; or
- Command responsibility, as defined in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, for the commission of such crimes, violations or acts by those under their command; or
- Failure to take effective measures to prevent, repress, investigate or prosecute other violations of international humanitarian, human rights or refugee law committed on a significant scale by those under their command;

(b) In the case of civilian or military authorities that are directly responsible for the management, administration or command of non-United Nations security forces:

- (i) Commission of grave violations by one or more units under their command;
- (ii) Combined with a failure to take effective measures to investigate and prosecute the violators.

A simple summary of the NCS/CCDI's aforementioned record (see <u>Chapter 2</u>) of widespread and systematic incommunicado detentions outside any judicial process and use of torture to extract confessions, its command responsibility over ample violations of the principle of non-refoulement and its explicit policies to that end, should make it clear to anyone that this entity bears direct responsibility for the commission of the very acts the UN Secretary General's Policy seeks to counter.

There is not a single one of the above defined grave violations that do not apply to the NCS/ CCDI's daily operations. Something UNODC should have known before entering its agreement if it had conducted its mandatory due diligence and risk assessment under the Policy, captured in the complementary guidance note's checklist and scheme:¹⁶³



Whether UNODC conducted that mandatory assessment on the NCS/CCDI's track record of compliance or non-compliance with international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law, including any specific record of grave violations, prior to signing the October 2019 MoU remains unknown. Most certainly, counter to the guidelines, no related elements are included in the text of the agreement.

Yet, the CCDI's 2018 written legal interpretation on the means of fugitive return, notably including the *persuade to return* and kidnapping measures in violation of fundamental principles of sovereignty and *non-refoulement*, had already been published.

Its domestic practice of incommunicado *liuzhi* detention for "anti-corruption" investigations had already been denounced by the UN Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances (WGEID) in a General Allegation Letter of September 2019.¹⁶⁴

Similarly, since the signing of the MoU, no visible signs of mandatory monitoring of the NCS/CCDI's behavior have taken place since, despite the reiterated concerns by the WGEID in its 2020 report to the 45th Human Rights Council¹⁶⁵, as well as its 2021 Fall Session report.¹⁶⁶


That independent monitoring of human rights conditions in the PRC is next to impossible is no secret, as the long list of outstanding country visit requests by UN human rights mechanisms or the five-year delay in the PRC's periodic reporting to a particularly relevant body such as the UN Committee Against Torture testify. However, rather than an excuse, that impossibility should have been an integral part of UNODC's due diligence process.

Under its transparency obligations, it should have made clear to the PRC that **in order to sustain** the support, the United Nations is obligated to continuously assess whether or not the recipient's actions are consistent with the Organization's obligations under the relevant bodies of law.

None of that is present in the text of the MoU.

If UNODC had conducted the risk assessment and continued its monitoring as prescribed, its outcome would have been crystal-clear. According to the scale established by the Policy, the NCS/ CCDI presents all elements of a high-level risk, meaning that *"there is a real likelihood that grave violations will be committed by the intended recipients and will remain unaddressed."*

One can only draw the following conclusion: either UNODC did not conduct its mandatory assessment, or it chose to ignore its results... maybe in its rush for *"mutually beneficial"* cooperation around the Belt and Road Initiative *"that charts a more equitable and prosperous world for all"*, as UNODC's Director General Ghada Waly reiterated on December 14, 2023.¹⁶⁷



[...]

Also at this session, UNODC is presenting highly relevant new publications.

One of those publications, titled 'Towards Building a Road of Integrity', is specifically focused on the Belt and Road Initiative, providing guidance on risk management as well as integrity in supply chains.

Another publication is focused on promoting integrity through the different phases of international investment projects.

I encourage you to make good use of these resources.

I also encourage you to seek avenues for enhancing cooperation, both formal and informal, across borders as well as at the national level between relevant domestic authorities, to leave no gap for corruption.

And I encourage you to ensure channels for successful investigation, prosecution, and adjudication of fraud and corruption in investment projects.

I also want to underline the importance of working across sectors and with all relevant stakeholders against corruption in the BRI, and I am pleased to see today's event include representatives of government, the private sector, the banking sector, and academia.

Ladies and gentlemen,

The Belt and Road Initiative charts a road towards a more equitable and prosperous world for all.

It is a road worth safeguarding from corruption.

As the Secretary-General said, "the United Nations system stands ready to travel this road with you."


Thank you.

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"Adherence to the human rights due diligence policy is important to maintain the legitimacy, credibility and public image of the United Nations and to ensure compliance with the Charter and with the Organization's obligations under international law."

UN Secretary General, Human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces, March 5, 2013.

Where do we go from here? The HRDDP leaves little room for interpretation¹⁶⁸:



UNODC cannot be allowed to ignore the multitude of issues its continued support to the NCS represents. In failing to properly assess, disclose or denounce such issues, UNODC has and is not only legitimizing the NCS/CCDI as a credible counterpart for independent anti-corruption and law enforcement bodies in other nations, it is also assisting it in building trust and expanding its networks in a way that put the human rights of individuals worldwide at direct risk.¹⁶⁹

If, counter to what was surmised above, UNODC did perform the mandatory risk assessment, such an assessment and its subsequent monitoring should be made public for evaluation.

Moreover, considering the reporting of grave systematic and widespread human rights violations by the NCS/CCDI both at home and abroad, as well as the admitted violations of territorial sovereignty of other nations, UNODC is obliged to intervene in accordance with the above HRDDP scheme: given it is a) highly unlikely the violations would indeed be addressed; and that b) international and independent human rights monitoring in the country is an impossibility imposed by PRC authorities themselves, all support to (including indirect support through the benefits it draws from its position as a *focal point for* all work under the Convention) and agreements with the NCS/CCDI should be interrupted.

UNODC would not be the first to suspend or rescind an MoU with the NCS/CCDI in the short timespan it started profiling itself as the PRC's main counterpart for international judicial cooperation. In a multitude of agreements signed since the National Supervision Law of 2018, also Denmark and Australia briefly entertained an MoU.

Both countries have since rescinded their agreements. Similar to UNODC, the Australian Federal Police (AFP) refused to release the content of their agreement, despite admitting in response to Safeguard Defenders' Freedom of Information request that the NCS/CCDI may indeed not qualify as a law enforcement agency. Following repeated parliamentary actions over the course of two years, in May 2023¹⁷⁰ the AFP confirmed to Senator James Paterson during a public hearing before Senate Estimates that it would never enter into an agreement with the entity again. The MoU, originally signed in December 2018, should have lapsed at the start of this year (2024).

CHAPTER 7 A GLIMPSE INTO THE FUTURE?

In 2023, the CCP Central Committee issued the next five-year Work Plan of the Central Anti-Corruption Coordination Group (2023-2027)¹⁷¹, with no indication that its "anti-corruption" drive both in and out of the country will be slowing down.

A publication by the CCDI's International Cooperation Bureau following the CCP's 20th National Congress (October 2022) provides a mission statement of sorts for its international objectives in the coming years, making clear it shows no intention to relent its practices. Rather, it aims to increase its efforts to insert the *Chinese characteristics* described in this report in current international norms and institutions, all while expanding direct cooperation with countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America in its bid to contrast the international human rights norms dubbed as *Western double standards and malicious defamation*.

As always, the Party and its leader figure front and center:¹⁷²

"For the 2023 International Cooperation against Corruption, we will follow the guidance of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era. We will fully adhere to the spirit of the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party and make arrangements according to the Second Plenary Session of the 20th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection.

We will coordinate the anti-corruption struggle both internationally and domestically, deepen international cooperation against corruption from the perspective of safeguarding national security and interests, provide strong support for winning the prolonged and tough battle against corruption, and secure the Party's missions in the new era.

We will actively participate in the construction of the international governance system against corruption. We will put our efforts on serving the top leader's diplomatic missions, deepen highlevel exchanges in the field of anti-corruption, and strengthen the political leadership of international cooperation against corruption.

We will enhance anti-corruption exchanges and cooperation under multilateral mechanisms such as the United Nations, G20, APEC, and BRICS countries, promoting practical cooperation in mechanisms focusing on fugitive return and ill-gotten gain recovery and strengthening political consensus such as rejecting corruption safe havens.

We will deepen cooperation with neighboring and developing countries, key countries in fugitive return and ill-gotten gain recovery, and anti-corruption agencies of the Belt and Road Initiative countries.

We will engage with more countries for the signing of extradition treaties, criminal legal assistance treaties, and anti-corruption cooperation agreements. We will continue to hold anti-corruption training courses for countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. We will strengthen international communication in the field of anti-corruption, and actively tell China's anti-corruption stories, including fugitive return and ill-gotten gain recovery, the clean construction of the Belt and Road Initiative, and supervision on poverty elimination.

We will promote the strategic deployment of the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party against corruption, and introduce China's anti-corruption concepts, paths, and propositions.

We will resolutely fight against certain Western countries' adoption of double standards and malicious defamation, creating a favorable external environment for strengthening Party governance with strict discipline."

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS & POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Concluding Observations

Headlines in today's world are dominated by the struggle between democracies and autocracies. There is much that separates the two systems of governance. But at its core it is the belief that individuals have inalienable rights. That freedom from fear is a *conditio* sine qua non to enjoy those rights. That Governments are bound to protect and defend these rights.

They fail to do so when authoritarian actors are allowed to roam freely on their territories or otherwise invade the civic space of individuals residing there. They fail to fulfill the commitments under the international conventions and treaties they freely signed on to. Commitments they are bound to as democratic governments not above but under the rule of law.

There can be no democracy when pockets of unfreedom at the hand of authoritarian actors are allowed to exist within their territory. Not only do those represent an abysmal form of discrimination, their tolerance constitutes an effective cession of sovereignty as the forceful extra-judicial returns described in this report demonstrate.

The *leitmotif* behind any nation's choice to put countermeasures in place should therefore be simple: protect and defend their democratic sovereignty as a direct means to upholding the international rules-based order and the universal rights that underpin it.

Built around the PRC's approach to its fugitive recovery operations, the chapters in this report also contain valuable clues for democratic authorities to counter this practice and the wider phenomenon of transnational repression.

Chapter 2 focused on the use of *extraditions* and the growing difficulties encountered by the PRC in obtaining them from their prime hunting ground for this form of official judicial cooperation, Europe. While the European Court of Human Rights and national courts have effectively curbed their use on grounds of the PRC's blatant disregard for international human rights norms, many bilateral treaties remain in effect and continue to limit the fundamental freedoms of those that may be targeted.

