中国领事的志愿者

On June 29th 2023, the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Consular Protection and Assistance [中华人民共和国领事保护与协助条例] were adopted by the State Council. They entered into force on September 1^st.

The Decree was issued roughly one month after the adopted G7 Hiroshima Leaders’ Communiqué of May 20, 2023, which included a dedicated China-section. Among the positions outlined, one stood out to us: “We call on China to act in accordance with its obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna Convention on Consular relations, and not to conduct interference activities aimed at undermining the security and safety of our communities, the integrity of our democratic institutions and our economic prosperity.”  

The generic rebuke reads as a partial response to reports on the establishment of so-called “overseas police service centers” by Chinese public security authorities in close cooperation with the United Front Work Department and its sprawling transnational repression activities aimed at suppressing the fundamental freedoms of diaspora communities (and not only them) around the world.

Attentive readers of our December 2022 report Patrol and Persuade may remember the express reference made to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Its opening articles (1 to 5) clearly stipulate the rules under which consular functions are to be exercised in any host country. We note in particular the provision in article 3 that “Consular functions are exercised by consular posts” (as defined in article 1) and in article 4 that “A consular post may be established in the territory of the receiving State only with that State’s consent. […] The consent of the receiving State shall also be required if a consulate-general or a consulate desires to open a vice-consulate or a consular agency in a locality other than that in which it is itself established. The prior express consent of the receiving State shall also be required for the opening of an office forming part of an existing consular post elsewhere than at the seat thereof.”

The Convention leaves little room for interpretation. Yet in typical PRC fashion the State Council resolved to “legalize” a practice they had been conducting abroad since at least 2013 - redolent of the infamous ‘rule by law’ system where grey zone or previously illegal practices are codified in China’s domestic legislation. In fact, a Ministry of Justice note on the Regulations states: “[…] some effective practices accumulated in the practice of Chinese consular protection and assistance need to be solidified at the level of the rule of law to promote the long-term development of this work” whereas “a system of consular protection and assistance with Chinese characteristics is gradually forming.”

In what otherwise seems like a rather bland decree on consular protection and assistance that repeats the need to abide by international law and the consent of the host country, concluding articles 24 and 25 add a special category: consular volunteers.

Article 24 The State encourages relevant organizations and individuals to provide voluntary services for consular protection and assistance. The state encourages and supports insurance companies, emergency rescue agencies, law firms and other social forces to participate in consular protection and assistance. 

Article 25 Organizations and individuals that have made outstanding contributions to consular protection and assistance shall be commended and rewarded in accordance with the relevant provisions of the State. 

These provisions – which were notably absent from the March 26, 2018, draft Regulation circulated by the Foreign Ministry for public comment - are cited as highlights in the aforementioned Ministry of Justice note on the Significance and highlights of the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Consular Protection and Assistance, and further underlined during a joint press conference by the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Innocent-looking enough, is it not? One might even argue this is further proof of what the PRC authorities have been saying all year in response to the reports on overseas police contact points, e.g. that they were solely providing assistance to overseas communities in need. We would argue otherwise, but let’s go back to the beginning.

If some of those cities ring a familiar bell, that should not come as a surprise. While we wish to emphasize that these consular liaisons are not the same as the so-called “overseas police service centers” in terms of their instituting authority [for the purposes of its previous reporting on the matter, Safeguard Defenders narrowly defined the “overseas police service centers” as those established by a public security authority in China], the networks of associations and individuals on which these platforms are run are indeed the same and frequently overlap.

Once again, the individuals named during consular volunteer commendation ceremonies or training events have direct and demonstrable ties to the CCP’s United Front.

The United Front linkage runs deeper than the individual volunteers involved. As an example, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office pops up in a 2021 Consulate General symposium for consular volunteers in Rio de Janeiro. Similarly, a training activity held during a 2023 Consular Assistance Volunteer Appointment Ceremony and Training Exchange Meeting at the Consulate General in Florence, Italy, was reportedly conducted by the same Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO), an external name used for the CCP’s United Front Work Department.

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) describes the latter as “a complex and opaque set of organisations designed to advance the CCP’s influence in industry and civil society. Within China, the united front system has several responsibilities, which range from repressing ethnic minorities in Tibet and Xinjiang to grooming members of China’s minor political parties to take up positions in government. But in addition to its extensive activities inside the country, the united front system acts as a liaison and amplifier for many other official and unofficial Chinese organisations engaged in shaping international public opinion of China, monitoring and reporting on the activities of the Chinese diaspora, and serving as access points for foreign technology transfer.” 

The 2022-2023 report from the French Parliamentary delegation on intelligence states: “The Middle Kingdom has entered a new phase, where interference strategy occupies a central place, around the concept of “United Front”. This policy designed and deployed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) consists of hindering its internal and external enemies, controlling groups that can challenge its authority, building a coalition around the Party to serve its interests and projecting its influence abroad. […] To carry out its power strategy, China uses different levers of action [among which] the use of diasporas which represent 40 to 60 million people in the world, including 600,000 in France. The strength of the Chinese intelligence and interference system abroad relies on the support provided by this diaspora, particularly in the fight against the ‘five poisons’ which are considered threats to the stability of the CCP’s power: democrats, Falun Gong, Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang. […]” 

In fact, these ‘threats’ are never far away. In a December 2019 consular volunteer meeting by the Strasbourg Consulate General relates Consul General Ling Jun’s “introduction of the spirit of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, and expression of his views on the recent situation in Hong Kong, the passage of Xinjiang-related laws by the United States and other issues, and conveyed China's solemn position”.

