South Africa's first extradition to China

The extradition was framed as an example of commitment to bilateral judicial and law enforcement cooperation; an overall success. Mr. Chen Fujia, a 63-year-old Chinese national, was accused of defrauding the Chinese government of 120 million RMB through an unregistered foreign currency exchange business. It is the first extradition from South Africa to China since a bilateral treaty took effect in November 2004 – and the extradition was not reported on as a single event but as “hunt.”

As reported in Inside Politics, South African Police Spokesperson Athlenda Mathe stated, “We received an extradition order from the Minister of Justice on the 20th of January. Three days ago, the Chinese delegation arrived, and we held a meeting with them. They not only alerted us on this particular fugitive, but also on 18 others we are searching for. Eleven are on Red Notices and we are still actively searching.”

Chinese state media celebrated the extradition as a “commitment of China and South Africa to combat cross-border crime and marks a significant step in enhancing bilateral judicial and law enforcement cooperation.”

Notably, the Chinese government’s formal extradition request submitted to South Africa included a series of “assurances” regarding the extradition. The assurances are general and framed in broad, declaratory terms – they largely amount to commitments to comply with China’s own legal system. 

The assurances (from original Chinese documents, translated into English) included are

1. 非政治性 / Nonpolitical nature
被请求引渡人陈富家所涉案件为普通刑事犯罪,不涉及政治犯罪、军事犯罪,亦不涉及基于种族、宗教、国籍等原因的歧视或迫害。
The case involving the requested person, Chen Fujia, constitutes an ordinary criminal offense and does not involve political or military crimes, nor does it involve discrimination or persecution based on race, religion, nationality, or other status.

2. 不适用死刑 / No death penalty
本案所涉罪名不适用死刑,中方将依法在法定刑幅度内追究其刑事责任。
The offense in this case does not carry the death penalty, and China will pursue criminal liability within the applicable statutory sentencing range.

3. 诉讼权利保障 / Fair trial and procedural rights
中方将依法保障陈富家的各项诉讼权利,包括其依法享有的辩护权和上诉权。
China will guarantee Chen Fujia’s procedural rights in accordance with the law, including the right to defense and the right to appeal.

4. 基本权利保障(羁押期间) / Protection of fundamental rights (during detention)
中方将依法保障被请求引渡人在羁押期间的基本权利,包括人身安全权、受教育权和获得医疗服务的权利。
China will ensure the requested person’s fundamental rights during detention, including personal safety, access to education, and access to medical care.

5. 符合法律及国际标准 / Compliance with law and international standards
中方将确保相关诉讼程序符合中国法律及联合国《囚犯待遇最低限度标准规则》等国际标准。
China will ensure that the relevant proceedings comply with Chinese law and with international standards, including the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.

6. 罪名限定原则(专一性原则) / Principle of specialty
中方保证仅就引渡请求所述罪行追究刑事责任,未经同意不就其他罪行追诉。
China guarantees that prosecution will be limited to the offenses specified in the extradition request and will not extend to other offenses without consent.

When states receive a request for an extradition, there is not an automatic obligation to do send the individual to the requesting state. Extradition procedures often rely on treaties between countries – such as the treaty touted in this case. But there is no duty to extradite under international law; there is, however, a duty to ensure that in sending the person to the requesting country, that the individual will not be at risk of torture.

As the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights explains, the principle of non-refoulement prohibits, under all circumstances (even if there is a treaty in place), the transfer or removal of an individual from one State to another where there are “substantial grounds for believing that the person would be at risk of irreparable harm upon return, including persecution, torture, ill-treatment or other serious human rights violation.”

South Africa and China signed a bilateral extradition treaty in 2001 and simultaneously a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty. Those treaties entered into force in 2004. Then, in 2014, China launched Operation Fox Hunt, and in 2015 Operation Sky Net – and in 2015 the Forum on China-African Cooperation (FOCAC) launched a series of security initiatives and the “China-Africa Peace and Security Plan.” 

This “peace and security cooperation” framework included police training programs, equipment transfers, and information-sharing channels. China steadfastly maintained its “noninterference” stance – conveniently invoked whenever other nations or the UN commented on China’s human rights records – all while deepening influence and active role in other states. As Paul Nantulya reported in the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, in 2016, Kenyan police worked with the Chinese People’s Armed Police to round up 44 Taiwanese nationals and sent them to China – some who had already been acquitted in a Kenyan court. The move overrode the domestic courts and Kenya’s judiciary. 

Police cooperation and extradition agreements have only continued to flourish since that time. Michael Kovrig reported in ChinaFile that: “The 2018 FOCAC plan of action goes even further, calling for an ongoing China-Africa Peace and Security Forum and China-Africa Law Enforcement and Security Forum, and commits both sides to more intelligence sharing. It also pledges to support programs in consular services, immigration, justice, and law enforcement, including running an annual anti-corruption course that aims to train 100 African officials by 2021. For police, there will be more exchanges, donations of equipment and training, and formalized engagement with the African Police Cooperation Organisation.”

Now – in South Africa – the first extradition of what may be many has taken place. It reflects not only the activation of a long-dormant treaty, but the normalization of cooperation with a system that has repeatedly operated outside formal legal channels. China’s growing use of formal extradition sits alongside a well-documented system of coercive overseas returns, even as it continues to invoke “non-interference” to resist scrutiny of its own practices. 

South Africa's non-refoulement obligation did not dissolve when the extradition treaty entered into force. It did not dissolve when FOCAC declared the bilateral relationship an “all-weather community with a shared future.” It did not dissolve when a Chinese delegation arrived at South African Police Service headquarters with a list of names, eleven of whom were already subject to Interpol Red Notices. The duty to ensure that a transferred individual will not face torture or serious ill-treatment is absolute – it applies, as the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has made clear, under all circumstances, even when a treaty is in place. In the Chen Fujia case, that duty appears not to have been discharged. Whether it will be discharged for the eighteen individuals still being “hunted” remains to be seen.