Chapter 3 treated the method of *repatriation* and its prevalent use in countries willing to provide PRC authorities with the swift and easy return of wanted individuals without any legal remedies. However, those returns still need a vehicle. Beyond diplomatic engagement on the issue with such countries, the use of commercial airliners and airport transits provide potential entry points for democratic authorities to exercise vigilance and adopt countermeasures. Previous lessons learned from countering human and sex trafficking may be invaluable.

Chapter 4 delved into the most preponderant in the PRC's *fugitive recovery playbook: persuade to return.* A method with many faces - from threatening pressure on and the collective punishment of loved ones in China, through the use of administrative measures to force an individual's return, to covert operations overseas by PRC authorities or their proxies - it is both the most difficult and the most pressing measure to address as its use and impact reach far beyond the individual alleged criminal cases listed in this report.

There are obvious limits to what any democratic authority can do with regard to events taking place *inside* China. However, also in this case multiple entry points for contrasting action exist.

Our recurring emphasis on the role of overseas organizations tied to the United Front does not stem from a blind fixation on the subject, but from the inherent dangers their growing role in acting as a liaison for CCP/PRC entities poses. Establishing oversight and clear red lines for activities taking place on their territory, as well as ensuring accountability in case of abuse, are well within the purview of national authorities.

Deconstructing bridges of influence with aforementioned entities, including through widespread awareness-raising activities on all levels of government, is key to building new ones with independent voices in the diaspora communities. Such efforts take time but are the only way forward for democratic authorities willing to understand and map what is most likely going on under their very noses. Furthermore, it is an exercise that will not only benefit those targeted by the PRC's actions but will directly contribute to the *resilience-building* of the entire society against malign foreign interference.

We are not naïve about the complications the abuse of administrative measures represents. Dealing with an exercise in sovereign responsibilities on both sides, individual cases may be difficult to assess and the risk of abusive claims – to the detriment of those with legitimate ones – is real.

However, the administrative power held by authoritarian regimes can be detrimental to the exercise of internationally recognized rights, for example through trumped up criminal records or the absence of identification documents. A coordinated understanding and policy around such measures by democratic allies and partners would be beneficial.

Some international rules for enforcement and potential reference already exist, for example under article 21 of the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, prohibiting *"anyone, other than a public official duly authorized by law to confiscate or (attempt to) destroy identity documents, documents authorizing entry to or stay, residence or establishment in the national territory or work permits. [...] In no case shall it be permitted to destroy the passport or equivalent document of a migrant worker or a member of his or her family".¹⁷³*

Chapter 5 dealt with the fifth and last measure on the CCDI's list: irregular measures. Their explicit mention presents perhaps the most damning indictment of the PRC's brazen actions. In combination with its consistent domestic track record of widespread and systematic human rights violations, it should be enough to make any democratic and international authority think twice about lending any form of cooperation to this Party body and those responding to it.

Allowing an entity expressly engaged in mass extrajudicial returns to become the formal focal point for international judicial cooperation not only provides them with valuable tools to pursue their illicit goals. It also affords them the legitimacy they so desperately seek to open doors where

others are being closed. Incidents contained in this report show the direct links between such cooperation agreements and mass violations of individual human rights.

International organizations bound by the UN Declaration on Human Rights and other mandatory human rights policies should not and cannot be allowed to contribute to such efforts.

Similarly, it begs disbelief that, despite the growing evidence on the PRC's transnational repression and forced returns methods, single democratic countries continue to provide pathways for PRC entities to conduct their illicit activities on their soil.

The recent reinstatement of joint police patrols in Croatia and the signing of a similar agreement in Hungary are a stark reminder of the absence of a strong and coordinated response by European authorities in response to previous reports and of particular concern in the context of Schengen.


As the European Court of Human Rights *Liu v. Poland* judgment did, it must be made exceedingly clear to the PRC that the international order and democratic nations will not lower their standards. If it wishes to engage in international law enforcement and judicial cooperation, the onus is on the PRC to bring its internal affairs in line with internationally agreed standards and allow for independent international monitoring, including through country visits by UN Special Rapporteurs and Procedures.

While on a smaller scale, the 2005 precedent of Spain's insistence on excluding the death penalty before signing on to a bilateral extradition treaty - a precedent that led to the PRC's acknowledgement it would have to do so with all EU Member States in order to obtain similar treaties¹⁷⁴ - demonstrates democratic nations have leverage when they want to.

This brings us to a last but not least. The PRC is far from the only authoritarian actor engaging in transnational repression efforts. A permissive environment for one constitutes fertile ground for any other to step in.

Yet, to end on a positive note: in the same fashion, the adoption of countermeasures against the transnational repression efforts of one sends a clear message to all, while providing those targeted by any actor with the necessary avenues to protect themselves and their communities.





Policy Recommendations

A democratic response to transnational repression is a fairly novel theme in global relations. It is only in recent years that a small number of nations have actively stepped up their efforts to adequately understand, map and counter the phenomenon.

While this is obviously not a positive note, it does mean there is ample space for international coordination on the issue and the joint adoption of best practices.

Guided by existing best practices adopted by some democratic nations and consistent recommendations by fellow human rights organizations, we center our approach around the acronym **WE CAN STOP TNR: W**hole of Government, **E**ducate, **C**oordinate, **A**ssess, **N**ame, **S**peak up, **T**rack, reach **O**ut, **P**ut on notice, **T**rain **and R**eport.

These recommendations are not exhaustive but may provide a useful initial guideline for countries that are yet to or just started to adopt countermeasures as to the breadth of issues that need to be tackled simultaneously. We firmly believe it is in any democratic country's national interest to do so.

WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT

Transnational repression is not just a foreign affairs or law enforcement issue. It touches upon interior or home(land) affairs; schools, universities and research institutes; the media and cultural environment; digital platforms; and so on. As a tool designed to limit individuals' free and full participation in democracies, its tentacles can spread across the whole of those societies.

This complex phenomenon therefore requires attention and coordinated response across the legislative, executive and judicial branches. It is recommended such response be overseen by a single entity.

EDUCATE

To sustain a whole-of-government and even whole-of-society response, it is crucial to raise awareness around the phenomenon and the factors that enable it.

In the context of the PRC this regards in particular the need for public information-sharing around the networks of proxies that are both engaged in influence operations and in exercising control over diaspora communities on behalf or at the behest of PRC entities. Few policies to counter transnational repression will be effective as long as (local) authorities are seen actively engaging with the perpetrators.

Building up resilience against these intertwined forms of malign foreign interference must take place at both the national and local level.

COORDINATE

Coordinating law enforcement and judicial responses, and information-sharing with likeminded allies and partners is essential to countering a phenomenon that is by definition transnational, where a victim in country A may be targeted by an individual in country B.

Similarly, coordination and steadfastness in diplomatic responses is crucial to sending a unified message that the undermining of democratic freedoms will not be tolerated.

Depending on the entity, such coordination should take place in bi- and multilateral fora, as well as within regional organizations.

ASSESS

Some acts of transnational repression already constitute criminal offences in most countries. However, to provide an adequate response to the wider phenomenon, including its elements that may not in and of themselves constitute such an offence, an assessment must be made of the current legislative and institutional framework for their adequacy in providing the necessary tools to counter transnational repression.

It is recommended such assessments be made on the basis of the specific insights, lessons learned and needs of those tasked with the effective implementation of policies, in particular law enforcement and/or designated coordinating entities.¹⁷⁵

At the same time: bilateral law enforcement and judicial cooperation with States and entities responsible for transnational repression must be carefully reviewed, and where (risk of) abuse exists, suspended. Open-ended police cooperation agreements without clear and specific objectives should be avoided at all costs.

International organizations engaged in supporting law enforcement and judicial cooperation must be held to their human rights obligations.

NAME

Provide a unified and internationally recognized definition of transnational repression as an element of foreign interference, shared by likeminded partners and allies.

It is recommended such a definition be not too narrow in scope as to not exclude emerging or novel forms, but rather build around the 1) aim of the phenomenon (e.g. to undermine the free exercise of fundamental freedoms), and 2) actors (e.g. authoritarian actors or those acting on their behalf).

Safeguard Defenders believes the potential targets of such acts should be widely defined. While members of the diaspora are indeed the prime targets, they are not the only ones. Similarly, targets or victims are not confined to regime critics. Transnational repression has wide ripple effects across communities in its aim to exert control, distress, and divide. Note: not all such acts may amount to criminal offences in and of themselves.

SPEAK UP

Publicly denounce acts of transnational repression and extrajudicial return efforts, both at a national and supra-national level.

Denounce cooperation with and assistance to State entities engaged in transnational repression in bi- and multilateral fora, including international organizations.

Make it clear to the PRC that in order to engage in international law enforcement and judicial cooperation, it must bring its internal system in line with internationally agreed standards and allow for independent international monitoring, including through country visits by UN Special Rapporteurs and Procedures.

TRACK

In combination with allied information-sharing and outreach activities, track transnational repression activities. No democratic country is immune to these acts. It is in their sovereign interest to know what is happening on their territory. Not all acts may amount to criminal offences, but only the systematic mapping of such acts will allow for the emergence of the patterns on methods and actors needed to instruct adequate counter-responses.

OUTREACH

Build outreach mechanisms to targeted communities and individuals. These include:

- Central hotlines for victims to report;
- Public communication on the Government's policy and reporting lines in targeted communities' languages (see examples of the FBI and AFP in <u>Background: Transnational Repression</u>);
- Identify and use existing mechanisms or locations to advertise such communications, such as places of arrival in country or administrative services sites. Avoid approaching specific individuals in locations where they may be viewed by others;
- Engage with trusted civil society stakeholders. Avoid engagement with PRC proxies.

PUT ON NOTICE

In combination with publicly denouncing acts of transnational repression, put potential perpetrators on notice, including by:

- Actively investigating any reported acts of transnational repression;
- Prosecuting any criminal offences committed. The <u>Annex II overview</u> of transnational repressionrelated criminal charges brought over the years in Canada, Germany, Sweden and the U.S. may provide useful guidance as to existing pathways in national jurisdictions;
- Issuing targeted sanctions and visa restrictions on individuals engaged or complicit in acts of transnational repression;
- Notification of such policies on Government platforms, both online and for example in locations such as Embassies and Consulates.

TRAIN

Train law enforcement officials, personnel at administrative services sites, and those working with refugees and asylum seekers to recognize traits of transnational repression.

Train personnel at ports of exit to recognize possible traits of forced returns, such as control exercised over an individual's documents at check-in or security.

REPORT

Legislative bodies should request periodical public reporting on identified trends, policies and effective countermeasures undertaken by their Governments and hold public hearings with relevant stakeholders, including civil society.