At an August 2022 symposium by the Consulate General in Manchester, during which consular assistance volunteer certificates were issued, then-Consul General Zheng “stressed that the white paper ‘Taiwan Issues and the Cause of China's Reunification in the New Era’ published by the Chinese government once again solemnly demonstrated the strong determination of the Chinese government and the Chinese people to unswervingly promote the complete reunification of the motherland. The criminal attempt of ‘Taiwan independence’ elements to split the motherland and the sinister use of anti-China forces in the United States and the West to hinder China's unification will surely is bound to fail. It is hoped that the overseas Chinese community in the territory will continue to unite, hold the banner of anti-independence high and make new contributions to the cause of reunification of the motherland and the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation in the new era.” 

The United Kingdom’s House of Commons Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament 2023 China report notes: “The Chinese authorities take a strong interest in the political views and activities of the Chinese diaspora overseas. […] Notwithstanding the size of the Chinese population, the JIC Chair told us: ‘China will be seeking in some cases no doubt to coerce [the Chinese diaspora in the UK], but certainly to encourage [it] to follow a line which is consistent with China’s interests.’”

Most apt in the current context is the summary provided by the German Marshall Fund’s Alliance for Securing Democracy (ASD) of a January 2022 Federal Canadian court decision that “upheld a decision identifying the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO), an administration that is part of the CCP’s United Front Work Department (UFWD), as an entity that engages in espionage and acts “contrary to Canada’s interests.” The ruling upheld a Canadian official’s denial of permanent Canadian residence to a Chinese citizen owing to their more than 20-year employment with the OCAO. Officially, the OCAO manages overseas issues related to China, including liaising with the Chinese diaspora. However, in court, Canadian Immigration argued “that the nature of OCAO’s interactions with the overseas Chinese communities, the information gathered, and the intended use of the gathered information is surreptitious,” — an assertation the judge upheld. UFWD is the CCP agency responsible for ensuring Party control of PRC society, including Chinese businesspeople and members of the Chinese diaspora, and has been linked to cases of political interference around the world.”

If China hadn’t adopted the Decree so soon after the Hiroshima G7 communique, this piece might not have been published.

First of all because there is a real risk of mistaking trees for the forest. We believe these are but iterations of what is inherently the nature of the beast: the CCP’s continued quest for establishing long-arm control over its diaspora communities.

Secondly, right or wrong as a practice may be, our prime concern is and must always be with the targeted diaspora communities and the potential unintended harm reporting may create.

Nobody should seek to excuse United Front activity or diminish its nefarious impact. But neither should we fail to acknowledge the impact of sensationalised reporting, which may have contributed to what some Party-state outlets have called ‘demonisation of overseas Chinese’. The wide nets of suspicion cast over the entire community may be harmful and risk further isolating community members overseas from their democratic hosts.

However, we would also posit that this feature is a direct – and possibly intended – consequence of the Party-state’s behavior and policies. It is abundantly clear that its so-called people-centered approach does not care about the harm its activities may bring to overseas communities or even the legal ramifications and potential criminal liabilities it may expose its undeclared proxies in third countries to, as long as it serves the Party interest and hold on power.

This is particularly painful in the context of the enhanced cooption of some long-standing community aid groups by the United Front over the past decade(s). Unfortunately, the Party-state linkage that was reinforced under Xi Jinping [in quoting from Hidden Hand: Exposing How the Chinese Communist Party is Reshaping the World (2020) by Mareike Ohlberg and Clive Hamilton: “At the 19^th Party Congress in 2017, Xi famously used a quotation from Mao to explain the role of the Party in China: ‘Government, military, society and schools, north, south, east and west – the party rules everything’.”] and that cannot conceive of independent civil society leaves little room to those that genuinely set out to help their fellow diaspora compatriots but to comply with Party edicts.

For this reason, we will not publish any lists of those that are statedly involved in the consular volunteer practice but rather renew our recommendation to lawful authorities to examine the practice and those that may be involved in this and other activities on behalf or at the behest of the Party-state. We further continue to recommend all officials and stakeholders in democratic societies to refrain from legitimizing such associations and individuals by partaking in their activities.

As we have previously stressed, the dual role played by these networks in influence activities within their local environments on the one hand, and the exertion of control against dissent within overseas communities on the other, appears as a key feature of these set-ups. The former role of often-time long-term engagement with local officials and opinion-makers in third countries directly contributes to the legitimization of individuals and organizations, which in turn fuels distrust towards those same officials and opinion-makers in those that may fall victim to the United Front’s or other CCP agency’s repressive activities.