Travel Advisory for at-risk individuals and targeted communities

There are many factors to consider around potential personal risks of traveling to or transiting through a country. The below world map represents some of those factors individuals at risk of the PRC's forced returns may want to take into account.

Based on the findings of this report and our previous reports on the use and abuse of extradition mechanisms, the map contains:

A. Countries with recent cases of forced returns through cooperation with PRC counterparts:

- Countries that assisted in the handover (e.g., repatriation) of individuals without access to legal remedies.
- As noted in the above report, many countries have significantly altered their policies since Operation Fox Hunt started ten years ago. Therefore, only those countries with a forced returns cooperation record since 2018 have been included.
- NB: This is not an exhaustive overview of existing police cooperation mechanisms with the PRC (not included for example: joint police patrols in Croatia, Hungary and Serbia, or extensive police cooperation in South Africa), but is based exclusively on the recently recorded cases of repatriation and luring and entrapment contained in this report. Safeguard Defenders aims to make more comprehensive resources on police cooperation mechanisms with the PRC available soon.


B. Countries with bilateral extradition treaties with the PRC:

- The map highlights countries with both ratified and signed-but-not-ratified extradition treaties with the PRC (or Hong Kong).
- In assessing the risk of extradition from those countries, judicial precedents and recent policies must be taken into account. For a more in-depth assessment on those factors, please consult our *Stop Extraditions to China Information and Help Center*.¹⁷⁶
- NB: even when judicial precedents and policies diminish the risk of effective extradition, individuals may still be at risk of lengthy and arbitrary detentions during the judicial process.

In general, individuals belonging to particular risk categories (e.g., members of ethnic and religious minorities, dissidents and activists, former CCP officials) may want to adopt the following minimal protocol when planning their travel:

- Inform a trusted individual of your travel plans and agree on a regular check-in time so when something goes wrong, their response can be timely.
- Always keep the emergency contacts of your country's consular services (when different from PRC) with you. Consular emergency services are usually available both in capital and in the country you travel to.
- Various emergency procedures (for example, UN Special Procedures) require consent of the individual or their immediate family. You may want to leave such consent, together with a copy of travel documents, with your trusted contact at home prior to departure.

If you become the target of any of the methods described in this report, please contact local authorities. Consult our Pilot Reporting Guides <u>on Page 6 of this report</u> for guidelines and assistance.



ANNEXES

ANNEX I: Memorandum of Understanding between United Nations and The National Commission of Supervision of The People's Republic of China on Cooperation in Combating Corruption

Whereas the United Nations, represented by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (hereinafter referred to as "UNODC") has the mandate to assist Member States in preventing and combating corruption in full compliance with the relevant United Nations conventions, in particular with the United Nations Convention against Corruption (hereinafter referred to as "UNCAC"), and to provide a wide range of technical assistance to enhance the capacity of Governments of States parties in anti-corruption related areas;

Whereas the National Commission of Supervision of the People's Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as "the National Commission of Supervision"), as the supreme supervisory body in China, has the mandate to inspect public personnel exercising public authorities, investigate illegal conduct and crimes in relation to abuse of office, carry out integrity and anti-corruption work, and uphold dignity of the Chinese Constitution and laws;

Whereas UNODC and the National Commission of Supervision (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Parties") share common objectives with regard to strengthening and advancing international cooperation against corruption in achieving the goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development of the United Nations, including in the areas of preventing and combating threats related to corruption, and wish to collaborate to further these common goals and objectives within their respective mandates and governing rules and regulations;

Whereas the Parties intend to conclude this Memorandum of Understanding (hereinafter referred to as "MoU") with the aim of consolidating, developing and detailing their cooperation and effectiveness to achieve the common objectives in the field of fighting corruption, including in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative, on the basis of mutual respect, equality, and mutual benefit;

Now therefore the Parties have agreed to cooperate under this Memorandum of Understanding as follows:

Article 1 - Interpretation

1. This MoU represents the complete understanding between the Parties and supersedes all prior MoUs, communications and representations, whether oral or written, concerning the subject matter of this MoU.

- 2. Any Annex to this MoU will be considered an integral part of this MoU. References to this MoU will be construed as including any Annexes, as varied or amended in accordance with the terms of this MoU.
- 3. For specific projects to be implemented pursuant to this MoU, the Parties will conclude separate agreements addressing, inter alia, the financial arrangements, ownership of intellectual property and dispute settlement, as well as other responsibilities of the parties in relation to the project.

Article 2 – Effective date and term

1. This MoU will be effective upon the last date of signature of the approving officials and remain in force for a period of three years. It will be automatically renewed after every three years, unless terminated in accordance with article 14 below.

Article 3 – Purpose and scope of the cooperation

- 1. The purpose of this MoU is to provide a framework of cooperation and understanding, and to facilitate collaboration between the Parties to further their shared goals and objectives in regard to:
 - a. Promotion of the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development of the United Nations through the fight against corruption;
 - Building a framework of cooperation related to preventing and combating corruption and maximizing the relevant benefit derived from international expertise including in the areas of criminalization and law enforcement, international cooperation and asset recovery in line with UNCAC;
 - c. Building cooperation on relevant areas under the Belt and Road Initiative as they relate to the mandates, programmes and activities of UNODC, on preventing and combatting threats related to corruption, with a view to promoting the establishment of the clean Silk Road.
- 2. The objectives of this MoU will be achieved through:
 - a. Regular dialogue meetings between UNODC and the National Commission of Supervision;
 - b. Execution of separate legal instruments between the Parties to define and implement any subsequent projects, programmes and activities pursuant to Article 1.3.
- 3. This MoU does not itself give rise to any financial implication or commitment of resources, financial or otherwise, on the part of UNODC of the National Commission of Supervision.

Article 4 - Areas of cooperation

- 1. Areas of cooperation are agreed jointly through the cooperation mechanism in the MoU. Policies and priorities under this MoU may also be jointly reviewed regularly by the Parties pursuant to Article 5 to allow the Parties to respond to newly emerging issues in the field of anti-corruption, including in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative.
- 2. The Parties have agreed to the following preliminary overarching themes for this MoU:
 - a. Promoting information sharing and exchange on prevention of corruption, including by conducting analysis and research, collecting international best practices, providing technical

assistance on both policy and practice basis, and organizing joint training and capacity building programmes in this area;

- b. Enhancing information sharing and exchange on trends in the investigation, evidence collection, extradition, mutual legal assistance and international law enforcement cooperation related to corruption offences, including through meetings, panel discussions and personnel training;
- c. Enhancing cooperation concerning recovery of stolen assets through information sharing and exchange on good practices, technical assistance provided by UNODC, including through the joint UNODC and World Bank Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative (StAR), and other cooperation projects;
- d. Supporting the National Commission of Supervision on activities related to the prevention and fight against corruption within UNODC's mandates and carrying out mutually beneficial cooperation against corruption in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative, subject to the availability of resources.
- e. Strenghtening dialogue and communication on the implementation of UNCAC;
- f. Cooperating to establish a communication platform under the online directory of UNCAC competent national authorities, with a view to promoting exchange of experience, dialogue and effective cooperation among anti-corruption authorities of the States parties.
- 3. These areas form part of UNODC's mandates and programmes of work. They are also priorities for the National Commission of Supervision. Some activities under these abovementioned fields are already ongoing, but are in need of additional support.
- 4. The above list is not exhaustive and should not be taken to exclude or replace other forms of cooperation between the Parties on other issues of common interest.

Article 5 - Organization of the cooperation

- 1. The Parties will hold regular bilateral meetings on matters of common interest, in accordance with an agenda agreed to in advance by the Parties, for the purpose of developing and monitoring collaborative projects. Such meetings will take place at least once every six months to:
 - a. Discuss technical and operational issues related to furthering the objectives of this MoU; and
 - b. Review progress of work pursuant to a separate legal instrument mentioned in the priority areas of cooperation mentioned in article 4 above.
- 2. Within the context defined above, further bilateral meetings will be encouraged and set up on an ad hoc basis as deemed necessary by UNODC and the National Commission of Supervision to address priority matters of common interest for the implementation of activities in specific areas, countries and regions.
- 3. In implementing activities, projects and programmes in the agreed priority areas, the Parties will execute a separate legal instrument appropriate for the implementation of such initiatives in accordance with article 1.3 above.
- 4. Where the National Commission of Supervision is organizing a meeting with external participation at which policy matters related to the aims of this MoU will be discussed, the

National Commission of Supervision will, as appropriate, either invite UNODC to participate in the meeting or update UNODC on relevant policy matters discussed at the meeting.

Article 6 - Status of the National Commission of Supervision and its Personnel

1. The Parties acknowledge and agree that the National Commission of Supervision is an entity separate and distinct from the United Nations, including UNODC. The employees, personnel, representatives, agents, contractors or affiliates of the National Commission of Supervision, including the personnel engaged by the National Commission of Supervision for carrying out any of the project activities pursuant to this MoU, will not be considered in any respect or for any purpose whatsoever as being employees, personnel, representatives, agents, contractors or affiliates of UNODC, nor will any employees, personnel, representatives, agents, contractors or affiliates of UNODC be considered, in any respect or for any purposes whatsoever, as being employees, personnel, representatives, agents, contractors or affiliates of UNODC be considered, in any respect or for any purposes whatsoever, as being employees, personnel, representatives, agents, contractors or affiliates of UNODC be considered, in any respect or for any purposes whatsoever, as being employees, personnel, representatives, agents, contractors or affiliates of UNODC be considered, in any respect or for any purposes whatsoever, as being employees, personnel, representatives, agents, contractors or affiliates of the National Commission of Supervision.

Article 7 – Relationship between the Parties and financial arrangements

- 1. This MoU sets out a general framework for cooperation between the Parties and does not obligate either Party to provide financial support of any kind to the other Party. In performing any responsibilities or engaging in any act under this MoU, each Party will bear its own costs. Nothing in this MoU will obligate either of the Parties to appropriate funds or enter into any contract, agreement or other obligation.
- 2. The Parties will not undertake any actions, incur any expenses or make any commitments, financial or otherwise, which would be inconsistent with this MoU or the respective Party's regulations, rules, policies and procedures, including, as necessary, the approval of their internal governing bodies. In the case of contributions by one Party to the other Party in support of particular activities under this MoU, appropriate financing arrangements will be established in writing in a project document, exchange of letters or an agreement as stated in article 1.3 above, specifying the costs or expenses relating to the activity and how they are to be borne by the Parties. Such agreements will also include a provision incorporating by reference, this MoU.
- 3. Nothing in this Memorandum will create any partnership or joint venture between the Parties. The Parties hereby recognize that the collaboration under this MoU is non-exclusive.

Article 8 - Intellectual Property rights

1. This Memorandum does not delegate or transfer either Party's intellectual property rights to the other Party. Unless otherwise provided in specific agreements to be concluded pursuant to article 1.3 above, each Party will maintain ownership and control of its intellectual property rights.

Article 9 – Use of name and emblem

1. Neither Party will use the name, emblem or trademarks of the other Party, its subsidiary bodies or entities and/or affiliates, or any abbreviation thereof, in connection with its activities, the cooperation under this MoU or otherwise without the prior expressly written approval of the other Party in each case. Under no circumstances, will authorization of the UN or UNODC name or emblem be granted for commercial purposes.

- 2. The National Commission of Supervision acknowledges that it is familiar with the independent, international and impartial status of the UN, including UNODC, and recognizes that the UN name and emblem may not be associated with any political or sectarian cause or otherwise used in a manner inconsistent with the status, reputation and neutrality of the UN, including UNODC.
- 3. The Parties agree to recognize and acknowledge the collaboration under this MoU, as appropriate. To this end, the Parties will consult with each other concerning the manner and form of such recognition and acknowledgement.

Article 10 – United Nations privileges and immunities

1. Nothing in or relating to this MoU will be deemed a waiver, express or implied, of any of the privileges and immunities of the United Nations, including its subsidiary organs.

Article 11 - Confidentiality

- 1. The handling of information will be subject to each Party's confidentiality policies.
- 2. Before disclosing internal documents, or documents that by virtue of their content or the circumstances of their creation or communication must be deemed confidential, of the other Party to third parties, each Party will obtain the express, written consent of the other Party.

Article 12 – Dispute settlement

In the event of a dispute, controversy of claim arising out of or relating to this MoU, the Parties will use their best efforts to promptly settle such dispute through direct negotiation.

Article 13 – Notification and amendments

- 1. Each Party will promptly notify the other in writing of any anticipated or actual material changes that will affect the execution of this MoU.
- 2. The Parties may amend this MoU by mutual written agreement.

Article 14 – Termination

- 1. Either Party may terminate this MoU by giving two months' prior written notice to the other Party.
- 2. Upon termination of this MoU, the rights and obligations of the Parties defined under any other legal instrument executed pursuant to this MoU will cease to be effective, unless that legal instrument states otherwise.
- 3. Any termination of this MoU will be without prejudice to (a) the orderly completion of any ongoing collaborative activity and (b) any other rights and obligations of the Parties accrued prior to the date of termination under this MoU or legal instrument executed pursuant to this MoU.

In witness thereof, the duly authorized representatives of the Parties affix their signatures below.

This MoU was signed in both English and Chinese languages, two copies. Both languages are identical and equally authentic. In case of conflicts of interpretation, English text will prevail.

ANNEX II: Overview Of Criminal Charges for PRC Transnational Repression Activities

🔍 CANADA

Location: Toronto, Ontario

Date(s): Deportation order issued in October 2008

Authority: Federal Court of Canada

Suspect(s): Gankhuyag Bumuutseren (Mongolian citizen, former double agent for Mongolia and China, asylum seeker)

Charge(s): RN/A (no criminal persecution)

Relevant legal clause(s): Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, Section 101(1)(f)

DESCRIPTION

Gankhuyag Bumuutseren, a Mongolian citizen, acted as an agent for the Inner Mongolian branch of China's secret services in the 1990s. When Mongolian authorities exposed Bumuutseren, he was coerced into working as a double agent. At some point, Chinese officials dispatched Bumuutseren on missions to the United States, where he was tasked with spying on Chinese dissidents, particularly representatives of the Inner Mongolian People's Party. However, when the PRC authorities discovered his dual role, Bumuutseren was detained, subjected to torture, and ultimately sentenced to 18 years in prison. After serving several months in prison, he was sent back to Mongolia, where he allegedly faced further detention and torture. In 2005, Bumuutseren and his family fled to Canada and sought protection, which they were granted. However, in 2008, Canadian authorities uncovered Bumuutseren's espionage background, leading to a reevaluation and termination of his claim under the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, Section 101(1)(f). This section stipulates that protection shall not be provided if the claimant "poses a danger to security or has violated human or international rights or committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge before their admission to that country as a refugee". Consequently, the Federal Court of Canada dismissed all of his appeals.

OUTCOME

When he was on the verge of being deported, Bumuutseren sought refuge in one of Toronto's churches. The police refrained from entering the church, adhering to internal recommendations and local customs. However, in 2011, Bumuutseren faced arrest in a case unrelated to espionage activities. After serving his prison sentence, he was eventually deported in 2013.

- Media coverage: https://nationalpost. com/news/when-a-toronto-church-gave-sanctuary-to-a-man-facing-deportation-it-unwittingly-harbored-a-child-molester
- Case documents: https://www.smhric.org/news_275.htm

Location: Stockholm

Date(s):

- Suspect arrested on June 4, 2009
- Sentenced on March 8, 2010,
- Court of appeal judgment delivered on September 17, 2010.

Authority: Stockholm District Court, Svea Court of Appeal

Suspect(s): Babur Mehsut (alternative spelling: Babur Maihesuti; Uyghur exile and naturalized Swedish citizen)

Charge(s): Refugee espionage, unlawful acquisition and distribution of information relating to individuals for the benefit of a foreign power

Relevant legal clause(s): Swedish Criminal Code, Chapter 18, Section 10b

DESCRIPTION

BBabur Maihesuti, former mayor of Xinjiang's Province Hotan City, was brought to Sweden from Hong Kong by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees. According to charges, Mehsut was alleged to have passed the information on the health, travel, and political views of other Uyghurs in Sweden and abroad (including at the World Uyghur Congress meeting in Washington, D.C.) between January 2008 and June 2009 to Lei Da, correspondent of The People's Daily (CCP official newspaper) in Sweden and Zhou Lulu, press officer at the Chinese Embassy in Sweden, who were in fact Chinese intelligence officers.

OUTCOME

Conviction (16-months sentence, extended to 22-months by the court of appeal)

- Radio Free Asia on the case: <u>https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/</u> spying-03092010132203.html
- Verdict: <u>https://safeguarddefenders.com/sites/default/files/Babur%20Maihesuti%20</u> verdict.pdf
- Court of Appeal judgment: <u>https://safeguarddefenders.com/sites/default/files/</u> Babur%20Maihesuti%20Court%20of%20Appeal%20judgment.pdf





Location: Celle

Date(s): Sentence announced on June 8, 2011

Authority: Niedersachsen State Supreme Court

Suspect(s): John Zhou (Chinese doctor by profession, one of the earliest adoptees of Falun Gong in Germany)

Charge(s): Spying on Falun Gong practitioners

Relevant legal clause(s): German Criminal Code, Section 99, paragraph 1, point 1

DESCRIPTION

According to Court documents, in 2005, an application to visit Zhou's sick father in China led him to establish contact with Tang Wenjuan, head of the Chinese Embassy consular section in Berlin and an alleged MSS agent. Zhou expressed a willingness to help the Chinese Communist Party "solve the Falun Gong problem". Zhou was charged with spying at the behest of the 610 Office for five years, including through the forwarding of emails from fellow Falun Gong practitioners, and managed to produce a 300-page report on Falun Gong practitioners' "organizational structure" in Germany for his coordinators in China. According to Manyan Ng, head of the Falun Gong Association in Germany, Zhou also went to great lengths to discover the password to the online voice server used by practitioners to communicate about sensitive matters.

OUTCOME

Conviction (€27,000 fine)

- Verdict (DE): <u>https://safeguarddefenders.com/sites/default/files/John%20Zhou%20</u> judgment%20%28DE%29.pdf
- Verdict (DE-EN autotranslation): <u>https://safeguarddefenders.com/sites/default/files/</u> John%20Zhou%20judgment%20%28EN%20autotranslation%29.pdf



Location: Munich

Date(s): The defendants were sentenced in the autumn of 2011

Authority: Higher Regional Court of Munich

Suspect(s): Four men of Uyghur descent (two Chinese citizens residing in Germany, two German citizens)

Charge(s): Spying on members of Uyghur community in Munich

Relevant legal clause(s): German Criminal Code, Section 99, paragraph 1, point

DESCRIPTION

The defendants' homes were searched in 2009, but no arrests or charges followed at that time. In 2011, two defendants faced charges related to collecting information on Munich's Uyghur community and sharing it with Chinese intelligence service officers. The shared information included details about upcoming protests, events, individuals, and the World Uyghur Congress. The third defendant was charged with acting as an intermediary between one of the perpetrators and intelligence service officers. One more suspect left Germany before being brought to trial.

OUTCOME

Suspended sentences (from 9 to 12 months)

Link

"Reuters" on the case: https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN0UD1B7/



Location: Stockholm County

Date(s):

- Suspect arrested on February 26, 2017
- Indictment filed on April 12, 2018,
- Sentence announced on June 15, 2018

Authority: Södertörn District Court

Suspect(s): Dorjee Gyantsan (Tibetan refugee granted asylum in Sweden)

Charge(s): Illegal intelligence activities against persons of Tibetan descent

Relevant legal clause(s) Swedish Criminal Code, Chapter 18, Section 10b

DESCRIPTION

In 1997, Dorjee Gyantsan fled to Nepal from Tibet after participating in a protest advocating for greater autonomy for Tibetans. He was granted refugee status by the UNHCR and offered asylum in Sweden. In February 2017, he was arrested for allegedly spying on people of Tibetan descent and transferring information to China's Ministry of State Security. The court found that, from 2015 to 2017, Gyantsan acquired information about personal relationships concerning Tibetans living and working in Sweden and abroad. This information included details about living conditions, family situations, political activities, and meetings with individuals of particular importance to the Chinese regime. Gyantsan regularly traveled to Poland for meetings with a representative of the MSS, receiving cash payments and reimbursement for his expenses.

OUTCOME

Conviction (22-months sentence)

- Safeguard Defenders on the case: https://safeguarddefenders.com/en/blog/tibetanrefugee-who-turned-spy-china-sweden
- Verdict: https://www.scribd.com/document/484821407/Dorjee-Gyantsan-dom



Location: Honolulu, Los Angeles, Washington, D.C.

Date(s):

- George Higginbotham charged on November 19, 2018
- Prakazrel 'Pras' Michel and Low Taek Jho charged on May 2, 2019
- Nickie Mali Lum Davis charged on August 17, 2020
- Elliot Broidy charged on October 6, 2020
- Nickie Mali Lum Davis sentenced on January 18, 2023
- Prakazrel "Pras" Michel convicted on April 26, 2023

Authority: United States District Court for the District of Hawaii, United States District Court for the Columbia

Suspect(s):

- Nickie Mali Lum Davis (U.S. citizen, businesswoman and consultant)
- Elliot Broidy (U.S. citizen, businessman, lobbyist)
- George Higginbotham (U.S. citizen, former senior congressional affairs specialist at the U.S. Department of Justice)
- Prakazrel 'Pras' Michel (U.S. citizen, rapper, businessman)
- Low Thaek Jow (also known as Jow Low, Malaysian businessman, alleged mastermind of 1MDB fraud)

Charge(s): Acting as agents of China and Malaysia without notifying the Attorney General of the United States

Relevant legal clause(s): Title 18, United States Code, Sections 371, 951.

DESCRIPTION

According to the documents of several cases covering the same events, from at least 2017 to 2018 the defendants were lobbying at the direction of PRC and Malaysian officials, thus acting as agents of foreign states, without notifying the U.S. Attorney General. The main charges are related to the Malaysian sovereign 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) fund, with charges including corruption, bribery, embezzlement, and money laundering. The perpetrators were also requested to assist with the extradition of Guo Wengui, sought by Chinese authorities. The request to persuade the Trump administration to extradite Wengui came from then-PRC Vice Minister Sun Lijun.



OUTCOME

- Nickie Mali Lum Davis conviction (two-year sentence and a \$250,000 fine)
- Elliot Broidy pleaded guilty and received a full presidential pardon
- George Higginbotham conviction (three-months probation)
- Prakazrel 'Pras' Michel conviction (sentence pending)
- Low Taek Jho remains at large

- U.S. Department of Justice press release on Nickie Mali Lum Davis: <u>https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/businesswoman-sentenced-facilitating-unregistered-lobbying-campaign-exchange-approximately-3</u>
- Information (indictment waived) Nickie Mali Lum Davis: <u>https://storage.courtlistener.</u> com/recap/gov.uscourts.hid.150762/gov.uscourts.hid.150762.1.0.pdf
- Case on CourtListener Nickie Mali Lum Davis: <u>https://www.courtlistener.com/</u> <u>docket/17470551/united-states-v-davis/</u>
- U.S. Department of Justice press release on Elliot Broidy: <u>https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/elliott-broidy-pleads-guilty-back-channel-lobbying-campaign-drop-1mdb-investigation-and</u>
- Information (indictment waived) Elliot Broidy: <u>https://storage.courtlistener.com/</u> recap/gov.uscourts.dcd.222876/gov.uscourts.dcd.222876.1.0_3.pdf
- Case on CourtListener Elliot Broidy: <u>https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/18519495/</u> united-states-v-broidy/
- U.S. Department of Justice press release on George Higginbotham: <u>https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-justice-department-employee-pleads-guilty-conspiracy-deceive-us-banks-about-millions</u>
- Factual basis for plea George Higginbotham: <u>https://www.justice.gov/media/979426/dl</u>
- Case on CourtListener George Higginbotham: <u>https://www.courtlistener.com/</u> <u>docket/8214913/united-states-v-higginbotham/</u>
- U.S. Department of Justice press release on Prakazrel 'Pras' Michel and Low Taek Jho: <u>https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-entertainer-convicted-engaging-foreign-influence-campaign</u>
- Case on CourtListener Prakazrel 'Pras' Michel and Low Taek Jho: <u>https://www.</u> <u>courtlistener.com/docket/15506078/united-states-v-michel/</u>
- Indictment Prakazrel 'Pras' Michel and Low Taek Jho: <u>https://storage.courtlistener.</u> com/recap/gov.uscourts.dcd.206879/gov.uscourts.dcd.206879.84.0_1.pdf

Location: State of Washington and elsewhere

Date(s): Indictment unsealed on July 21, 2020

Authority: United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Washington

Suspect(s):

- Li Xiaoyu (a.k.a. "OroOlxy", Chinese hacker)
- Dong Jiazhi (Chinese hacker)

Charge(s):

- Conspiracy to access without authorization and damage computers
- Conspiracy to commit theft of trade secrets
- Unauthorized access to computers
- Conspiracy to commit wire fraud
- Aggravated identity theft

Relevant legal clause(s): Title 18, United States Code, Sections 371, 1028A, 2, 1030(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(5)(A), (b), (c)(2)(B)(i-iii), 1343, 1349, 1832(a)(1-3), 1832(a)(5)

DESCRIPTION

The charges in this case primarily relate to hacking activities carried out by the suspects over a period of more than 10 years for their own financial gain. These alleged hackers exploited software vulnerabilities and stole information from victims' computers. Additionally, Xiaoyu and Jiazhi are accused of acting under the command of the PRC's Ministry of State Security (MSS) and other government bodies, which involved elements of transnational repression. According to the indictment, the suspects targeted U.S. and Canadian residents of Chinese descent who advocated for freedom and democracy in Hong Kong, hacking their email accounts.


OUTCOME

Trial pending, both suspects remain at large.

- U.S. Department of Justice press release: <u>https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-chinese-hackers-working-ministry-state-security-charged-global-computer-intrusion</u>
- Indictment: <u>https://www.justice.gov/media/1079581/dl</u>
- Case on CourtListener: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/17366551/united-states-v-xiaoyu/



Date(s):



- Criminal information on Rong Jing (separate proceeding) filed on March 3, 2021
- Indictment filed on May 12, 2021, superseding indictment on July 21, 2021
- Jury verdict against three defendants announced on June 20, 2023
- Sentences against three defendants to be announced in July 2024

Authority: United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York

Suspect(s):

- Hu Ji (citizen and resident of China, was a public security officer with the Wuhan Public Security Bureau)
- Li Minjun (citizen and resident of China, formerly a physician at the Hubei Xiangyang Canter Hospital in Xiangyang, China)
- Tu Lan (citizen and resident of China, prosecutor with the Hangyang People's Procuratorate)
- Zhu Feng (also known as Johnny Zhu, Chinese citizen, U.S. lawful resident until April 2017)
- Zhai Yongqiang (Chinese citizen, U.S. and Chinese resident)
- Zheng Congying (Chinese citizen, U.S. lawful resident)
- Zhu Yong (also known as Jason Zhu, Chinese citizen, U.S. lawful resident)
- Michael McMahon (U.S. citizen, former sergeant in the New York City Police Department, private investigator)
- Kuang Zebin (also known as Vincent Kuang, Chinese citizen, U.S. lawful resident)
- Hongru Jin (U.S. citizen, tour guide for PRC nationals)
- Rong Jing (Chinese citizen, U.S. lawful resident)

Charge(s):

- Interstate stalking, harassment, and intimidation of Xu Jin and his family members
- Acting as agents of the Chinese state without notifying the Attorney General of the United States
- Obstruction of justice

Relevant legal clause(s): Title 18, United States Code, Sections 371, 951 (a), 1512(c)(2), 1512(k), 2261A (1)(b)



DESCRIPTION

This case marked the first in a series of trials involving a victim of Operation Fox Hunt. Xu Jin, a former Chinese official who relocated to the U.S. in 2010 and settled in New Jersey, faced accusations of bribery and embezzlement from PRC authorities. Interpol issued a Red Notice at the PRC's request. In 2015, the PRC designated Xu Jin as a 'top-wanted fugitive'. According to the indictment, in 2016, Zhu Yong, a Chinese citizen residing in the U.S. with connections to PRC security forces, enlisted the services of Michael McMahon, a retired NYPD sergeant working as a private investigator, to gather information about Xu Jin and conduct surveillance on him. Simultaneously, Chinese citizen Zheng Congying and other defendants stalked, blackmailed, and threatened Xu Jin and his family members in an attempt to coerce him into returning to China and facing trial. These actions were orchestrated by Chinese officials Hu Ji and Tu Lan, who occasionally traveled to the U.S. to coordinate the entire operation. Alongside other defendants, they also brought Xu Jin's elderly father from China to the U.S., compelling him to persuade his son to return to China.

OUTCOME

- Zheng Congying, Zhu Yong, and Michael McMahon convicted on June 20, 2023, sentences to be announced on July 15 to 17, 2024
- Rong Jing pleaded guilty, sentence pending
- Kuang Zebin pleaded guilty, sentence pending
- Other trials pending, the rest of the defendants are mainly at large

- U.S. Department of Justice press release: <u>https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/eight-individuals-charged-conspiring-act-illegal-agents-people-s-republic-china</u>
- Complaint: <u>https://www.justice.gov/media/1101836/dl</u>
- Superseding indictment: https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.nyed.464107.76.0.pdf
- Information (indictment waived) Rong Jing: <u>https://safeguarddefenders.com/sites/</u> <u>default/files/Jing%20Rong%20information.pdf</u>
- Case on CourtListener Hu Ji et al.: <u>https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/59901751/</u> <u>united-states-v-ji-hu/</u>
- Case on CourtListener Rong Jing: <u>https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/59696206/</u> <u>united-states-v-rong/</u>

Date(s): Criminal complaint filed on February 18, 2022

Authority: Federal Bureau of Investigation

Suspect(s): Sun Hoi Ying (aka Sun Haiying)

Charge(s): Acting as an agent of the Chinese state without notifying the U.S. Attorney General

Relevant legal clause(s): Title 18, United States Code, Sections 371, 951.

DESCRIPTION

According to the request for an arrest warrant, from at least 2017 to 2022, Sun Hoi Ying, a Chinese citizen residing in New York, acted as a PRC agent as part of Operation Fox Hunt. Among other activities, he hired private investigators in the U.S. to collect personal information on targets of Operation Fox Hunt, labeled as 'fugitives' by the PRC. Sun allegedly exerted pressure on one of these targets to return to China, while the target's daughter, a U.S. citizen, was held against her will in the PRC for eight months after visiting family, in an attempt to coerce the 'fugitive' to return.

OUTCOME

The case is pending. The defendant is at large in China.

- U.S. Department of Justice press release: <u>https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/man-charged-</u> <u>transnational-repression-campaign-while-acting-illegal-agent-chinese-government</u>
- Complaint: <u>https://www.justice.gov/media/1215966/dl</u>
- Case on CourtListener: <u>https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/63203453/united-states-v-ying/</u>



Date(s): Amended complaint unsealed on March 16, 2022

Authority: Federal Bureau of Investigation

Suspect(s): Qiming Lin (citizen and resident of the PRC, believed to be a retired police officer who later joined China's Ministry of State Security)

Charge(s): Conspiracy to commit interstate stalking

Relevant legal clause(s): Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1028(a)(7), 1028(c)(3)(A), 1028(f)

DESCRIPTION

Around September 2021 a Brooklyn resident Yan Xiong, a former student leader of prodemocracy activists during the Tiananmen Square protests in Beijing in April 1989 who moved to the US in 1992, announced his plans to run for U.S. Congress. Shortly thereafter a private investigator active in New York contacted the FBI. The investigator reported that the defendant had contacted him and offered a collaboration to undermine Xiong's electoral campaign. According to monitored calls between the PI and the defendant, the measures suggested by Lin included manufacturing derogatory information about Xiong, physically harming him, and even setting up a car crash.

OUTCOME

Trial pending, the suspect remains at large

- U.S. Department of Justice press release: <u>https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/five-</u> individuals-charged-variously-stalking-harassing-and-spying-us-residents-behalf-prc-0
- Complaint and affidavit: <u>https://www.justice.gov/media/1213176/dl</u>
- Case on CourtListener: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/63162358/united-states-v-sealed/



Date(s):

- Complaint unsealed and Shujun Wang arrested on March 16, 2022 (later released on bail)
- Indictment filed on May 17, 2022

Authority: United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York

Suspect(s):

- Shujun Wang (naturalized U.S. citizen of Chinese descent, scholar, founder of New Yorkbased organization "Memorial Foundation" which overtly opposes the CCP)
- Feng He (also known as 'Boss He', citizen of China, director of the Guangdong State Security Bureau)
- Jie Ji (citizen of China, section chief at the Quingdao State Security Bureau)
- Ming Li (also known as 'Elder Tang' and 'Little Li', citizen of China, affiliated with the Guangdong State Security Bureau)
- Kejing Lu (also known as 'Boss Lu', citizen of China, division chief at the Quingdao State Security Bureau)

Charge(s):

- Acting as an agent of the Chinese State without notifying the U.S. Attorney General
- Illegal possession and transferring of means of identification of other persons (Chinese dissidents and pro-democracy activists)
- False statement during interviews with FBI and U.S. Customs and Border Protection onspiracy to commit interstate stalking

Relevant legal clause(s): Title 18, United States Code, Sections 371, 951(a), 1001(a)(2), 1028(a) (7), 1028(b)(2)(B), 1028(b)(5), 1028(c)(3)(A)

DESCRIPTION

According to the indictment, from at least 2005 until his arrest in 2022, Shujun Wang acted as an agent of the PRC. He allegedly utilized his position within the New York Chinese diaspora community to collect information on Chinese dissidents and human rights activists residing in the U.S. The information gathered was then transferred to the other four defendants, who were officials at the PRC Ministry of State Security (MSS) directing Wang's activities. Wang also received specific tasks from his coordinators, such as speaking with a particular person of interest for the MSS on a specific subject or attending specific events. At least one Hong Kong dissident, whom Wang reported on, was subsequently arrested by Chinese authorities.

OUTCOME

Shujun Wang's trial will start on July 15, 2024; the other defendants are at large in China.



Links

• U.S. Department of Justice press release: <u>https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/us-</u> citizen-and-four-chinese-intelligence-officers-charged-spying-prominent-pro

In simplified Chinese: <u>https://www.justice.gov/zh-hans/opa/pr/us-citizen-and-four-</u> <u>chinese-intelligence-officers-charged-spying-prominent-dissidents-human</u>

In traditional Chinese: <u>https://www.justice.gov/zh-hant/opa/pr/us-citizen-and-four-</u> chinese-intelligence-officers-charged-spying-prominent-dissidents-human

- Indictment: https://www.justice.gov/media/1223686/dl
- Case on CourtListener: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/63318653/united-states-v-wang/

Date(s): Two suspects arrested on May 15, 2022, Superseding indictment filed on July 6, 2022

Authority: United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York

Suspect(s):

- Fan "Frank" Liu (U.S. citizen born in China, president of a media company based in New York)
- Matthew Ziburis (former state correctional officer, bodyguard)
- Quiang "Jason" Sun (PRC-based employee of an international technology company headquartered in the PRC)
- Craig Miller (deportation officer to the Department of Homeland Security's Emergency Relief Operations in Minneapolis)
- Derrick Taylor (retired DHS law enforcement agent, private investigator)

Charge(s):

- Conspiracy to act as agents of the Chinese State without notifying the U.S. Attorney General.
- Conspiracy to bribe a public official (Internal Revenue Service employee)
- Conspiracy to engage in interstate harassment
- Misuse of means of identification (collecting of U.S.-based Chinese dissidents' personal details)
- Destroying evidence, thus obstructing justice
- False statements, while interrogated by FBI special agents

Relevant legal clause(s): Title 18, United States Code, Sections 201(b)(1)(C), 951(a), 1001(a) (2), 1028(a)(7), 1028(b)(2)(B), 1028(c)(3)(A), 1512(c)(1), 1512(c)(2), 2261A(1)(B)

DESCRIPTION

According to the indictment, Liu and Ziburis allegedly committed multifaceted harassment and stalking on Chinese dissidents in several U.S. states, commanded by China-based Son, who acted as a mediator between the defendants and PRC secret services. This included, for instance, plotting to destroy the artwork of a Chinese dissident artist residing in Los Angeles and planting surveillance equipment in his workplace and car. Another charge deals with planning to interview the dissidents in mock media sessions. Sun allegedly provided questions for these interviews, hoping that possible answers could humiliate or discredit the dissidents, and intending that these materials could be used in PRC propaganda materials targeting the dissidents. Alleged perpetrators also attempted to bribe an IRS employee to get information



on federal tax returns of one dissident that could possibly discredit him. Miller's and Taylor's role in the scheme is believed to be obtaining personal information of Chinese dissidents using access to Homeland Security data.

OUTCOME

On trial, Miller and Ziburis pleaded guilty, Quiang "Jason" Sun remains at large in ChinaCode, Sections 371, 951(a), 1001(a)(2), 1028(a)(7), 1028(b)(2)(B), 1028(b)(5), 1028(c)(3)(A)

- U.S. Department of Justice press release: <u>https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/five-men-indicted-crimes-related-transnational-repression-scheme-silence-critics-people-s</u>
- In simplified Chinese: https://www.justice.gov/zh-hans/opa/pr/five-men-indicted-crimes-related-transnational-repression-scheme-silence-critics-people-s
- In traditional Chinese: <u>https://www.justice.gov/zh-hant/opa/pr/five-men-indicted-</u> crimes-related-transnational-repression-scheme-silence-critics-people-s
- Superseding indictment: <u>https://www.justice.gov/media/1230031/dl</u>
- Case on CourtListener: <u>https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/64882692/united-states-v-liu/</u>

Date(s): Indictment unsealed and two defendants arrested on October 20, 2022

Authority: United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York

Suspect(s):

- Quanzhong An (Chinese citizen, U.S. lawful resident, businessman)
- Guangyang An (Chinese citizen, U.S. lawful resident, Quanzhong An's daughter)
- Tian Peng (citizen and resident of China, Chinese Communist Party functionary)
- Chenghua Chen (citizen and resident of China, CCP functionary)
- Chunde Ming (citizen and resident of China, CCP functionary)
- Xuexin Hou (citizen and resident of China, CCP functionary)
- Weidong Yuan (citizen and resident of China, Chinese government official)

Charge(s):

- Acting as an agent of the Chinese state without notifying the U.S. Attorney General
- Engaging in a money laundering scheme

Relevant legal clause(s): Title 18, United States Code, Sections 371, 951(a), 1952(a)(3)(A), 1952(b)(i)(2), 1956(h).

DESCRIPTION

A group of seven individuals is alleged to have participated in a scheme to force the repatriation of a Chinese national residing in the United States as part of 'Operation Fox Hunt.' The victim, a former general manager of a Chinese state-owned corporation, has been accused by Chinese authorities of embezzlement. The scheme, with Quanzhong An as the alleged main perpetrator, was executed from 2018 to 2022. It included threats to and harassment of the victim and his son, attempts to coerce the victim into returning to China and involuntarily bringing a family member of the victim from China to the United States with the task of persuading their family member to return. Quanzhong An received instructions from provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection officials and visited China to discuss the ongoing operation in person at least twice. Quanzhong An and Guangyang An are also charged with engaging in a money laundering scheme, involving the transfer of millions of dollars from China to the United States.

OUTCOME

Two defendants were arrested (later released on bail) and are now on trial, while the other five are at large in China.



Links

• U.S. Department of Justice press release: <u>https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/six-individuals-charged-conspiring-act-illegal-agents-peoples-republic-china-0</u>

In simplified Chinese: <u>https://www.justice.gov/zh-hans/opa/pr/two-arrested-and-13-charged-three-separate-cases-alleged-participation-malign-schemes-united</u>

In traditional Chinese: <u>https://www.justice.gov/zh-hant/opa/pr/two-arrested-and-13-charged-three-separate-cases-alleged-participation-malign-schemes-united</u>

- Indictment: https://www.justice.gov/media/1254316/dl
- Case on CourtListener: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/65599528/united-states-v-an/

Date(s): Suspects arrested on April 17, 2023 (later released on bond), Indictment filed on August 2, 2023

Authority: United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York

Suspect(s):

- Lu Jianwang (also known as "Harry Lu", U.S. citizen of Chinese descent)
- Chen Jinping (U.S. citizen of Chinese descent)

Charge(s): Conspiracy to act as an agent of China's government without prior notification to the Attorney General of the United States

Relevant legal clause(s): Title 18, United States Code, Sections 371, 1512(c)(1)

DESCRIPTION

Two U.S. citizens of Chinese descent, residing in New York, were arrested for allegedly setting up an illegal Chinese overseas 'police station' in Lower Manhattan in early 2022. While officially claiming to be just a representative office for administrative purposes (for example, to reissue driving licenses to Chinese citizens living in New York), this 'police station' was also active in intimidating Chinese dissidents per instructions of the PRC Ministry of Public Security (MSS). This included stalking Chinese persons of interest for the MPS and attempting to coerce them into returning to China by threatening harm to their family members.

OUTCOME

Trial pending

Links

• U.S. Department of Justice press release: <u>https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/two-individuals-arrested-operating-undeclared-police-station-chinese-government</u>

In simplified Chinese: <u>https://www.justice.gov/zh-hans/opa/pr/two-arrested-operating-illegal-overseas-police-station-chinese-government</u>

In traditional Chinese: <u>https://www.justice.gov/zh-hant/opa/pr/two-arrested-operating-illegal-overseas-police-station-chinese-government</u>

- Indictment: https://safeguarddefenders.com/sites/default/files/Lu%20Jianwang%2C%20
 Chen%20Jinping%20indictment.pdf
- Case on CourtListener: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/67663021/united-states-v-jianwang/





O UNITED STATES

Location: New York and the rest of the country (since online activities are involved)

Date(s): Complaints unsealed on April 17, 2023



Authority: Federal Bureau of Investigation

Suspect(s): Yunpeng Bai, Zhichen Chen, Cainan Gao, Hongting Gao, Xiaohui Hu, Chunhui Huang, Yi Jin, Qiang Ju, Bolun Li, Xuan Li, Xueyang Li, Zhefeng Li, Shuang Liang, Yuqiong Lin, Zhaoxi Liu, Shihui Miao, Liangtian Shi, Yang Song, Yang Song, Jinyan Tan, Chunjie Wang, Shipeng Wang, Jianxun Wen, Shuo Xi, Yue Xi, Yanan Xu, Zhen Xu, Wenfeng Xue, Dalin Yang, Miao Yang, Yina Yin, Miao Yu, Di Zhang, Guoqiang Zhou, Xinjiang Jin, Yuanyuan Chen, Yibin Fu, Yiwen Huang, Tao Jin, Zhiyang Liu, Zhenhua Shen, Guorong Song, Xinning Tian, Wei Xu.

Charge(s):

- Illegal possession and transferring of means of identification of other persons
- Interstate communication containing threats
- Stalking via internet

Relevant legal clause(s): Title 18, United States Code, Sections 371, 875(c), 1028 (a)(7), 1028(f), 2261(A)(2)(B)

DESCRIPTION

Two cases involving a total of 44 defendants, with 40 believed to be officers of the PRC's Ministry of State Security (MSS). In the first scenario, the alleged perpetrators created thousands of fake social media accounts to threaten, harass, and intimidate opponents of the PRC regime residing in the U.S. and worldwide. Their activities ranged from disseminating PRC propaganda to composing articles and videos based on tasks assigned by the MSS, disrupting video conferences of Chinese dissidents with threats and flooding, and more. The second case, dating back to 2020, involves using work access to internal protocols of Zoom (where one of the defendants was employed) to prevent Chinese dissidents from organizing calls and video conferences and to block them. This included actions such as shutting down meetings commemorating the victims of the Tiananmen Square massacre.

OUTCOME

All the defendants are at large, either in China or elsewhere in Asia.

- U.S. Department of Justice press release: <u>https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/40-officers-</u> china-s-national-police-charged-transnational-repression-schemes-targeting-us
- Case #1 on CourtListener: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/67206453/united-states-v-bai/
- Case #1 complaint and affidavit: https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.nyed.495471.2.0.pdf
- Case #2 on CourtListener: <u>https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/18756735/united-</u> states-v-jin/
- Case #2 complaint and affidavit: <u>https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.</u> nyed.456138/gov.uscourts.nyed.456138.1.0.pdf

Location: Boston, Massachusetts

Date(s):

- Indictment filed on May 4, 2023
- Suspect arrested on May 9, 2023 (later released on bond)

Authority: Assistant United States Attorney for the District of Massachusetts

Suspect(s): Litang Liang (U.S. citizen, owner of a Chinese restaurant in Boston, co-founder of the New England Alliance for the Peaceful Unification of China)

Charge(s): Acting as an agent of the Chinese state without notifying the U.S. Attorney General

Relevant legal clause(s): Title 18, United States Code, Section 951

DESCRIPTION

According to the indictment, between approximately 2018 and 2022, Liang consistently communicated with several PRC government officials, providing them with information about Chinese dissidents residing in the Boston area. The indictment highlights that Liang was also allegedly involved in orchestrating counter-protests against local pro-democracy activists who had expressed support for the anti-extradition protests in Hong Kong in 2019.

OUTCOME

Trial pending

- U.S. Department of Justice press release: <u>https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/</u> <u>massachusetts-man-indicted-acting-illegal-agent-people-s-republic-china</u>
- Indictment: https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.mad.256659/gov.uscourts.mad.256659.l0.pdf
- Case on CourtListener: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/67351577/united-states-v-liang/



Date(s): Indictment filed on June 9, 2023

Authority: United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York

Suspect(s):

- John Chen (also known as Chen Jun, U.S. citizen and resident)
- Lin Feng (Chinese citizen, U.S. lawful resident)

Charge(s):

- Acting as agents of the Chinese State without notifying the U.S. Attorney General
- Bribing a public official
- Conspiracy to commit international money laundering

Relevant legal clause(s): Title 18, United States Code, Sections 201(b)(1), 951, 1956(h)

DESCRIPTION

From at least January 2023 to May 2023, Chen and Feng allegedly participated in a scheme directed by the PRC to revoke the tax-exempt status of a legal entity run by Falun Gong practitioners in the U.S. The defendants purportedly offered \$5,000 in cash bribes to an undercover FBI officer, whom they believed to be an employee of the Internal Revenue Service. They also promised to provide additional payment for his further assistance in initiating an audit of the Falun Gong organization and revoking its tax-exempt status. Chen and Feng allegedly received instructions and bribe money from a PRC government official.

OUTCOME

Trial pending

- U.S. Department of Justice press release: <u>https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/illegal-agents-prc-government-charged-prc-directed-bribery-scheme</u>
- Indictment: <u>https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.nysd.600237/gov.uscourts.nysd.600237.3.0.pdf</u>
- Case on CourtListener: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/67494607/united-states-v-chen/





Location: Vancouver

Date(s): Suspect arrested on July 18, 2023 (later released on bail)





Authority: Court of Québec

Suspect(s): William Majcher (retired Royal Canadian Mounted Police officer)

Charge(s): Preparatory acts and conspiracy to conduct foreign interference on behalf of China

Relevant legal clause(s): Security of Information Act, Sections 22, 23

DESCRIPTION

In 2007, William Majher retired from the police after more than 20 years of service and moved to Hong Kong, where he established a consulting business entity. In 2023, during one of his visits to Canada, he was arrested at the airport and charged with using his knowledge and extensive network of contacts in Canada to obtain intelligence or services for the benefit of the PRC. According to the police report and media sources, Majher was allegedly attempting to locate and intimidate Kevin Sun, a Vancouver-based real estate entrepreneur who had fled from China, to coerce him into returning to the PRC. Other potential instances of acting in favor of China include assembling a dossier on the World Uyghur Congress and its leaders.



Trial pending

Link

Case coverage by "The Globe and Mail": <u>https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-rcmp-officer-charged-bc-entrepreneur/</u>



Location: New York and worldwide (since online activities are involved)

Date(s): Indictment unsealed on March 25, 2024

Authority: United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York

Suspect(s):

- Ni Gaobin (citizen of China, hacker)
- Weng Ming (citizen of China, hacker)
- Cheng Feng (citizen of China, hacker)
- Peng Yaowen (citizen of China, hacker)
- Sun Xiaohui (citizen of China, hacker)
- Xiong Wang (citizen of China, hacker)
- Zhao Guanzhong (citizen of China, hacker)

Charge(s):

- Conspiracy to commit computer intrusions
- Wire fraud conspiracy

Relevant legal clause(s): Title 18, United States Code, Sections 371, 981(a)(1)(C), 982(a)(2), 982(b)(1), 1030(i)(1), 1030(i)(2).

DESCRIPTION:

Along with other hackers and intelligence officers from China's Ministry of State Security (MSS), the defendants allegedly were members of a hacking group operating in China. This group is known as Advanced Persistent Threat 31 (APT31). Operating under the guidance of the MSS's Hubei State Security Department, located in the city of Wuhan, the defendants reportedly sent over 10,000 malicious emails containing hidden tracking links and links that installed malware on the victims' computers. The group used several types of custom malware, including self-created ones. As a result, they gained unauthorized access to the victims' data and tracked their activities. Through this hacker group, the MSS targeted a diverse range of individuals and companies of interest to the Chinese government. This included politicians, government officials in the United States and other countries (including "all European Members of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC)), U.S. election campaign staff members, IT managed service providers, and companies in defense, telecommunications, and research industries. The same day, the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, Finland, and Denmark all attributed cyberattacks on parliamentary emails to the same group. Additionally, overseas Chinese dissidents and opponents of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), particularly Hong Kong pro-democracy activists located in the United States and other countries, were also victims, which highlights an element of transnational repression in this case.



OUTCOME:

Trial pending, the alleged perpetrators remain at large, presumably in China

Links

- U.S. Department of Justice press release: <u>https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/seven-hackers-associated-chinese-government-charged-computer-intrusions-targeting-perceived</u>
- Indictment: https://www.justice.gov/opa/media/1345141/dl
- Case on CourtListener: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/68371314/united-states-v-gaobin/

ANNEX III: (Attempted) Forced Returns Cases Reported by Non-PRC Sources

Legend

- Persuade to return operation conducted from within China through telecommunication and pressure on family and relatives back home (PCN)
- Persuade to return operation conducted overseas in direct contact with the target abroad by PRC agents or their proxies (POS)
- Repatriation without legal remedies conducted by PRC agents abroad in conjunction with local counterparts (REP)
- Luring or Entrapment operation conducted by PRC agents in cooperation with local counterparts (L&E)
- Formal extradition proceedings with simultaneous persuasion to induce the target to refrain from fully enjoying judicial safeguards (ET)
- Kidnapping on foreign territory (KID)
- Numbered entries highlighted in orange indicate successful return operations; entries in blue indicate a failed attempt.

#	Country	Year	Name CN	Name Pinyin	Foreign Nationality	Return Method	Target country collaboration	Operation	Data source
	Australia	2015	郑介甫	Zheng Jiefu		POS			<u>Media</u>
1	Australia	2016	周世勤	Zhou Shiqin		PCN		Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	<u>Media</u>
	Australia	2016	吉东升	Ji Dongsheng		PCN		Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	<u>Media</u>
	Australia	2020	洞物员	Dong Wuyuan Zoo (fake name)		PCN			<u>Media</u>
	Canada	2017		Tursunjan Rouzi		PCN			NGO
	Canada	2018	谢卫东	Xie Weidong		PCN - POS			<u>Media</u>
	Canada	2021		Arzu* (pseudonym)		PCN			NGO
	Canada	~2021		Hu Wei	Canada	PCN - POS		Fox Hunt, Interpol Red Notice	<u>Media</u>
	Cyprus	2022		Ma Chau		PCN - ET			<u>NGO, NGO Media</u>



#	Country	Year	Name CN	Name Pinyin	Foreign Nationality	Return Method	Target country collaboration	Operation	Data source
	Cyprus	2022		Liu Lingshuang (Ma Chau's wife)		PCN		Interpol Red Notice	<u>NGO, NGO Media</u>
2	Egypt	2016		Abdusemi Turdi		PCN			<u>Xinjiang Victims Database</u>
3	Egypt	2016		Bakihaji Helil		PCN			<u>Media</u>
4	Egypt	2016	阿卜杜外 力•如则	Abduweli Rozi		PCN			Xinjiang Victims Database
5	Egypt	2016		Adil Abdurazaq		PCN			Xinjiang Victims Database
6	Egypt	2016		Mahire (Adil Abdurazaq's wife)		PCN			Xinjiang Victims Database
7	Egypt	2016		Adil Abdurazaq's son 1		PCN			Xinjiang Victims Database
8	Egypt	2016		Adil Abdurazaq's son 2		PCN			Xinjiang Victims Database
9	Egypt	2016		Elanur Esqer		PCN			Xinjiang Victims Database
10	Egypt	2016		Hesenjan Abdusemet		PCN			Xinjiang Victims Database
11	Egypt	2016		Bilal Hesen (Elanur Esqer's child)		PCN			<u>Xinjiang Victims Database</u>
12	Egypt	2016		Bushira Hesen (Elanur Esqer's child)		PCN			Xinjiang Victims Database
13	Egypt	2017		Ezimet Seyit'akhun		PCN			<u>Media</u>
14	Egypt	2017		Ibrahim Seyit'akhun		PCN			<u>Media</u>

#	Country	Year	Name CN	Name Pinyin	Foreign Nationality	Return Method	Target country collaboration	Operation	Data source
15	Egypt	2017	麦麦提江• 艾麦提	Memetjan Emet (Muhammetjan Emet)		REP	Egyptian police		<u>Xinjiang Victims Database</u>
16	Egypt	2017		Hezreteli Tursun		PCN			Xinjiang Victims Database
17	Egypt	2017		Bumeryem Muhemmed		PCN			<u>Xinjiang Victims Database</u> , <u>Media</u>
18	Egypt	2017		Muhter Rozi (Bumeryem Muhemmed's husband)		REP	Egyptian police		<u>Xinjiang Victims Database</u> , <u>Media</u>
19	France	2017	郑宁	Zheng Ning		POS		Interpol Red Notice	<u>Media</u>
20	Hong Kong	2015	李波	Lee Bo	United Kingdom	KID			<u>Media</u>
21	Hong Kong	2017	肖建华	Xiao Jianhua	Canada	KID			<u>Media</u>
22	Indonesia	2020		Ahmet Mahmud	Türkiye	REP	Indonesian authorities		<u>Media, Media</u>
23	Indonesia	2020		Altinci Bayram	Türkiye	REP	Indonesian authorities		<u>Media, Media</u>
24	Indonesia	2020		Abdul Basit Tuzer	Türkiye	REP	Indonesian authorities		<u>Media, Media</u>
25	Indonesia	2022		Ahmet Bozoglan	Türkiye	REP	Indonesian authorities		<u>Media, Media</u>
	Israel	2017		Tahir Imin		PCN			<u>Media, Media</u>
26	Japan	2021	米芮.艾 尔肯	Mihriay Erkin		PCN			<u>Media</u>
27	Kazakhstan	2017	阿斯哈·阿 孜提别克	Asqar Azatbek	Kazakh	KID			<u>Media, Xinjiang Victims</u> <u>Database</u>
	Kazakhstan	2018		Sayragul Sauytbai		ET			<u>NGO, NGO</u>
	Kazakhstan	2019~		Gulpiya Qazybek		PCN - L&E			<u>Media</u>



#	Country	Year	Name CN	Name Pinyin	Foreign Nationality	Return Method	Target country collaboration	Operation	Data source
	Kazakhstan	2019~		Erbaqyt Otarbay		PCN	Kazakh police		<u>Academic research</u>
28	Laos	2023	杨泽伟(乔 鑫鑫)	Yang Zewei (Qiao Xinxin)		PCN - REP	Laotian police, a leader of Hunan Chamber of Commerce in Laos		<u>Media, NGO</u>
29	Laos	2023	卢思位	Lu Siwei		REP	Laotian police		NGO
	Malta	2023		N/A (a couple)		REP	Maltese Immigration Appeals Board		NGO
	Malta	2023		N/A (a couple)		REP	Maltese Immigration Appeals Board		NGO
30	Mongolia	2014	达赖巴特 尔	Dalaibaatar Dovchin		REP	Mongolian police		NGO
31	Mongolia	2014	图力古尔	Tulguur Norovrinchen		REP	Mongolian police		NGO
32	Mongolia	2023	拉幕札部	Lhamjab Borjigin		PCN - POS - KID or REP	Mongolian police (?)		NGO, NGO
	Morocco	2021	依地热斯・ 艾山	Yidiresi Aishan (Idris Hasan)		L&E - ET	Moroccan authorities	Interpol Red Notice	NGO, NGO
33	Myanmar	2015	唐志顺	Tang Zhishun		REP	Burmese authorities		<u>NGO, Media</u>
34	Myanmar	2015	幸清贤	Xing Qingxian		REP	Burmese authorities		NGO, <u>Media</u>
35	Myanmar	2015	包卓轩	Bao Zhuoxuan		REP	Burmese authorities		<u>NGO, Media</u>
	Netherlands	?		Yunus Tohti's brother (Maybe Eli Tohti)		PCN			NGO
	Netherlands	2021	凯尔比努 尔·赛迪克	Qelbinur Sedik		PCN			<u>Media</u>
	Saudi Arabia	2020- ongoing		Hemdullah Abduweli		L&E (+ REP?)	Saudi authorities		NGO

#	Country	Year	Name CN	Name Pinyin	Foreign Nationality	Return Method	Target country collaboration	Operation	Data source
	Saudi Arabia	2020 - ongoing		Nurmemet Rozi		L&E (+ REP?)	Saudi authorities		<u>NGO</u>
	Saudi Arabia	2022 - ongoing		Abula Buheliqiemu		L&E (+ REP?)	Saudi authorities		NGO
	Saudi Arabia	2022 - ongoing		Baibure Miremaiti		L&E (+ REP?)	Saudi authorities		NGO
	South Korea	2021	陈宇镇	Chen Yuzhen		PCN			<u>Media</u>
	Sweden	2015		Patigul Talip		PCN			<u>Uyghur Tribunal</u>
36	Thailand	2015	桂民海	Gui Minhai		KID	Thai authorities		NGO
37	Thailand, Vietnam	2015 & 2022	董广平	Dong Guangping		REP	Thai authorities		<u>Media</u>
38	Thailand	2015	姜野飞	Jiang Yefei		REP	Thai authorities		<u>Media</u>
39	Thailand	2016	李新	Li Xin		KID			<u>Media</u>
	Thailand	2017	陈桂秋	Chen Guiqiu		PCN - POS - REP	Thai authorities, local Chinese in Thailand who might work with the PRC Embassy		<u>Media, NGO</u>
	Thailand	2017		Chen Guiqiu's daughter 1		PCN - POS - REP	Thai authorities, local Chinese in Thailand who might work with the PRC Embassy		<u>Media, NGO</u>
	Thailand	2017		Chen Guiqiu's daughter 2		PCN - POS - REP	Thai authorities, local Chinese in Thailand who might work with the PRC Chinese Embassy		<u>Media, NGO</u>
	Thailand	2018	颜克芬	Yan Kefen		POS	Thai authorities		<u>Media</u>
	Thailand	2018	刘兴联	Liu Xinglian		POS	Thai authorities		<u>Media</u>
	Thailand	2019	邢鉴	Xing Jian		REP	Thai authorities	Interpol Red Notice	<u>Media, Media</u>
	Türkiye	2017		Melikzat Habibul		PCN			<u>Uyghur Tribunal</u>



#	Country	Year	Name CN	Name Pinyin	Foreign Nationality	Return Method	Target country collaboration	Operation	Data source
	Türkiye	2017		Kuduse Abdukader (Melikzat Habibul's husband)		PCN			<u>Uyghur Tribunal</u>
40	Türkiye, Tajikistan	2019		Zinnetgul Tursun		L&E -REP	Turkish authorities, Tajik authorities		<u>Media, Xinjiang Victims</u> <u>Database</u>
41	Türkiye, Tajikistan	2019		Hilal Shehinur (Zinnetgul Tursun's daughter)		L&E -REP	Turkish authorities, Tajik authorities		<u>Media, Xinjiang Victims</u> <u>Database</u>
42	Türkiye, Tajikistan	2019		Banu Abdullah (Zinnetgul Tursun's daughter)		L&E -REP	Turkish authorities, Tajik authorities		<u>Media, Xinjiang Victims</u> <u>Database</u>
43	United Arab Emirates	2017	牙生江·麦 麦提依明	Yasinjan Memtimin		REP	UAE authorities	Interpol Red Notice	Xinjiang Victims Database
44	United Arab Emirates	2017		Osmanjan Omer		REP	UAE authorities		<u>Media, Xinjiang Victims</u> <u>Database</u>
45	United Arab Emirates	2017	伊敏托合 提玉荪	Huseyin Imintohti		L&E -REP	Turkish authorities & UAE authorities		<u>NGO, Media</u>
46	United Arab Emirates	2018	塔利普	Ahmad Talip		REP	UAE authorities	Interpol Red Notice	<u>NGO, Media</u>
47	USA	2016	杨秀珠	Yang Xiuzhu		PCN - REP	U.S. authorities	Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	<u>Media</u>
	USA	2017	徐进	Xu Jin		PCN - POS		Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	<u>Government</u>
	USA	2017	刘芳	Liu Fang		PCN - POS		Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	<u>Government</u>
48	USA	2017	郭欣	Guo Xin		PCN		Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	<u>Media</u>

#	Country	Year	Name CN	Name Pinyin	Foreign Nationality	Return Method	Target country collaboration	Operation	Data source
	USA	2017	邱耿敏	Qiu Gengmin		PCN - POS		Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	<u>Media</u>
	USA	2017	郭文贵	Guo Wengui		POS			NGO
	USA	2018	李刚	Li Gang		PCN - POS			<u>Media</u>
	USA	2018	彭旭峰	Peng Xufeng		PCN - POS		Sky Net, Interpol Red Notice	<u>Media</u>
	USA	2018	贾斯语	Jia Siyu		PCN - POS		Sky Net	<u>Media</u>
	USA	2018	刘昌明	Liu Changming		PCN		Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	<u>Media</u>
49	USA	2019	肖建明	Xiao Jianming		PCN		Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	<u>Media</u>
	USA	2020	徐维铭	Xu Weiming		PCN		Sky Net, 100 most-wanted Red Notice list	Media
	USA	2020	萨米拉・ 伊明	Samira Imin		PCN			Media



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